LORD PALMERSTON'S OPINION.

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Seas long before ours could find their way there. This is, without doubt, true; and it behoves us to provide for the defence of India, just as we should for the defence of our own coasts; not that we apprehend danger, but because it is by no means the national disposition to permit our safety to depend, under Providence, on anything except our own strength, and due precautions. The fact then to be considered is this, that France may certainly, if she chooses, despatch a fleet of iron-clad frigates, or of other ships of equal calibre, at any moment into the Indian Seas, so soon as the Suez Canal is finished. Her power will unquestionably be increased by the opening of the Canal, just as it was augmented by the establishment of the port and arsenal at Cherbourg. Possessing Cherbourg and Toulon, she is enabled by means of railways in a few hours to direct her whole available naval strength, so far as it consists of men and stores, either into the British Channel or the Mediterranean; and to send her land forces to take part in proceedings that may be intended to be carried out in either

Sea. Some have imagined that for many practical purposes the martial force of France has thus been doubled.

Nothing is more certain, than that if we wish to secure ourselves against ironclads, ironclads must be provided to meet them. This ought assuredly to be done, but nothing can so powerfully tend to render their employment needless, as the understanding with France which has been recommended. Both morally and physically, an understanding with France, entered into with a view to neutralise and civilise the East, would afford us a basis for action, whereas at present we have none; and communications with India will be all the safer if we are not dependent on any one line, for each line may be affected by different contingencies. There is only one thing to be added, and that is, that whether in order to solve the embarrassing problems connected with the Eastern Question, or in order to derive the full measure of benefit which may be secured by taking steps in concert with France, it is highly advisable that there should be

no delay. We have, as usual, waited almost too long; for the national mind of England seldom arrives at a definite, fixed, and vigorous determination before the moment when it is impelled to do so by the pressure of circumstances; and until the national mind does arrive at a definite, fixed, and vigorous determination, our statesmen are not, in this instance, likely to act with effect. But the national mind is awakening, for the Suez Canal is almost completed, and circumstances at present indicate, not only that we ought to join France in neutralising and civilising the East, but also that it is important that in doing so we should lose no time.

H

APPENDIX.

A.

Ar this moment a loan is in process of being made to the Company in Paris, which will enable a corresponding amount of what is due to the Company to be left outstanding for some time, or perhaps altogether as to part of it. This financial operation seems to be a highly judicious one, and is certainly a very successful mode of proceeding.

B.

The French a few years since took steps with the apparent intention of forming a settlement on the coast of Abyssinia, but are not supposed to be very anxious to proceed further in the enterprise. They acquired a claim, however, to a tract of land which could at any