If the British government has nothing more in view than it is willing to avow,it cannot refuse to concur in an arrangement rescinding on her part the Orders in Council; and on ours the embargo. If France does not concur, the Orders will be better enforced by the continuance of the embargo against her, than they are by the British fleet and cruizers, and in the mean time, all the benefits of our trade will be thrown into the lap of Great-Brit ain. [Letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Pinckney, dated January 18, 1898.]

The prosperity of America is essential to the prosperity of Great-Britain. When those adjustments shall take place to which, though unfortunately not practicable at this moment, nor under the conditions prescribed by Mr. Pinckney, the undersigned confidently looks forward; it will perhaps be no insecure pledge for the continuance of the good understanding between the two countries, that they have learnt duly to appreciate each other's friendship; and that it will not hereafter be imputed to Great-Britain either on the one hand that she envies American industry as prejudicial to British commerce, or on the other, that she is compelled to court an intercourse with America as absolutely necessary to her own existence.-[Letter from Mr. Can ning to Mr. Pinckney, dated September 23, 1808,

FALSEHOODS.

It was by the exertions of our government, and by President Jefferson's EMBARGO that our difficulties with England were settled, and not by the rebellious conduct of the tories. Had there been no tories, no Englishmen in our country, the business would have been fettled many months ago. To the jacobinical opposition to government, and their violations of the Embargo, must be attributed the delays which have taken place.'

Chronicle, May 1.

• With peculiar pleasure does every free, candid, and enlightened American perceive that the policy of President Jefferson has saved the United States from the horrors and calamities of war. His measure of the Embargo has had the effect intended. It has obliged the British government to recede from the unjust ground it had taken; and to repeal the orders against American commerce. Had it not been for the ravings of an infurgent fac tion; the British would have given up the point twelve months ago.' Chronicle, May 1.

n

Such unblushing assertions confront us in every column of the Chronicle; they contain every argument of the democratick party. The points they endeavour to establish are these :

1st. That the Embargo has coerced Great-Britain so severely, that she has been obliged to concede the Orders in Council,' in obedience to our demands.

2d. The opposition of the Federalists has occasioned all the delay which government has experienced; and but for them the business would have been settled many months ago."

Leaving out all attempt at confuting the minor scurrility of this vehicle of slander, such as the epithets of tories,' jacobinical opposition,'' rebellious conduct,' ' ravings of an insurgent faction,' which may have great weight with the Chronicle scribblers in the way of argument, we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the two points we have stated, and by a reference to official documents and common sense, we imagine we shall be able to establish the falsehood of the assertions so universally circulated in favour of Mr. Jefferson, and in hostility to the Federalists.

It is manifest that the first enquiry to be made upon the subject under consideration is, what has Great-Britain conceded to us, by agree. ing to relinquish the Orders in council, provided we shall repeal the non-intercourse act in her favour? For if it appear that she has not yielded any thing to us, and if it appear that she has gained a great deal by this arrangement, it will not be contended that the embargo has had any material effect in respect to coercion. By enquiring what were the motives which induced Great-Britain to adopt the measure of the Orders in Council, we may be able to discover what she now yields by not enforcing them any longer. In pursuing this enquiry, we naturally revert back to the state of things immediately previous to the Embargo measure, and the promulgation of the Orders. We find the distresses of the West Indian colonies had reduced the planter to the last state of desperation ; and the irritation of those in the West-Indian interests against the American trade from the French colonies to France, had been evinced in numerous pamphlets, requiring the ministry to adopt the measure under consideration. These complaints at length became so clamorous and loud, that many committees were appointed by the House of Commons upon the subject; and the last report of the com. mittee of that body, 'On the commercial state of the West-India Iflands,' has been made publick. It was published about a month previous to the date of the Orders in Council of Nov. 11, 1807, and it appears very clearly that the recommendations of this committee had a very powerful influence in inducing the ministry to adopt the policy contained in those Orders. This will be made apparent by a reference to the report of the committee itself.

After enumerating the evils sustained by the West-Indian Planter, in the cultivation of his estates, and proving from the most authentick evidence, that the proceeds of the produce would not pay the cost of cultivation, the committee proceed to assert that the result of all their enquiries on this most important part of the subject, have brought before their eyes, one grand and primary evil, from which all the others are easily to be deduced; namely, the facility of intercourse between the hostile colonies and Europe, under the American neutral flag, by means of which not only the whole of their produce is carried to a market, but at charges little exceeding those of peace; while the British planter is burthened with all the inconvenience, risk, and expense resulting from a state of war.' It states the imports from the United States into Amsterdam alone, in the year 1806, to have been 34,085 hhds. sugar, and that the charges on the articles through the United States of America, from the hostile colonies, were less by 11s. 8d. per cwt. than those charges on British sugar to the same port.' The committee then observe, that in order to counterbalance in some degree the disadvantages thus enjoyed by the hostile colonies to the detriment of the British planter, it has been recommended, that a blockade of the ports of the enemies settlements should be resorted to; but,' they continue, a measure of more permanent and certain advantage, would be the enforcement of those restrictions on the trade between neutrals and the enemies colonies, which were formerly maintained by Great-Britain, and from the relaxation of which the enemies colonies obtain indirectly during war, all the advantages of peace. It appears to your committee to be a matter of evident and imperious necessity to resort to such a system, as by impeding and restricting, and as far as possible preventing the export of the produce of the enemies colonies from the places of its growth, shall compel the continent to have recourse to the only source of supply which in that event would be open to it.'

