Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991University of Pittsburgh Pre, 1992 M01 15 - 360 páginas Using a great power-small power theoretical approach and advancing a supplier-recipient barganing model, Jeffery Lefebvre attempts to explain what the United States has paid for its relations with two weak and vulnerable arms recipients in the Horn of Africa. |
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... executive branch , Congress does have the power to affect at least indirectly the content and conduct of U.S. arms transfer policy . 31 The relative lack of interest exhibited by the legislative branch in exer- cising this power with ...
... executive branch in making a threat of defection , since this simply means replacing one foreign commitment with another . Congress is more likely to favor a threat of aid reduction or termination rather than defection . Nonetheless ...
... executive branch that characterizes the U.S. arms transfer process . These institutions , which live on long after a presidential administration has ended , are able to place their own long- term stamp on American policy — a stamp that ...
... executive branch agencies , we should also note that until recently a general consensus had held between them concerning arms transfers , and more specifically U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa . First , arms transfers were viewed ...
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Contenido
3 | |
11 | |
53 | |
III The United States and Somalia 19771990 | 173 |
Conclusion | 265 |
Appendix | 278 |
Notes | 283 |
Index | 343 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre Vista previa limitada - 1992 |
Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre Vista de fragmentos - 1991 |
Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre Sin vista previa disponible - 1992 |