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tion of the higher grade merchant marine officers sailing under the English colors are reserve officers of the British navy, ready for the emergency, each man of record as to ability and standing, each man not only available but qualified, save in the more formal essentials.

To be specific, one should, under the system here suggested, seek specialized engineering officers among civil engineers of repute and high standing, among the engineers of the great railroads, and among the engineers of the great electrical and mechanical manufacturers. One would seek ordnance material among the staffs of the great steel corporations and the great machinery houses, as well as among the commercial gun and small arm manufacturers of the nation, and possibly even among the chemists of the great explosive manufacturers. In the quartermaster's branches one would seek men possibly in all of these walks of industry, but with special reference to their careful commercial training and quali fications; whilst for the signal corps material would be sought primarily amongst the great communication corporations, telegraph, telephone, and wireless, with some additions from those industries engaged in the manufacture of the appliances used in such work. Regarding a few of the quite obvious objections:

PAY AND EXPENSE

It might be necessary (I doubt it) to attach some small annual remuneration to each reserve commission, in the same way that retainers are granted in civil life to men of similar standing. Even if this proved necessary, it would be a small monetary burden as compared with the insurance secured. I should, however, be gravely disappointed if such a measure proved to be necessary to the success of the plan; the indirect reward should have sufficient value.

In time of active service, pay and allowance would obviously he identical with those of any volunteer officer, however secured; no burden or obligation lies here.

TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE

It would not be the primary purpose to make soldiers, but rather to provide fit technical material. To make these men quickly available, prescribed reading would be necessary, and possibly a system of infrequent staff and routine detail for very brief periods; the point, however, of the provision of suitable material is the crux of the argument, and should not be permitted to be hidden by any objection of inadequate military training.

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THE QUESTION OF RANK AND COMMAND

On a reserve basis it would not seem to be necessary to give these men really high rank, nor would I suggest for a moment that they be given a stripe on their trousers. Granting that a certain proportion of these men would, in the emergency, have to command troops, it would seem to be simple to make it inherent in the system that with a detail to the command of troops they would cease to have official connection with the reserve, and would forthwith literally become volunteer officers on exactly the same basis that volunteer officers always have and probably always will be created.

It seems to be inherent in our system, personally, I think very regrettably inherent, that a considerable proportion of citizen officers in any war will start out ranking professional officers of the regular establishment, whose whole lives have been given to a study of their profession. In principle I believe that this is bad, but we are dealing with a condition, not a theory, and if this condition is to obtain, I believe that all will concede that it would be better in the technical branches that such men should at least have high qualifications, and be of high standing, than that they should be selected and appointed almost by chance.

MAINTENANCE OF INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM

Here we must fall back upon the hackneyed theory of natural elimination of the unfit, nevertheless it is thoroughly true that it is better that this process of elimination should go on in times of peace than in the presence of the emergency. The men who could not maintain interest and enthusiasm would not be the men whom we should want as reserve officers, and they would disappear by self elimination and would be progressively replaced by more fit material.

A certain large measure of interest and enthusiasm might well, however, be maintained by the detailing of especially well qualified men from the reserve branches to all kinds of advisory boards.

No civilian who has studied our organization even superficially can fail to be as much surprised as impressed by the extraordinary proficiency of the officers of the regular establishment in almost all branches of specialized engineering; nevertheless, the officers of the regular establishment can not, with very rare exceptions, hope to be anything but what the medical profession would term "general practitioners;" they can not, broadly, be specialists in electrical, mechanical, or other separate branches of engineering; never

theless the service has great need, from time to time, of the advisory aid of such specialists, and such aid would be found to be forthcoming in a properly organized reserve corps such as suggested, and this, while directly beneficial, would also be indirectly beneficial, as a means of maintaining sustained enthusiasm and interest.

At this point it would be appropriate for some one to suggest that, if we need a reserve of 2,000 technical men who are officer material, we also need not less than 15,000 men as reserve technical troops.

This is perfectly true, and it is also probably true that this presents a harder problem for peace solution, and an easier problem for war time solution, than the question of officers.

It is always easier to find a working force for the building of a bridge than to find the engineer and the foremen. Men have done, and men will do, pretty well on this kind of a job with unskilled labor, and with considerable rapidity will convert unskilled labor into skilled labor. To tackle the building of the same structure with an engineer and with foremen who had to be trained and created on the job is a hard proposition.

Nevertheless, given a reserve of technical officers such as is suggested, it seems fair to believe that a plan would be speedily evolved for the creation of at least a skeleton reserve of technical troops; such a skeleton establishment perhaps as that which Switzerland has for her entire military force; groups of men rising perhaps to the degree of organization which might be termed cadres, located particularly in the great industrial centers, and affording, at least, preferred material for non-commissioned ranks, and a rallying center for quick recruiting, guided more or less by the definite acquaintance of the reserve **non-coms." of the cadres.

