heresy and nonsense. The distinction of persons cannot be more truly and aptly represented, than by the distinction between three men. For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are as really three distinct persons, as Peter, James, and John. We must allow the Divine persons to be real substantial beings."

Mr. How, of high reputation among Calvinists, regards "the divine persons as three distinct individuals, necessarily existing, spiritual beings, who formed together the most delicious society!" A society of Gods, it must be, for one God could not make a society!

Dr. Waterland considers person and intelligent being to be the same. Mr. Locke defines person to be a thinking intelligent being. Dr. Doddridge says, "the word person commonly signifies one single, intelligent, voluntary agent, or conscious being; and this we choose to call the philosophical sense of the word; but in a political sense it may express the different relations supported by the same political person; the same man may be father, husband," &c. And afterwards he says, "if it be inquired in what sense the word person is used in the proposition respecting the three persons in the Godhead, we answer, it must at least be true in a political sense, yet cannot amount to so much as a philosophical personality, unless we allow a plurality of Gods."

Dr. South makes the persons to be "internal relations of one substance of Deity to itself."

Dr. Wallace makes them external relations of the Deity to mankind. Zanky says, "a person is

nothing but the divine essence distinguished, and, as it were, individuated by certain personal property." Junius thinks the persons are distinguished from the essence, in notion only.

Mr. Baxter says, "there is in God a trinity of essential, formal, inadequate conceptions or primalities, viz. vital active power, intellect, and will."

How again supposes that there are three distinct, eternal Spirits, or distinct intelligent hypotheses, which, on account of their consent, affection, and mutual self-consciousness, may be called the one God." Dr. Waterland, Abraham Taylor, and many others make three proper distinct persons, entirely equal to and independent on each other, yet making up one and the same being.

Dr. Watts held to one supreme God willing in the human nature of Christ, which he supposes existed the first of all creatures, and speaks of the Logos, as the wisdom of God, and the Holy Spirit, as the divine power, or influence and effect of it, which he says is a scriptural person.

Dr. Tillotson, instead of saying three persons in the Godhead, says three differences; Bishop Burnet says three diversities; Dr. Wallis, three somewhats, and Archbishop Secker says three subsistencies. And some have substituted, in place of these three vexatious persons, a threefold distinction, they know not what, but they say that there must be a distinction of a threefold nature in the Deity. St. Augustine, when asked what the three are, said, "Human language is scanty and affords not terms

Some

to express it, it is therefore answered, three persons, not as if that was to the purpose, but somewhat must be said, and we must not be silent." have made the three persons to be three attributes of Deity, as his wisdom, power, and goodness. And there have been many other strange notions upon this subject. But what pity it is, that nothing can be found in the Bible, that bears any resemblance to any of them.

But before entering upon the consideration of the evidence, relative to the Trinity, I must observe that it will be necessary to carry constantly along with us the most essential, fundamental parts of the doctrine, such as that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each separately is God, is Lord, is almighty, is eternal, is omniscient, is uncreated, &c.; and that the Father alone has an underived essence and existence; that the Son is begotten of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit proceedeth from the Father and the Son; that the three persons, (though each is God, Lord, &c.,) after having hitched on to them, the technical term (as they call it) of persons, (a term nowhere applied to them in the Bible,) are but one God, one Lord, &c.; and although the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, all three have but one nature, yet one of them, the Son alone has two natures! A part contains twice as much as the whole! New axiom! What need have we of further evidence? The very statement alone of the doctrine contradicts and confounds it. But as the subject is of great importance, since the doctrine has ("per fas,

aut nefas") taken possession of the minds of a great part of the Christian world, I shall proceed to consider the evidence relative to the subject, as though it were possible, and even probable, that the doctrine might be true.

CHAPTER XII.

THE EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO THE TRINITY CONSIDERED.

We shall now attempt to produce all the most important and material evidence concerning the doctrine of the Trinity. It must be acknowledged, that the doctrine, in whatever form or words it is stated, is an affirmative proposition, and according to the established rules of evidence must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. We may not take for granted, that it is true, and then require the opponents to prove the negative. We must first support the affirmative, by at least primâ facie evidence. I will therefore proceed to examine the proof in support of the doctrine; first observing, that no conclusive evidence can be obtained, but what is produced from the revelation of God himself; as there is no other being who can of himself have any underived knowledge on the subject. I will commence with the beginning of the written revelation, not because I consider the Old Testament as perfect, clear, and conclusive upon this subject, as the New; but because it is first in order of time. It would, however, be natural to expect that the Almighty, in making his first revelation to his intelligent creatures, would fully reveal himself, his essential character, his existence, and his mode of existence, if there was anything peculiar in that; that he would make