Dolphin checked this movement and gave the Spaniards an opportunity to escape.

The bodies of about forty dead Spaniards were found in the vicinity of the block-house and eighteen prisoners were taken. The Cubans had two men killed and four wounded, and the marines two wounded, while twentythree were overcome by the intense heat. In truth, the heat seemed more deadly than Spanish bullets, which were fired without regard to aim. This affair ended the conflict, the Spanish having been too severely punished to make any new assault on the camp of the marines.

The experience of the marines taught some useful lessons. It showed that the Spaniards were shrewd and daring bush-fighters, and that American camps needed to be carefully protected against night attacks. It also proved that bullets from magazine rifles might be wasted at an extraordinary rate without execution under the shades of night. In the daylight attacks the Spaniards had concealed themselves in the brush by wearing plantain leaves on their foreheads in place of hats. They also, wearing bark-colored trousers and tying green branches round their waists, had shown themselves able to move slowly across open spaces without being detected. Another trick was to make a moving screen of two or three large palm leaves, which formed an excellent disguise in the chaparral, from which stunted palms everywhere rose.

The Cuban allies far surpassed the marines in detecting these tricks, with which they were thoroughly familiar, having often practised them against the Spaniards. These men, mostly negroes, were keen-eyed woodsmen, well versed in bush-fighting, in which they displayed a daring that called forth American admiration. But they

were wildly reckless in handling the magazine rifles with which they had been supplied, and as wretched in marksmanship as the Spanish troops.

The final engagement in the bay of Guantanamo was the shelling, on June 16, of the fort and earthworks at Caimanera, a town on the west side of the bay some distance inward from the camp of the marines. These works were demolished, and all resistance was brought to an end. On the same day the fleet made a third bombardment of the forts at the mouth of Santiago harbor, with the exception of the Morro, where Lieutenant Hobson was supposed to be confined. The affair continued for about an hour, the Spaniards replying briskly but wildly, while in the end most of their guns were abandoned. Not a ship was struck nor a man hurt on the American side. On the other hand, the batteries showed signs of being seriously injured, and many of their guns appeared to be dismounted.

The interesting feature of this affair, however, was the work of the dynamite boat Vesuvius. The dynamite guns carried by this vessel had been tried with good effect on land, but they had never been tested at sea, and the dread that the gun-cotton cartridges might explode within the tubes and blow the vessel to fragments made naval officers fearful of them. In consequence, the Vesuvius had been used as a despatch-boat, and only on this occasion was permission given for a trial of her guns. At midnight of the day preceding the bombardment she drew cautiously in and fired three of her 250-pound projectiles with perfect safety to the vessel. From two of these no report came. The third exploded with terrific violence on Cayo Smith, a frightful fiery gleam illuminating the harbor. From the ships the next

morning a deep crater appeared on the side of the island, though subsequent observation indicated that no great harm had been done. On June 24 the Vesuvius performed a service of a different character, entering the harbor at night and passing unobserved around the wreck of the Merrimac. The result of the reconnoissance was to prove that the channel had not been closed, and that a battle-ship could pass in safety on either side of the sunken collier.

On the 20th occurred the first landing of officers of the regular army on Cuban soil. This was at Ascerraderos, twelve miles west of Santiago, where General Garcia had established his camp. General Shafter, commander of the army of invasion, with his staff, landed for a conference with the Cuban general, accompanied by Admiral Sampson and his chief of staff. No soldiers or sailors were landed, the escort of ragged Cuban soldiers sufficing. The meeting took place in a very picturesque location, on the summit of a high cliff that overlooked a valley green with the royal palm, while beyond the white breakers at the beach stretched far away the calm blue sea, dotted thickly with transports and ships-of

war.

The three commanders took their seats under the palm-leaf roof of an open hut on which the sun's rays fell hotly. Outside stood five half-naked negro sentries, and beyond were grouped hundreds of Cubans, officers and men commingled, conversing as well as they could with the staff-officers from the fleet.

Plans for the coming attack on Santiago were discussed and arrangements for the co-operation of the allied forces settled, a map of the surrounding country being frequently consulted. This done, the conference

ended, the three principal actors in the drama about to be played bade one another adieu, and the Americans returned to their boats, leaving their Cuban allies to seek again their lurking-places in the brush.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ARMY OF INVASION.

ON the 23d of April President McKinley, as already stated, called forth a volunteer force of 125,000 men for two years' service, apportioning them among the States and Territories in accordance with population. These were recruited from the existing National Guard organizations, vacancies being filled under a very careful system of health inspection. On May 23 a second call was issued, for 75,000 men, under similar conditions, though without restriction to the National Guards. The regular army was also increased by filling up the regiments to their full quotas, its limit being 62,000 men, and several special forces were called for, making the total strength of the army, when fully recruited, 278,500

men.

This force was to be made up as follows: Regular army, 62,000; volunteer, first call, 125,000, second call, 75,000; three special cavalry regiments, 3000; new engineer force, 3500; and ten regiments of volunteer infantry immune from yellow fever, 10,000. The last, composed of men who had recovered from or been exposed to this fever, were intended for use in infected districts. The first assignment of commanding officers, made public May 16, included the following majorgenerals Wesley Merritt, in command of the Department of the Pacific (including the Philippines); John R. Brooke, in command of the First Corps and the De