Probably this system, in its earlier stages, could not be as systematically organized as the officer force, but it could doubtless be evolved into something efficient and useful and without expense.

There is one curious national strain in our race which I venture to believe we enjoy to a far greater extent than the people of any other nation; it might be termed a kind of military hankering, which most Americans of all classes would be glad to indulge if they could do so by the acceptance of some established system.

I have heard it said that every healthy American believes himself capable of becoming an effective general, and that nothing prevents him from feeling that he might become an effective admiral, save the fear that he might be sea-sick.

I have heard this statement presented time and again as a humorous criticism of certain national traits; may we not, however, turn it to serious good in connection with a propaganda such as is here presented?

I admit freely that I have laid before you a plan both crude and daring. It is at least presented with enthusiasm-not with any idea that the plan as here presented can or will be adopted, not with any idea that the thoughts presented are original, but with a deep seated hope that these suggestions may be materially helpful in crystallizing a really good plan, equivalent in purpose and in result to the intent of the thoughts which I have laid before you.

DISCUSSION

Col. F. V. ABBOT

Corps of Engineers

Mr. Haskins' suggestions for a technical reserve for the Army are carefully thought out, and open up for consideration a most important practical problem. For the Cuban war in 1898 three regiments of volunteer engineers were rapidly formed, and were officered without difficulty by men who were well fitted to do credit to the service had there been any real military engineering to be done. My experience is limited to one company, which was raised in St. Paul, Minn. Its captain was A. O. Powell, the principal assistant engineer in the river and harbor district of which I was in charge. The non-commissioned officers included the draftsman. of the United States Engineer Office, and a number of young men engaged in well paid positions, as foremen in the gas and electrical companies outdoor working parties, as lumber foremen, as railroad section hands, etc., while the enlisted force covered all the technical branches of trade. Surveyors and rod men, telegraphers, electricians, steam engineers, locomotive engineers, blacksmiths, mill men, machinists, plumbers, masons, carpenters, timber cutters were all represented. It would be hard to organize a better force for a general contractor than was represented by that company.

On the return from their bloodless campaign in Alabama I was glad to employ as foremen and journeymen many members of this company, and to the credit of the patriotism of the people of St. Paul it should be said that with few exceptions the men who had given up their positions to join the company were reinstated in their old positions on their return.

This brings up one vitally important point. Would men of technical training give a pledge which would bind them to quit without delay whatever work they were doing, without reference to the interests of the persons by whom they were employed? Would em

ployers entrust men so pledged with the supervision of important and costly work, interruption of which might easily entail direct and unavoidable losses? This is the weak point in our whole militia problem. The best men in the community are willing to give their time and energy to develop the local militia, which is the **secular arm" on which the police must rely in civil disorder beyond their power of control, and which is to serve within the limited area of a single state, but they hesitate to become full volunteers in time of peace to bind themselves to serve at an indefinite time, and for a cause which may or may not meet with their personal approbation. When real need arises, when they know definitely what they are doing, why they are doing it, and when they must volunteer or stay behind, such men will offer their services to the Government. History has proved this. That the most desirable and reliable class of technical men will bind themselves beforehand, in the dark, and in utter ignorance of where and when they may be called upon to serve, seems extremely doubtful. If the positions as commissioned officers are filled beforehand with men, not the most desirable and reliable, but only thoughtless and enthusiastic, the technical troops actually raised will lack the most important of all factors to success a commissioned personnel of sound judgment, broad intellect, and wise forethought.

Mr. W. F. WELLS

The writer concurs with Mr. Haskins that considerable advantage would accrue from a more definite cooperation between the engineers of the Army and those of civil life, and from an organization of a technical reserve to the Army.

Cooperation would give the Army engineer the advantage of the experience gained by a civilian engineer in any highly specialized class of work, which experience has been obtained through experiments and work extending over a number of years and requir ing a large and expensive plant and organization. As the ultimate work of the Army is not constructive, but either destructive or defensive, the Army engineers have little to give in return that would be appreciated by those in civil life. As a rule, construetive engineers in this Republic care little for title or honor, and therefore, in time of peace, the advice and experience of those best fitted could probably be obtained only by means of a retainer. Engineers are as patriotic as any other class, but would not be expected to give away valuable time and services any more than a merchant would furnish supplies to the quartermaster without charge.

With regard to the technical reserve, the civil life engineer. holding an administrative position in a large company, has by virtue of such position an excellent opportunity to select men for the work of the engineer corps; his broad acquaintance enables him to quickly collect the requisite number of men fitted for any con

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