of the world. Of the productions of the last bounteous year, how many can be said to serve any purpose of use or pleasure? The only end of writing is to enable the readers better to enjoy life, or better to endure it: and how will either of those be put more in our power by him who tells us that we are puppets, of which some creature not much wiser than ourselves manages the wires. That a set of beings unseen and unheard, are hovering about us, trying experiments upon our sensibility, putting us in agonies to see our limbs quiver, torturing us to madness, that they may laugh at our vagaries, sometimes obstructing the bile, that they may see how a man looks when he is yellow; sometimes breaking a traveller's bones to try how he will get home; sometimes wasting a man to a skeleton, and sometimes killing him fat for the greater elegance of his hide.

This is an account of natural evil, which though, like the rest, not quite new, is very entertaining, though I know not how much it may contribute to patience. The only reason why we should contemplate evil is, that we may bear it better; and I am afraid nothing is much more placidly endured, for the sake of making others sport.

The first pages of the fourth Letter are such as incline me both to hope and wish that I shall find nothing to blame in the succeeding part. He offers a criterion of action, on account of virtue and vice, for which I have often contended, and which must be embraced by all who are willing to know why they act, or why they forbear to give any reason of their conduct to themselves or others.

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"In order to find out the true origin of moral " evil, it will be necessary, in the first place, to enquire into its nature and essence; or what it "is that constitutes one action evil, and another good. Various have been the opinions of various authors on this criterion of virtue; and this variety has rendered that doubtful, which must "otherwise have been clear and manifest to the "meanest capacity. Some indeed have denied "that there is any such thing, because different 66 ages and nations have entertained different sen"timents concerning it: but this is just as reason"able as to assert, that there are neither sun, moon,

nor stars, because astronomers have supported "different systems of the motions and magnitudes "of these celestial bodies. Some have placed it "in conformity to truth, some to the fitness of

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things, and others to the will of God. But all "this is merely superficial: they resolve us not "why truth, or the fitness of things, are either "eligible or obligatory, or why God should re"quire us to act in one manner rather than ano"ther; the true reason of which can possibly be "no other than this, because some actions pro"duce happiness and others misery: so that all "moral good and evil are nothing more than the "production of natural. This alone it is that "makes truth preferable to falsehood, this that "determines the fitness of things, and this that "induces God to command some actions, and for"bid others. They who extol the truth, beauty, " and harmony of virtue, exclusive of its consequences, deal but in pompous nonsense; and

they who would persuade us, that good and evil "are things indifferent, depending wholly on the "will of God, do but confound the nature of

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things, as well as all our notions of God himself, "by representing him capable of willing contra"dictions; that is, that we should be, and be happy, and at the same time that we should torment and destroy each other; for injuries can"not be made benefits, pain cannot be made pleasure, and consequently vice cannot be made virtue "by, any power whatever. It is the consequences, "therefore, of all human actions that must stamp "their value. So far as the general practice of any "action tends to produce good, and introduce hap

piness into the world, so far we may pronounce "it virtuous; so much evil as it occasions, such is "the degree of vice it contains. I say the general

practice, because we must always remember, in judging by this rule, to apply it only to the ge"neral species of actions, and not to particular "actions; for the infinite wisdom of God, desirous "to set bounds to the destructive consequences "which must otherwise have followed from the "universal depravity of mankind, has so wonder,

fully contrived the nature of things, that our most "vicious actions may sometimes accidentally and "collaterally produce good. Thus, for instance, "robbery may disperse useless hoards to the bene"fit of the publick; adultery may bring heirs and "good humour too into many families, where they "would otherwise have been wanting; and murder "free the world from tyrants and oppressors. Lux

ury maintains its thousands, and vanity its ten "thousands. Superstition and arbitrary power "contribute to the grandeur of many nations, and "the liberties of others are preserved by the per"petual contentions of avarice, knavery, selfishness, "and ambition; and thus the worst of vices, and "the worst of men, are often compelled by Pro"vidence to serve the most beneficial purposes, "contrary to their own malevolent tendencies and "inclinations; and thus private vices become pub"lick benefits, by the force only of accidental cir"cumstances. But this impeaches not the truth " of the criterion of virtue before mentioned, the "only solid foundation on which any true system "of ethicks can be built, the only plain, simple, "and uniform rule by which we can pass any "judgment on our actions; but by this we may be

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enabled, not only to determine which are Good, "and which are Évil, but almost mathematically "to demonstrate the proportion of virtue or vice "which belongs to each, by comparing them with "the degrees of happiness or misery which they "occasion. But though the production of hap

piness is the essence of virtue, it is by no means "the end; the great end is the probation of man"kind, or the giving them an opportunity of exalt"ing or degrading themselves in another state by "their behaviour in the present. And thus indeed "it answers two most important purposes; those "are the conservation of our happiness, and "the test of our obedience; or had not such a test "seemed necessary to God's infinite. wisdom, and "productive of universal good, he would never have VOL. IX. M

"permitted the happiness of men, even in this life, "to have depended on so precarious a tenure, as "their mutual good behaviour to each other. For "it is observable, that he who best knows our for"mation, has trusted no one thing of importance "to our reason or virtue: he trusts only to our "appetites for the support of the individual, and "the continuance of our species; to our vanity or "compassion, for our bounty to others; and to our "fears, for the preservation of ourselves; often to our vices for the support of government, and "sometimes to our follies for the preservation of our religion. But since some test of our obedi

ence was necessary, nothing sure could have been "commanded for that end so fit and proper, and "at the same time so useful, as the practice of "virtue: nothing could have been so justly reward"ed with happiness, as the production of happi

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ness in conformity to the will of God. It is this "conformity alone which adds merit to virtue, and "constitutes the essential difference between mo"rality and religion. Morality obliges men to live honestly and soberly, because such behaviour is "most conducive to publick happiness, and consequently to their own; religion to pursue the same 66 course, because conformable to the will of their "Creator. Morality induces them to embrace vir"tue from prudential considerations; religion from "those of gratitude and obedience. Morality

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therefore, entirely abstracted from religion, can "have nothing meritorious in it; it being but wis"dom, prudence, or good economy, which like "health, beauty, or riches, are rather obligations