lies with them to treat us with justifiable contempt, or whip us into

sense.

The new President has been evidently partial to the French nation," in all his negociations. The last publication of suppressed documents prove the assertion beyoud all doubt or contradiction. And even this non-intercourse law, has a tendency the same way. Whilst all trade and all intercourse between us and any port in the actual possession of the English and French is prohibited; we find the terms of expression so guarded as to admit the construction of an admission to trade with Holland, by which, if it can be prosecuted, Napoleon will derive nearly all the benefit which could result to him from a trade directly with France. If Holland is not a dependency of France, when governed by a French king, what reason is there for doubting, as Mr. Gallatin does, about granting clearances to the kingdom of Italy? But the effect of this new law on the morals of this community, will be to the laft degree deplorable; it erects a system of commerce which will probably be extensive, but which will be the most corrupt that can possibly be imagined. England will be supplied indirectly through Portugal, with cotton, and we shall pay the additional expences in the manufactures, which we shall inevitably receive in return, through Canada. Of course, our most solemn oaths, will be a mere formulary of words; and the frequent repetition of falsehood will at last make us believe it of no importance. This pretended panacea for the diseases of the political body, will be universal in its operation; but the malady will not be removed.

Mr. Madison's address on taking the oath of office seems to us replete with misrepresentation and cant. Among the proofs of what he denominates the unrivalled growth of our faculties and resources,' which distinguished this country, until lately, he enumerates' le progress of manufactures and useful arts ;' than which no assertion can be more erroneous. There is, perhaps, no country so little distinguished for manufactures as this; and the circumstance of the general illsuccess of all manufacturing schemes is a proof of our great prosperity in other respects. Placed as this nation has been in a situation so singularly advantageous, as to enjoy all the advantages of war, without any of its evils; we owe all our prosperity to our distance from the scenes of warfare; and to the contempt with which we were for a long time viewed by the belligerent powers. The benign influence of our republican institutions,' as Mr. Madison so affectedly styles them, has had nothing to do in producing the effect. It was in the nature of things, that our commercial spirit should promote the prosperity which the peculiar state of our foreign affairs invited us to enjoy. The hostility to that enjoyment was first promulgated by Mr. Jefferson; and Mr. Madison, in his famous resolutions in 1794, seconded the endeav

our.

Mr. Madison then makes the following assertion; it has been the true glory of the United States to cultivate peace by observing justice, and to entitle themselves to the respect of the nations at war by fulfilling their neutral obligations, with the most scrupulous impartiality. If there be truth or candor in the world, the truth of these assertions will not be questioned. Posterity will at length do justice to them.' We generally doubt the sincerity of an observation, where such an evident wish appears that it may seem to be true. This question of

and he hopes to

partiality is undoubtedly Mr. Madison's sore place, salve it over, or wrap it up in an appeal to the candor and truth of the world.' We do believe him, notwithstanding all this parade, to have been always decidedly partial to the interests of France, and in as great a degree hostile to the views of Great-Britain.

His arguments on the question of impressment were evidently dictated by such hostility; for it is clear that the claim of the British in searching a foreign merchant vessel for deserters, is in its nature equally just, with the undoubted right of searching a neutral vessel for contraband goods. The reasoning in both cases will equally apply. The exceptions taken by Mr. Madison to the course the British have pursued, are applicable exclusively to the practice of that nation, and do not affect the right at all. The long pamphlets, which he has written expressly for the purpose of making British hostility evident, where there was never any intended; the apparent insincerity of the negociations on the British treaty, by Messrs. Munroe and Pinckney, who followed his instructions; and more recently his correspondence with Mr. Rose, on the Chesapeak disaster, afford ample evidence of his willingness to irritate, and unwillingness to heal the wound inflicted on us by Great-Britain. His conduct in regard to France is equally instructive of his partiality. His suppressed correspondence with General Armstrong, as disgraceful to his honour as it is pernicious in its tendency, would not leave us any doubts upon the subject, even if we were otherwise unsatisfied. His abject fear of the French emperour, his tone of supplication, and his invariable style of communicating his sentiments form a contrast with his deportment towards Great-Britain, as striking as it is instructive. Indeed it was not until the Federalists made some very severe strictures on the conduct of the administration, particularly as respected their foreign partialities, and until this opinion began to gain circulation, that we heard any thing from government about French hostility; and we believe the Berlin decree would have been si lently acquiesced in,or only formally noticed,if such bold truths had not been told by the Federalists. Then indeed, the tone of the administration at home began to change; and France was coupled with England in our state papers. But in France what Napoleon's impression of our hostility was, can be collected from General Armstrong's letter to Mr. Madison, in which he expresses his belief that our measures will never

go beyond words, words, words, that we dare not declare war against France, any more than the minister of foreign relations dare mention our commercial pretensions to the irritable emperour. This impression of Napoleon's is made more evident by his publick expression concerning us; "the allies of France and the United States sacrifice, with a resolution equally generous, their private conveniences, in repelling from all points the English commerce.' Thus we are, in the opinion of the emperour, coupled with France, in resisting the British nation. What our negociations with the French ministry to authorise such a conviction must have been, it is more easy to imagine than decide.

