CHAPTER I.

PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL.

THE terms Evil and Good mark antithetical ideas which have maintained their opposition in all human thought and action. All experience manifests the distinction between the Good and the Bad, and hence all language, all literature, all science, and all action must recognise such a distinction. Speaking generally, without regard to philosophical exactitude, Good is that which is desired, and Evil that which is avoided. To the individual alone the Good is that which he aims to bring into his experience, conserve, and perpetuate; Evil, on the other hand, is that which he endeavours to cast out and keep out of his experience. In like manner to society the Good is that towards which effort is or ought to be directed to secure and preserve, while Evil is that which is or ought to be avoided and warded off. Good is to be sought, Evil is to be extirpated; Good we would retain for ever, Evil we would abolish entirely.

It is one of the purposes of this treatise to fix more exactly and accurately the meanings of Good and Evil, especially the latter term. The above remarks will, therefore, be sufficient provisionally, and will answer the end of directing the attention to the questions to be brought forward for consideration. Religiously considered, the Problem of Evil is the most perplexing and seemingly the most insoluble of any that pertain to theism. Given an omnipotent and benevolent Creator, how can it happen that there is evil at all in a universe of His creation? All sorts of solutions have been proposed, but none of them have been entirely satisfactory, and hence the question always presents itself anew. I do not state

Fashion varies from time to time with regard to the preference for 'I'or 'We' in introducing the declaration of the author. If either is used exclusively or too frequently it is tedious to the reader, though the old criticism that ‘I' indicates egotism on the part of the writer is substantially obsolete. In a work

this problem with the expectation of solving it, but with the hope that, by studying the nature of evil and generalising some of the facts of human experience with respect to it, we may ascertain its proximate sources, and indicate the general methods by employing which we may effect its reduction, and, to as great an extent as may be, its elimination.

Much of the evil of which men are cognisant comes from the action of physical forces in the inorganic world, and from the vegetal and animal creation. Electricity, for instance, is a destructive agent. The lightning strikes and causes death with a suddenness against which there could be no prevision. The tornado destroys houses and villages, utterly regardless of human interests. Vesuvius with its fiery rain extinguishes the flourishing cities at its base. On sea and land alike every year witnesses multitudes doomed to suffering and death through the force of natural agents, which cannot be avoided or controlled. Not less true is this when we look for causes higher in the organic scale. Upas trees there may not be, but poison as deadly as the upas lurks around the Villa Borghese or along the luxuriant banks of the Amazon. Neither the tiger nor the serpent knows any mercy or pity. Even in the crowded streets of a great metropolis the mad steer tramples under foot the terror-stricken child. Everywhere in nature there are all the time occurring, as the results of natural causes, events which, if we only could, we would prevent or avoid.

Over and above this so-called Physical Evil there exists evil which is derived from the conduct of sentient beings, or (if we include the acts of the animal creation below man in the same general category with manifestation of inorganic force) from the conduct of human beings. Such is commonly termed Moral Evil. The distinction thus drawn is very generally accepted, and marks two grand divisions of the subject now before us.

Evil is still evil, whether it be physical or moral, and as such is an object for abatement; but, so far as mankind is concerned, the two sorts are very differently viewed. Man is commonly regarded as responsible for moral evil inasmuch as he is considered the voluntary cause of it, with the power, if only he chose, to prevent its existence. That it still continues to exist is consequently not alone man's misfortune, but directly his fault. Thus

of this kind it is a relief to the author, and, I think, to the reader, to change occasionally from the singular to the plural and back again. This plan is, therefore, followed in the present book.

a peculiar character attaches itself to moral evil, separate and distinct from that pertaining to physical evil. Whether the current ideas as to the antithesis between the two classes are correctly entertained or not, and whether or not there is any intrinsic difference or difference in kind between the two are questions which will be discussed as we proceed. It is enough at present to note the claims generally made. Provisionally at least we may allow a distinction between physical and moral evil.

CHAPTER II.

DIFFERENT THEORIES OF EVIL.

BEFORE proceeding to consider further the phenomena which we call evil or of evil nature, it may be well to note what the human mind has thought with regard to evil in explanation of its existence. I do not intend to review in detail the tenets of the various schools of philosophy, or the creeds of the different religious sects or other bodies on this subject; but in the light of what has been held to exhibit the leading ideas which it is possible for us to entertain with respect thereto.

It has been most usual to connect evil with the supernatural, and therefore the problem of evil has been very largely a religious problem. Evil is certainly interwoven with nature's order throughout; and if from nature we look for a source or a cause of the natural processes and nature's evolution in a supernatural, to this supernatural must we go for a source and a cause of evil. Assuming this to be the case, we strike at once upon that very old and very serious question, referred to in the preceding chapter. How can an all-powerful and all-holy God be the author of evil? Epicurus states the difficulty: Either God wishes to prevent evil and cannot; or He can and will not; or He neither will nor can; or He both can and will. In the first case He is weak and not omnipotent; in the second He is wicked; in the third He is both weak and wicked; in the fourth we are impelled to ask, How is evil at all possible? 1

If, then, an all-powerful and all-holy God is not the author of evil, we are first driven over to the Manicheans or, further back, to the Zoroastrian system. In the beginning, there was,' said Zarathrustra, a pair of twins-two spirits, each having his own distinct essence. These, the Good and the Evil, rule over us in thought, word, and deed.' There are two Gods, or two Principles, in the supernatural world, each self-existent, and the two struggling 1 Lactantius, De Ira Dei, chap. 13.

2 Hymn from the Avesta; Bunsen, God in History, i, 280,

against each other for the supernatural supremacy and for the control of the universe. Both of these beings are certainly godsAura-Mainyus no less than Ahura-Mazda. The former is the source and the cause of Evil, the latter the source and cause of all Good.

There is, however, a middle ground, be it well or ill taken. The Divine Being may be supposed to be infinite in power, goodness, and holiness, and yet for good purposes permit the existence of evil supernatural beings-Satan and his followers-through whom and from whom all that is evil emanates. This distinguishes the Christian doctrine of the Devil from the Persian and the Manichean dualism. With these latter the strife between the powers of Good and Evil is eternal; in the Christian scheme it is only temporal, to end in the complete triumph of good. And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.'1 The queries which immediately suggest themselves in connection with this theory are, Whence came the Devil originally? Why is he permitted to exist, and evil to flow from him and his works?

2

As an answer to the last query, there is still another view of the supernatural origin of evil, but which may occur either with or without the notion of a personal devil. This is the doctrine that all evil is only good in the making. What we esteem to be bad in the universe is imperfection not yet made perfect. Could we know the secrets of the Divine Mind, we should perceive that what we now condemn, reject, and avoid, is only a necessary stage in the development of God's most beneficent purposes. Thus argued Dr. William King, Archbishop of Dublin, and the brothers Samuel and John Clarke (the two latter in the Boyle lectures). They stood, however, always upon the Christian basis of evil and evil powers permitted in furtherance of God's beneficent purposes, and they also insisted upon the distinction between moral and physical evil; with the former going the doctrine of man's responsibility to God. Indeed, it is obvious that we must draw sharp distinctions here. For, if evil be only good in the making, then it may be asked with the Epicureans, How is evil possible? That which we call evil is not evil, but imperfect good. Is there, then, any warrant for assuming a particular character for moral evil by which any taint of sinfulness attaches to the perpetrator of that which, bad as it may seem, is but crude goodness?

1 Revelation of S. John xx. 10.

2 De Origine Mali,