Without intending to enter into a justification of the principles or policy conveyed by these recommendations, we mean to assert that they held out the greatest inducement which operated on the British government ultimately to adopt the measure. The motives therefore, which prevailed upon Great-Britain to pursue this kind of restrictive policy, no matter how unjust it might be, were evidently to restrain the American trade in, the colonial produce of her enemies and thereby relieve her own subjects from a pressure of distress, unequalled in the annals of her colonies. The consequences were, that after the orders in council were issued, sugar and coffee began to rise in England, the demand on the continent was imperious for those articles, and great quantities were conveyed over to Holland in aclandestine manner. So that long before the Report of the committee of the House of Commons in respect to the distillation of that article instead of grain had appeared, sugar experienced an augmentation in price of at least 19s. per cwt. This rise,

if it operate only on half the quantity imported into Great-Britain, would amount to 6,370,000 dollars. The cost of the American supplies in the cultivation of sugar does not amount to but about one seventh of the whole charge. Thus, the sums paid on seven sugar estates in Jamaica, for American supplies in 1806, during that and the three preceding years, amount to a total of 8797, and the whole expences of the same estates during that period amounted to 62,570 dollars.' The greatest effect of the embargo, therefore, upon the West Indies would be to deprive them of one seventh part of their whole supplies, which of course they would be obliged to resort to other countries to obtain.

The Orders in Council, however, were adopted under the firmest conviction that our government would pass a non-intercourse or embargo law, and under a full persuasion of the greatest difficulties they would be obliged to encounter, from its most rigorous operation. This will very clearly appear from the examination of many gentlemen engaged in the West-Indian traffick before the committee of the House of Commons; and it will also be rendered very apparent by the following extract from the report of the committee just mentioned:

'As it may be apprehended that from the adoption of such measures, difficulties might arise in that intercourse from which the West Indies at present derive a considerable proportion of the sum of their supplies, your committee have thought it their duty to make enquiry into the resources in that respect, to which recourse might be had in such an event. During the only period which affords an example of the suspension of that intercourse, the evidence concurs as to the fact of a supply having been obtained (though not without temporary and casual inconveniencies) from a variety of sources which may reasonably be relied upon in case of such necessity at the present moment to a greater amount than at the former period.' They then remark that although the American supplies are important to the West Indies, yet that the trade is not essential to their existence, or equivalent to the disadvantages of their situation in these respects, which your committee have gone through in the present statement.'

The Milan decree of 17 Dec. 1807, by Napoleon, soon followed the Orders in Council, by which all neutral vessels which may have been searched by an English ship, are declared to become English property, and of course good prize. A rigorous blockade of the French colonies was established soon after; and our embargo measure was adopted about the same time. In our enquiries therefore as to what Great-Britain has yielded to us, we cannot but remark that those reasons which we have been able to discover, which induced her to adopt the Orders in Council, are exactly as strong in favour of the present state of things. The American commerce is just as much restrained now as it was under their operation, the English West Indian colo

nies are more effectually relieved, as they now freely obtain our sup plies, which will contribute to diminish the cost of their sugar; whilst the manufacturer at home will enjoy all the custom of which he was deprived by the embargo. The blockade of the French colonies and the Milan Decree render the Orders in Council a dead letter; they had no real effect in restraining neutral commerce, and had only an obnoxious one in point of principle. By relinquishing them as soon as the tenor of our non-intercourse law afforded them a fair opportunity, the British ministry have not only lost nothing, but have secured to themselves many benefits. In reality Mr. Canning has played a very subtle game; for under the present aspect of affairs, he secures all the advantages which the most rigid adherence to the Orders in Council, would have produced; the colonial trade of his enemy, by means of the neutral is stopped, the neutral commerce is sufficiently restrained by Napoleon himself, and he receives therefore the whole odium which the restraint excites. Whilst Great-Britain, in addition to the other real and com parative advantages we have mentioned, will enjoy all the benefits of our trade, which a state of affairs, the most unrestricted, could confer. Beside all this, the reparation she has made for the national aggression, in the Chesapeak attack, has produced a favourable impression on the minds of the American people, whilst France is placed by the non-intercourse law, in precisely a similar situation to that of GreatBritain, before that reparation was accepted.

The question which we proposed to discuss, whether the embargo had obliged Great-Britain to concede the Orders in Council, in our favour, has now received an obvious and satisfactory reply. We cannot discover that she has relinquished any thing, but has gained much; in fact the arrangement is a master-stroke of policy; but admitting a concession to have been made, we cannot admit the embargo to have been instrumental in obtaining it, because the Orders were promulgated under the impression of some such retaliatory measure, and because the operation of it has secured many benefits to those very peculiar interests in Great-Britain, to favour which, the Orders in Council were first promulgated. The embargo came in aid of the West-Indian planter, most effectually.

6

We are now led to confute the assertion, that but for the opposition of the Federalists, the British would have given up the point twelve months ago.' This may be opposed by asking, what point have the British given up? If we are answered, the reparation for the Chesa peak attack, we answer that but for the Federal opposition to the last Embargo bill, the French and English would never have been placed upon terms of equality in the non-intercourse law. And it is difficult to imagine that unless the proclamation of the President respecting that outrage had been repealed, or unless France were made equally the aggressor by some publick instrument, Great-Britain could after