From such an opinion as we entertain of Mr. Madison's sincerity, we cannot believe the following sentence, that in the fulfillment of his duty as President, among other motives which will actuate him, he intends to cherish peace and friendly intercourse with all nations, haying correspondent dispositions; to maintain sincere neutrality towards the belligerent nations; to prefer in all cases, amicable discussion and reasonable accommodation of differences, to a decision of them by an appeal to arms; to exclude foreign intrigues and foreign partialities, so degrading to all countries, and so baneful to free ones.'

We should have thought Mr. Madison had better have omitted any mention of Mr. Jefferson, than thus to satirise him; after saying he has the good fortune to have the path in which he is to tread, lighted by examples of services the most illustrious, he proceeds to observe : 'Of those of my immediate predecessor it might least become me here to speak; I may, however, be pardoned for not suppressing the sympathy with which my heart is full, in the rich reward he enjoys in the benedictions of a beloved country; gratefully bestowed for exalted talents, zealously devoted through a long career, to the advancement of its highest interests and happiness.'

The 'benedictions of a beloved country' is an expression evidently ironical. A fifteen months embargo, his negociations abroad, hypocrisy at home, and the universal distress in which he has left the United States produce the strongest probability that the 'benedictions' of which Mr. Madison speaks, more resemble hatred and execration.

SPANISH AFFAIRS.

TO place too strong a reliance on the militia of a country is the general fault of visionary politicians. Courage, honour, personal strength, and patriotick motives may do very well for a little time; but they will soon give way to steadiness, concert, superiour discipline and tacticks. The experience of all

great generals, from Carthaginian Hannibal to Russian Suwarrow, proves the truth of this assertion. There is scarcely an instance where levies of militia, suddenly raised, have ever made any long stand against regular troops. It is real service and the practice of tactical knowledge, that will make soldiers, better than all the theory which can be invented. The Prussians, before the battle of Jena, were considered the best soldiers in Europe; the English had adopted their discipline and tacticks; and, to be sure, as far as mere proficiency in the manual exercise, external appearance and accurate manœuvres went, they were excellent troops. But the new tacticks of the French were too much for them; and they had been out of practice for many years: the consequence was, they were cut to pieces by Napoleon. In our revolutionary war we were almost always beaten when we came to action in the open field; and it was the true policy of Washington to retire to heights and other strong defensive positions, where he intrenched himself, and would never give battle if he could avoid it, but upon terms decidedly advantageous to himself.

The policy, which the Spanish generals are pursuing, is evidently the best, which they could adopt. They carry on a kind of partizan warfare; they do not concentrate their whole army, and hazard the fate of the country upon the issue of a general engagement. The battles of Austerlitz and Jena speak a lesson to them, upon the subject, too striking to be disregarded. If they are attacked they defend themselves as well as they are able, but retire when the danger of entire defeat becomes apparent. Thus the French make a progress in the country; but the Spaniards, sometimes successful and sometimes worsted, are learning to become good soldiers, and their officers are every day gaining intelligence. Peter the great first brought the Russians to be good soldiers; he fought with Charles the 12th of Sweden, and though at first more than 60,000 of his troops ran from 10,000 Swedes, yet before the war was ended, the Russians had learned to beat their instructors in the famous battle of Pulowa. The Supreme Junta, in recommending this system of warfare to the Spanish Generals, have been of incal culable service to their country; we are not prepared to declare that the Spaniards will ultimately succeed in their glorious strug gle, but we really can conceive of no better system of defence

than that on which they now practice. The Spaniards have a most excellent officer in General Blake; his retreat through the mountains of Asturias will be considered a masterly one hereafter, by military men; and by the last accounts from Spain, it appears that he is enlarging his army in Leon, and is again preparing to attack the enemy. This intimation, however it may seem to contradict his having resigned the command of the army on the 27th of November to the Marquis of Romano, may be reconciled on the supposition that he has begun to col lect anoth which supposition is not weak, if it be considered that Romano has joined the English at Salamanca or Benevento. The accounts which General Castanos gives of the battle of Tudella differs in many essential particulars from the French bulletins. In our last number we gave as clear an account of that action, as could be obtained from the perverted sources from which we derived it. But Don Castanos, in a great measure contradicts it, he claims a victory, and though this cannot be granted him, it appears that so far from giving way on the first approach of the French, the Spaniards fought with much steadiness and actually repulsed them. On the left particularly the Spaniards were eminently successful, but pursuing their successes too far, they lost the day; for the French, as they state in the bulletin, penetrated through Tudella, and took the pursuing Spaniards in the rear. But let us hear the Spaniard himself.

On the 23d the advanced parties reported that three columus of the enemy were marching in the direction of Tudella; the generale was beaten, and while the troops of Arragon were passing the bridge, the enemy occupied the points of attack, which began at eight o'clock in morning; at ten o'clock the whole line was engaged. Our troops maintained their position with the utmost valour, and the enemy was repulsed on both sides. He renewed the attack, and rendered himself master of an olive grove on the left, whence he descended with a tremendous fire, but was so well received by our gallant troops. that after the most obstinate conflict he was compelled to retreat, while our troops were pursuing the defeated enemy on our left, when another division of the enemy penetrated through Tudella on the right, and took our pursuing troops in the rear. This decided the fate of the day, and nothing was left for our army but to retreat to Borja. While this was going forward