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272

THE DESPATCH-VESSELS CROSS THE BAR.

so far as the monsoon was concerned, there existed no obstacle to the passage of our gunboats along the coast. They had already weathered the Cape, and were now not surely incapable of following in the wake of the French. Indeed, had there been any chance of delay arising from this cause, it would probably have been mentioned when the gunboats were first applied for. Inasmuch, however, as, notwithstanding their absence, the allied force had now become formidable, Lord Elgin lost no time in repeating to the Admiral his opinion of the importance of a movement on Tientsin; and it was arranged that an attempt should be made at the first spring-tides to push the despatch-vessels over the bar, so that they might be in readiness, should the answer of the Prime Minister render necessary the capture of the forts on the 1st of May. On the 28th of April the first attempt was made, but the tide was not sufficiently high for our vessels, though some of the French gunboats, which drew less water, succeeded in scraping over. On the following day, however, the Nimrod was forced over by her indefatigable commander, while the Cormorant ran past all the French gunboats, and anchored within about 1500 yards of the forts. When this little squadron was joined by the Coromandel, we had seven men-of-war inside the bar.

On the 30th an extremely unsatisfactory communication was received from Tan, governor-general of Chili, stating that he had, in conjunction with a man

EXPIRY OF THE DELAY.

273

darin named Tsung-lun, director-general of granaries, and Wu, under-secretary of the cabinet, been appointed Commissioner to meet the foreign Plenipotentiaries at Takoo, and enter upon negotiations. As he did not allude to the nature or extent of the powers with which he was invested, he was called upon to define them, and informed that, if they were not as full as those held by Lord Elgin, and specified in his former communications as required, he (the Ambassador) would regard his pacific overture for the appointment of a "duly qualified officer" as rejected. The reply to this letter was to the effect that the powers of Tan, Tsung, and Wu were limited to reporting our demands, &c., to the capital. The whole of this correspondence took place on the 30th. Under these circumstances, the only course left seemed to be, to send in an ultimatum to Tan, stating that the Plenipotentiaries had now placed the matter in the hands of the allied naval authorities.

As the 1st of May had been the day originally fixed as the expiry of the "delai fatal," the excitement became pretty general throughout the fleet on the 30th, more especially in consequence of a signal being made by the flagship for the small-arm men to hold themselves in readiness for landing. General orders were also issued by the Admiral, containing the dispositions of attack. On the 1st, consequently, great were the preparations on board the Furious. Excited midshipmen, staggering under blankets, canteens, and havresacks, rushed frantically about the deck; the

274

POSTPONEMENT OF ATTACK.

landing-parties had their rations served out, and were told off; the paddle-box boats were lowered, and the guns put in them; and all were on the tiptoe of expectation until the afternoon, when it began to be whispered that a change had taken place in the views of the naval Commander-in-chief, and that an attack on the forts was indefinitely postponed. This took all the world by surprise, as nothing had occurred which could explain this alteration of plan.

Thus a second time the policy which Lord Elgin had determined to carry out in his movement to the north sustained a check. On the first occasion, in consequence of the absence of gunboats to support him on his arrival in the Gulf, he had been compelled to invite a Chinese plenipotentiary to meet him at the mouth of the Peiho, instead of proceeding to some point nearer to the capital,-a change of plan which was very injurious, because the mouth of the Peiho was the scene of the abortive negotiations of Sir John Bowring in 1854; and now again, when the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had failed to produce their credentials within a fixed period, he was thwarted in his desire to foil their attempts at evasion, by a rapid and immediate movement up the country. The consequences of these delays were serious in the extreme. In a military point of view they are graphically described in the Admiral's despatch of the 21st May, upon the occasion of the taking of the forts three weeks afterwards. "From the arrival of the Ambassa

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DELAY. 275

dors on the 14th of April," says his Excellency, "the Chinese have used every exertion to strengthen the forts at the entrance to the Peiho; earthworks, sandbag batteries, and parapets for the heavy gingalls, have been erected on both sides for a distance of nearly a mile in length, upon which eighty-seven guns in position were visible; and the whole shore had been piled to oppose a landing." Politically they were even more disastrous, because, by obliging Lord Elgin to protract, at the mouth of the Peiho, negotiations which he clearly saw could lead to no good result, they gave to his proceedings a vacillating character, which was calculated to strengthen the self-confidence of the Chinese diplomatists.

CHAPTER XIV.

PERILOUS POSITION OF DESPATCH

GUNBOATS-STRENGTHENING OF

REINFORCEMENTS

THE

THE FORTS -ARRIVAL OF CHINESE
QUESTION OF FULL POWERS-ANGLO-AMERICAN VISIT TO THE
PEIHO IN 1854-INTERCOURSE ON THAT OCCASION-INTERVIEW
WITH TSUNG AND TAN-MEMORIAL OF COMMISSIONERS IN 1854-
REFERENCE ΤΟ PEKIN-CONTEMPTUOUS TREATMENT BY THE

AS TO

FUTURE MOVEMENTS

CHINESE GOVERNMENT-ANXIETY
MEMORANDUM OF SIR M. SEYMOUR-COMMUNICATION WITH
TAN-THE FINAL SUMMONS-INSOLENCE OF THE GARRISON.

For the next three weeks our life in the Gulf was one of absolute inaction. This was the more trying as the cool season was slipping rapidly past. The hot gusts came oftener, and in one week the thermometer rose from 42° to 74°. During all this time, hundreds of grain-junks were passing into the mouth of the river, bearing the annual tribute of rice, on which Pekin is so entirely dependent. The interception of this grain-fleet had been one of Lord Elgin's principal objects in pushing northwards early, and desiring to be accompanied by the gunboats. It was impossible, however, to establish a blockade while negotiations ostensibly pacific were still in progress, and it was equally impossible to bring those negotiations to a close, until the naval authorities announced

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