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ings which it has in the examples. We begin with the preposition κατά. .
The primary meaning of Kará is down. Now, all downward motion has a natural and fixed point, where it terminates ; namely, the surface of the earth. Here the falling stone and the falling flakes of snow stop ; and here, when it has found the lowest possible point, the running brook ceases to flow. As, therefore, all downward motion has in nature a fixed point of termination, it follows, conversely, first, that all actions which are contemplated purely with regard to their termination in space may naturally be denoted by the preposition that signifies down. Hence, katandéw = to sail to land, because that is the natural point where the voyage terminates ; katanéuto = to send from the inland to the sea-coast, because there the journey must end ; katakleiw = to shut, as a door, because ihe door-post is the fixed point where the motion ceases και καταπορεύομαι to come back, that is, to the point which is regarded as the person's restingplace ; karádapıyıs = a reflection, because the light has met an object and illuminated it. Secondly, actions contemplated merely with regard to their termination, though not in space, are naturally expressed by aid of this preposition. Hence karatéuvo = to cut in pieces, that is, till the cutting is done ; kateobío = to eat up, consume, * that is, until the action ceases because there is nothing left to eat ; katapetyw = to take refuge, to escape, that is, to flee (peúyo), until the action comes to its natural end, which may either be by reaching some place where the pursuer cannot follow, and then it means to take refuge ; or, it may be, by distancing the pursuer, and then it means to escape.
From the foregoing analysis it is seen why kará, more than any other preposition, gives an intensive, and often a transitive force to the verbs with which it is connected. Other prepositions, as éní, mpós, point to an object in connection with the verb, but they denote some more specific relation than kará, and consequently do not so often give objective force to the verb. In this connection, we recognize the ground of
the usage of Kará signifying according to, in conformity with, as κατά φύσιν, κατά τύχην. As down is the natural direction of things in space, every action that is done naturally, fitly, in its own sphere, may properly have this quality signified by the preposition down ; thus κατά το αληθές, κατά το δίκαιον, and other like expressions.
This analysis will rescue from the frigid interpretation that is sometimes given them a class of words in which Kará conveys the idea of disparagement, disapproval, condemnation ; as Katakpivo = to condemn ; karadoków = to think against one. It has been said that, in this class of words, Kará has its primitive meaning, down. This is, at least, an unnatural interpretation, and entirely gratuitous. We have seen, that even in regard to actions which happen in space, kará often loses its primary, and bears a derived, meaning. In actions purely moral, then, we should much more naturally expect to find this derived signification. The word Katakpivo signifies, strictly, to make one the object of a discriminating judgment; and this comes to be equivalent to condemn, by a well known mental law ; namely, that acts of judgment are called forth not by what is in harmony with ourselves, but by what in some way offends us. It is not the innocent whose conduct is marked for special notice, but the guilty ; hence, an act of judgment is, in general, an act of blame.
If with these brief indications of a logical treatment of the preposition, we open the lexicon, and examine the mass of explanations arrayed under the word, we shall see at once the want of a better method, and shall find more or less that is erroneous, and calculated only to mislead the student. The following is an instance of this : «τοξεύειν κατά τινος, κατά OKOTOû, etc., to shoot at, because the arrow falls down upon its mark.” Nothing can be worse for the student's mind than such pretended explanations as this. They cheat him of the knowledge they ought to impart, and what is worse, they substitute an absurdity in the guise of knowledge in its place. The notion of down has not the least share in the interpretation of the phrase in question. Grant that the arrow does descend somewhat before it reaches the mark, still this descent is so inconsiderable that it could form no appreciable part of the picture to the observer's eye ; consequently, it could never have suggested the necessity of employing a word to describe it. The true interpretation has already
been suggested ; kará is employed because the mark is the point at which the action is to terminate ; and the genitive case is used, because the designed, and not the actual, termination is asserted.
We proceed now to examine the uses of the preposition åyá in connection with its primary signification as applied to things in space. The original meaning of ảvá is up. All upward motion has a natural and fixed point of departure ; namely, the surface of the earth. From this as its starting point it extends into space without any definite limit, or point of termination. All upward motion, then, has a definite beginning, and no definite termination; it follows, therefore, first, that actions in space which start from a fixed and known point, and pass into indefinite regions, may naturally be expressed by the aid of this preposition; as avandéw = to sail from port to sea, from a fixed and known point of departure into an indefinite region ; åvaßaivo = to go from the coast into the interior of a country, applied especially to an army landing, and making its progress into an unknown region ; avoiyo = to open, as a door. Secondly, actions contemplated as commencing will naturally be described by the aid of åvá; as avakalw = to kindle, to rouse ; àvoðúpopar = to break out into wailing ; ávaxopeúo = to begin a choral dance. Thirdly, as the natural motion of things is downward, an action which opposes a thing in its natural motion may be denoted by this preposition; as åvakpots = to check, as a horse by drawing the reins, or as a . ship by reversing the motion of the oars. By extending this idea, we come naturally to the notion of repeated action ; for if the opposing force be sufficiently increased, it will stop the motion of the thing it opposes, and reverse it, causing it to retrace its former course ; hence, in the fourth place, åvá gives the idea of repeated action ; as åvayetpéw = to measure again ; åvapáxoua = to renew the fight ; ávaxwpéw = to go back.
In the case of both these prepositions we have taken no notice of instances in which they have their primary signification, these being too obvious to require remark.
In some words, the force of åvá and Kará in composition seems at first view to be nearly the same ; but here a close examination will show that each has its peculiar force. Thus, avaipéw and kabapéw may both mean to destroy; but the former means to destroy by displacing, the latter by deVOL. LXIV. — NO. 135.
him.” As that on, or over, which (inép) a man stands is essential to his position, the preposition imép is here used to mark the permanent relation between Socrates and certain points of duty and belief, which relation made up his character; while the transient relation of his judges to him is denoted by nepi. The prepositions ånó and mapá, both with the genitive case, signify from ; but as mapá, originally signifying beside of, denotes a more intimate relation than ånó, it is used when a thing is naturally resident in the person from whom it proceeds, -as an inheritance from a father, commands from a sovereign ; while ámró, meaning off from, denotes a merely superficial relation, and is used when one thing comes accidentally, as it were, from another.
The prepositions imó and após may both, with the genitive case, point to the remote agent, the person who causes the action; but imó merely denotes that the action takes place under the person's power ; após brings the remote and immediate agent face to face, and pictures the latter as receiving the command from the mouth of the other. Hence, the whole sad picture presented in the προς άλλης ιστoν υφαίνοις of Homer; ; where the captive Andromache must stand before the face of her mistress, take her commands, and go and do her bidding.
The preceding are but a few instances, which a full discussion of the subject would multiply, showing the importance of a strict logical method in treating of this part of the language. When we say, that this method is essential in order to make sure that the ordinary definitions of words shall be given correctly in the lexicon, it may seem that we assume too much; the position, however, is strictly true. No amount of toil and care will save the lexicographer from palpable mistakes, unless he has the light of guiding principles. If he starts with an indefinite notion of a preposition, and does not, by logical forecast, keep the field of inquiry narrow before him, his lexicon will show confusion through the whole circle of words into which the preposition enters. Nowhere more than here should the inquirer remember, that prudens quæstio dimidium est scientiæ.
We have an illustration of this in hand. The verb åvaklaiw is defined in the larger lexicon before us, “to weep aloud, to burst into tears; also, with the accusative, to weep for, bewail, both in Herod. 3. 14.” Now the natural question suggested by the analysis of the preposition is, Is the