"I did not receive your Excellency's Letter till my return from Head quarters last Evening, or I should have comply'd with your requisition sooner.

"I have before given my reasons for being against exposeing this Army to a Winters Campaign in their present condition. I would add to them the present Temper of the soldiery, who I am convinced are very gener❜ly against it.

"The practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia I have look'd upon to be entirely out of the question since your Excellency's return from viewing the Enemy's Works.

"As to the Aid of the Militia, I cannot be brought to think they will be of any in such an attempt. I am inclined to think whilst this Boddy were assembling we should loose more Continental officers & soldiers by waiting for them in the Field, then double the value of them that would arrive. Experience shewes that few Militia can be brought to stand in the line of Battle, & it would be deceiving ourselves to expect them upon this creation to march up to the attack of the Enemy's Works.

"If such an attack is to be made, I would advise it to be put in execution Immediately with the Force we have in the Field, because I think we are stronger than we shall be any time this winter. it is possible our numbers may encrease, but our real strength will diminish.

"Without some new light could be thrown upon this matter, or other reasons urged then I heard at the late

Council, I am clearly against either making a winter's Campaign, or attacking the Enemy's works.

"I have the Honour to be your Excellencys

"Most Obedt humble Serv

"W WOODFORD."

"DR SIR

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON.

"I have from the first moment it was suggested to your Excellency, that an attack on Philadelphia this winter with the aid of Militia was practicable and promised success,' kept in mind the desirable object; have compaired and viewed it in every light, and on every ground I could place it, and after mature consideration on the matter cannot promise a single Advantage that would justifie the measure, nor can I see the least prospect of anything honorable or advantagious by adopting it. On the other hand I foresee numberless Obstacles to retard, and perplex that with sober reasoning stares any man in the face who views it with an impartial eye, places it on a military scale, and reflects on what human nature is.-It has been found, I believe, by most of your Officers who you have advised with on the matter, that your Continental Force is far, very far, Inadequate to an attack on the enemies lines, in their present strength and situation.-Operations like those proposed, are of too extensive a nature to carry into sudden execution. Reasons sufficiently cogent, must diminish your force every day you keep the field at this season of the year, and to resolve on the measure, ensures a winters Campaign to this Army, which in their Circumstances also ensures certain destruction to great part of them, without the Aid of an enemy-your principle dependence must then be on the Militia, to carry this important matter into execution. Glory and our Countries good is no doubt what every upright soldier would wish to obtain, but we may be too keen in pursuit of it, and like the Dogs in the fable, suffer the substance to escape while we Grasp at the Shadow.—I would only mention to y' Excellency some Difficulties that occur

in drawing a sufficient force of Militia together for this purpose, and providing for them; particularly at a season of the year when our Fields, and Rivers are Ice & Snow.-Covering we have not for them when they arrive, Hospital Stores we could not furnish for the numbers that would fall sick by being exposed to the severity of the winter, nor do I know that even provisions & forrage, could be procured with any degree of certainty, which shorely should be rendered beyond a doubt in such cases; take the matter still on a more extensive scale. Every one that reflects on human nature and considers mankind at large must know how reluctantly they relinquish the ease and more calmer pleasures of domestick & social life to share the hardships & Fatigue of a Camp, even in more pleasant weather than what winter generally affords us. Men that are not taught and compelled to obey, will never render service, and Obedience & perseverance is not to be expected from a permiscuous body of men drawn together from all Quarters of the Globe, ware they to assemble, but you would find one half would desert in their way to Camp, others probably might arive, a day or two before their time of service expired. No object on Earth would keep them afterwards, nor could an [ ] influence them after their time was out. What would follow must be distressing to an exalted mind. You would find your regular Troops by this time much Diminished. They must bare the burthen of all necessary duties, in such cases, while this body of men are collecting,-expensive preparations are daily accumulating. The Eyes of the Continent are turned towards you. Much speculation on the practicability of the expedition terminating with success, which you at last find yourself obliged to relinquish, leaving the unthinking world (who want nothing more to blast reputation than a miscarriage, without inquiring into it's causes,) at liberty to sensure boath you & army.-Your Excellency is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments respecting this Army-it is Sir the Bullwork of America and should be nursed and cherished as the salvator of her Liberties. The Troops that compose it are not more than mortal, and

cannot work Maricles. The bravest spirits may be exausted by uncommon, and constant fatigue. And Sir, there is not in my Opinion an Object on the Continent that justifies subjecting them, at this particular time, to a winters Campaign, unless there was a moral certainty of obtaining that Object, and with it, a perminant and honorable end to any further Hostilities. I give it therefore as my clear Opinion, that keeping this Army in the Field for the purpose of attacking Philadelphia, under the uncertainty of sufficient aid and support of Militia, is by no means Advisable, and am Sir, with high esteem

"Yr Excellencies most obed Serv

"Your Excellency was pleas'd to desire the Opinion of your General Officers on 'The Adviseability of a Winters Campaign, & practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia, with the Aid of a considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled at an appointed Time & place.' I must Confess that to me this Question seems so much interwoven, with the Question your Excellency was pleasd to put a few days ago, that I can hardly seperate them: The main point, I conceive, is still, whether a Winters Campaign is practicable; if not, the last Question falls of Course, unless the Time is the Spring. A Winter's Campaign to me, seems not only unadviseable, on account of our Situation, but impracticable, at least if I am to Judge of other Brigades by my own; one single Regt of mine have turned out Ninety Men unfit for duty, on Account of Shoes & other Necessarys. The Sick become Numerous, & the Men, notwithstanding the utmost Care of their Officers, will be Frostbitten, & subject to many other disorders, if they are to keep the Field, until the Militia can be collected, which if we are to Judge from

the past, cannot be done in less than two Months-in the meantime it cannot be expected that the Enemy will remain Idle, Their Works will be Continued, Their Vessells who are now before the Town, will not only furnish them with Cannon, but with Marines, Sailors &c., so that in all probability, before the Militia can be collected an Attack will be thought impracticable, upon the same Grounds & perhaps with more reason than at present.-At the Time when this Hint was first thrown out in Council, I was pleasd with it, there seemd a probability of success; but I had no Idea, that a Winter's Campaign was so closely Connected with the plan, which in my Opinion would prove more fatal to the Army under your Excellencys Comand than an unfortunate Attack on the Town-but I am far from thinking the plan ought to be dropped entirely. If the Army was to go into Winter Quarters where the Men could be refreshd & Clothd, & remain there untill the latter end of March; the Militia could be Collected in the meantime. Then a Vigorous Attack could be made with a probability of success.

"Thus I have given your Excellency my Sentiments on the Question proposd, as Clear as the shortness of the time I had for Consideration would permit me, which was only a few Minutes this Morning. The utility of hearing a Question debated is great, at least to a Young SoldierShould the Question be decided otherwise your Excellency may be assured that any part entrusted to me shall be executed with the greatest Chearfullness.

"Your Excellencys Most Obed & very humble Servt "P: MUHLENBERG."

"SIR

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT.

"WHITE MARSH, 4th Dec 1777

"I rec" your Excellencys letter of yesterday. I well remember the proposition made. I then thought there was a probability of Success in such an attempt, but after your Excellency returnd from Reconoitring the Enemy's Lines