CHAPTER XX.

THE CO-OPERATIVE IDEA.

THAT men will organise for common ends is an inevitable consequence of the social appetite. The family and the state are pre-eminently fundamental and necessary forms, in which this propensity manifests itself. The discussions of the preceding part are sufficient to show this. But that, nevertheless, these institutions are only means to ends, and that they must be judged by their efficiency in subserving their legitimate ends, we have endeavoured to make appear. The most formidable difficulty in the way of reaching this efficiency we found to lie in the tendency to elevate the means to the importance and dignity of ends in themselves, in fact to forget the central principle of all organic life that each part must always be the means and end of all the rest; and if this balance is not preserved, the organism perishes.

Since the sphere of the family is very circumscribed, and since the action of the state-if limited to attaining and preserving security for individuals-is also restricted, it is not surprising that the organising tendency in human nature should be still further developed in many ways, because the increased power arising from combination is patent and must always be impressing itself upon popular thought. The church exhibits one direction in which this development has appeared with great effect; and there are still others, which it will now be our task to consider.

The co-operative idea may seek to realise its purposes through the state administration or outside of it. If the former, to get control of the government is the first step to be taken; if the latter, obtaining the protection of government is all that is desired, the work being pursued through the channels of non-political life. Thus in all varieties of industrial, political, philanthropic, and educational effort we have attempts made to accumulate power for ends deemed desirable, by combination and co-operation.

Now there can be no doubt of the greater efficiency of organised

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co-operative over desultory and unorganised attempts to accomplish any purpose. Nor is there room to doubt, either, the utility of co-operation for ends that are good, so long as it tends to achieve those ends and has no overbalancing evil consequences. In the condition of things, for instance, in which authority establishes itself against progress, co-operation to resist is highly praiseworthy and advantageous. It is very far from my present purpose to condemn the principle of combination in its essential character or to inveigh against its proper applications. But almost every idea that has been an inspiration of progress has been perverted to unworthy uses through the blind zeal of those whom it possesses; and when any principle is put forward as a panacea for social evils, it is of the greatest importance to note its tendencies, to determine where it will lead to excess, and to regulate its power according to strict interpretations of its usefulness. The idea of co-operation furnishes no exception to the general rule in this respect.

It will be recollected that in Chapter X. we found and enunciated two general precepts, which we deemed the most important to govern us in the determination of conduct to aid in the elimination of evil. The first of these was to aim at the minimum of extrinsic restraint and the maximum of liberty for the individual; the second was to aim at the most complete and universal development of the altruistic character. Let us examine the co-operative idea in the light of these precepts.

The fundamental notion in co-operation is nothing more than combination of powers for mutual advantage. It is the social idea in the sense of society being an organic unity. Its distinctive feature, however, is the accomplishment of results by union, by and through the corporation, so to speak, rather than through individuals. But its ends are those of the general or common good, as it may be conceived. We may assume, therefore, that the co-operative idea in its purity does not propose for its objects of achievement anything different from the ends of general happiness and abatement of evil which have been herein set forth as fixing the moral law. If, then, the means relied upon are not the best calculated to promote this end, or if they should work results opposed to it, they must be condemned, or at least qualified, even according to their own foundation principles.

Observing the evil that undeniably arises in human affairs from the struggling of individuals against each other in competition,

wherein every man is for himself and not for any other, many people have thought that if organisations could be formed wherein each person should be subordinated to the corporate control, the beneficial ends of each person could be wrought out far more perfectly and with less likelihood of detriment through the corporate body. Each person should be equal to every other before the law, and the corporate authority should be exercised to secure this equality in everything needed. Inequalities of social condition, arising in regard to property or political or industrial power, would hence be done away with. In its application to the governmental administration, this doctrine is expressed in the demand that the state shall act positively instead of negatively to secure the welfare of its individuals. And, lest individual domination should assert itself, all property rights should be vested in the state, which gives not ownership, but only liberty of use, to individuals.

Without particularising further just at present, it must appear that this doctrine does not accord with the precepts above referred to; at least with the first one. The minimum of extrinsic restraint certainly is not aimed at; on the contrary, extrinsic control is everywhere sought to be increased and extended. The second precept is not excluded. It may be urged that the co-operative idea tends toward securing the universal altruistic disposition, or it may, perhaps, be said that if a perfect control over individuals is attained, the want of power to effect will make the disposition of secondary consequence. These possible claims we shall be obliged to consider. I do not think it will be urged that the altruistic disposition is undesirable, unless, perhaps, when it is exhibited in such form as to weaken the power of firm, determined, and, perhaps, unsympathetic action and individual exertion for beneficial ends.

To begin with, let us see, in general, what can be accomplished and what cannot be accomplished by co-operation, upon a reasonable view of human capacities and tendencies. It must not be forgotten, though apt to be, that co-operation is co-operation of individuals. Whatever is done must be done through the wills and the acts of individuals. Hence the results to be attained are wholly conditioned upon the constitution of the men and women that we have to deal with. The society, therefore, in co-operation is only an abstract entity. It is an aggregation of individuals. When we say that power resides in the society, that the society

is to accomplish this, that, or the other, we mean that some individuals in the society are to do what the others command, urge, or acquiesce in, and perhaps are ready to assist in, if need be. This was sufficiently illustrated in the discussions of the preceding part. It is hence of the utmost importance in cooperation that a unanimity of will be secured within the society. Some degree of this unanimity is the requisite to any co-operation And so far forth as there is within the organisation a lack of concentration of disposition its effectiveness is impaired. Much more will its power be curtailed if there be force within acting in positive opposition to the ends of co-operation.

Again, there must be something of intellectual agreement. The best harmony of disposition in the world would be of no practical use, if everybody had a plan of his own for carrying out the common purposes, and no one could be persuaded that any other method than his was of advantage. The unanimity of disposition would itself be lost under such circumstances, and the society would fall to pieces. And so far forth as there is heterogenity of opinion, it undoubtedly tends to lessen the disposition to co-operate and diminishes the force to be employed, although by concessions disruption may be averted. These two, thenharmony of volition and intellectual agreement are necessary elements of successful co-operation. If there be in the society homogeneity of will and of opinion, the co-operation is substantially efficient and can accomplish its purposes, except as thwarted by a vis major of outside resistance.

Unfortunately for this perfection the conditioned suppositions will inevitably be more largely contrary to than in accordance with fact. Individuals do not agree. Diversities of mental capacity, education, environment, all combine to produce great diversities in judgment, opinion, and belief. And the more action of a practical nature is involved the less is the unanimity. People may agree very readily upon the general proposition that the welfare of the whole society is paramount, but when it comes to getting particular questions of casuistry under this principle they are apt to be hopelessly at variance.

Equally true is it that there is always more or less heterogeneity of will. I have just remarked that this unavoidably arises from differences of opinion. But the co-operative society has much more than this to contend against. It has to encounter the egoistic disposition. This may be openly manifested or covertly