might be most beneficially altered: 1st, in granting to them two miles of ground on each side of the railway, instead of one mile, as was intended; and wherever this might be impossible, because of the land belonging to private persons, or for any other reason, then by granting ground of equivalent value elsewhere; 2nd, in granting to the Company a concession for the line of electric telegraph which passes in the same direction as the railway, and is at present managed in such a manner as to be most unsatisfactory to many of those interested in communication with India; to facilitate which communication is, of course, the grand object for which it was established. It is quite obvious that since the Turks have exhibited their incompetency to carry out this railway by means of their own unaided resources, they must consent to terms sufficiently beneficial to induce European nations to do so, unless, indeed, the regions under their sway are to be permitted to remain in their present condition. The Sultan has demonstrated his anxiety to ameliorate that condition, by

ADVANTAGES OF THE EUPHRATES RAILWAY. 69

the steps already taken to urge forward the construction of this railway; and there can be no doubt that the construction of this line must produce results of almost unexampled magnitude in augmenting the productive powers of the localities affected by it, and advancing their improvement in all respects; but even if he were to desire that the country through which the Euphrates Railway would pass should remain in its present condition, the relations and stipulations entered into by him with France and England, and the obligations he owes to them, give them an absolute right to declare that this shall not be. To insure the carrying out of the construction of this railway, or of any great enterprise calculated to promote civilisation in the regions between the Mediterranean and India, they have only to make the necessary representations in common, and to supply the necessary resources, taking care to secure terms which shall provide for an adequate return of profit. In this, as in all other instances, an understanding between France and England (joined, if occasion

arises, by Russia), entered into with a view to neutralise and civilise the East, would best secure this result, and it would fully do so. Immediately on its being entered into we might hope (to use the words of the Emperor Napoleon already alluded to), that "the jealousy of the Great Powers may no longer prevent the East from shaking off the dust of twenty centuries, and from being born again to life and civilisation."

The profit to England from facilitating our intercourse with India, and increasing our commerce with Asiatic Turkey, and the supply of raw materials for our manufactures, would be very large indeed; while the advantage to be derived from averting the probability of hostile collision between European nations is yet more worthy of serious consideration; but should our statesmen not make up their minds to initiate the bold though prudent policy of frankly and cordially joining the French by giving guarantees where requisite, the Suez Canal will obviously be finished without our aid, and without even our concurrence being re

GUARANTEES OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. 71

quired; and no stretch of imagination is needed to suppose that the French Government will give whatever guarantee is called for, to make up the comparatively small amount which can alone be demanded by the circumstances of the case. The French cannot do better than extend their guarantee to this undertaking in Egypt, on the plan pursued by us in India for railway and canal work, if we do not choose to adopt a similar line of conduct ourselves. In any negotiation about communications with the East, they have this advantage over us, if such negotiation is to be conducted in a spirit of rivalry, that the works on their own special undertaking, the Suez Canal, are nearly finished, and that it is quite in their power to finish them; so that it rests with us to decide whether we desire facilities for Eastern communication to be further extended or not. French interests, so far as they are concerned, are safe, whatever course may be adopted as regards the extension of those facilities.

Even should our statesmen not see their

way

to aiding, by means of guarantees, the extension

of the facilities for communication with India, it is to be hoped they will not fail to arrange, while there is yet time, an understanding with France, having for its object to neutralise and civilise the East. The mere existence of such an understanding would be productive of vast benefit. A third alternative must unfortunately be considered; our statesmen may do neither of these things; they perceive, as everyone perceives, that the affairs of the East are approaching a crisis, and that the difficulties in which they are entangled cannot be solved without a crisis taking place. If they will not prepare for this by adopting a comprehensive policy adequate to the occasion, they manifestly cannot expect to master events, but will be mastered by them; they will afford a fresh example of the practice and principles of what is called political expediency in this country, by which British administrators have often astonished mankind. The North American colonies were mainly acquired by the energy of our middle classes, and lost through the proceedings of ministers who possessed the art of "reducing