bourhood of 400,000 men in the field. The total expenses for the armies of Europe alone in time of peace is enough to pay our interest-bearing debt every year.

of

and a

Mr. President, I object to this bill. I object to it as calculated Patriotism to injure and to destroy the patriotic impulse of the young men paid army. the country, who want to be educated to believe that when there is danger they are the ones to confront it— the young men who should be taught to believe that a man is entitled to go into the Army when his country is assailed. He does not go into the Army for $15 a month, but he goes into it stimulated by patriotism and not by the hope of gain. You are going to say to all the young men, "You are not needed; it is folly to take an interest in military affairs, for we are going to fight our battles in the future with paid hirelings," whom we pick up frequently out of the very slums of Europe; men who are fighting machines, but are not thinking

men.

of the

Civil War.

Mr. President, we had a great army in the field, a million men at The armies one time on our side, and somewhat less on the other. Why were those two armies the best armies in the world that ever aggregated together? Simply because they were the brains and the patriotism of the country. There were, of course, some bounty jumpers and some foreigners, but the great battles were fought by the stalwart sons of American fathers and mothers, and that is where you have to go, unless you are to follow the European system and the European policy with a great standing army.

battles won by

We have fought our battles, not with the Regular Army, but with Glorious the volunteers. The great battles of the revolution were fought by humble men of the country who were not regulars. The war of volunteers. 1812, as will be discovered if anybody will take the pains to look, was won by volunteers, and the Mexican war was fought by volunteers and not by the regulars. The most glorious battles in the world, where the greatest heroism has been exhibited, where the greatest conflicts between men have taken place, have been fought, not by regulars, but by volunteers. It was the boys out of the shop, with the exception of the Old Guard, that fought for Napoleon on

Y

many a bloody battlefield. It was not the regulars. He called upon the French people and they responded. Such has been the case in England. Such is the case with every liberty-loving people. You must rely upon the people, not upon an army. An army is a vain delusion. It may to-day be for you; it may be against you to

morrow.

CHAPTER XVIII

TAXATION AND FINANCE

134. The Uniformity Rule Applied to Indirect Taxes

THE general taxing power of Congress is subject to the two great limitations that indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States and direct taxes must be apportioned among the States according to population. The question of direct and indirect taxes and the uniformity rule were thus discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Knowlton v. Moore reviewing the inheritance tax law enacted during the Spanish-American war.

of the

question.

The act of Congress of June 13, 1898, c. 448, which is usually Statement spoken of as the War Revenue Act, (30 Stat. 448), imposes various stamp duties and other taxes. Sections 29 and 30 of the statute, which are therein prefaced by the heading "Legacies and Distributive Shares of Personal Property," provide for the assessment and collection of the particular taxes which are described in the sections in question [i.e., inheritance taxes]. To determine the issues which arise on this record it is necessary to decide whether the taxes imposed are void because repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and if they be valid, to ascertain and define their true import...

It is asserted that it was decided in the income tax cases that, in order to determine whether a tax be direct within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be ascertained whether the one upon whom by law the burden of paying it is first cast, can thereafter shift it to another person. If he cannot, the tax would then be direct in the constitutional sense, and, hence, however obvious in other respects it might be a duty, impost, or excise, it cannot be levied by the rule of uniformity and must be apportioned. From this assumed premise it is argued that death duties cannot be shifted from the one

The Constitution, not political economy, the guide in explaining the term "direct."

The taxing power not to be obstructed

by subtle

on whom they are first cast by law, and therefore they are direct taxes requiring apportionment.

The fallacy is in the premise. It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the ability to shift the same was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. The constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things were decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely because of his general ownership of real property, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and hence must be apportioned. These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the person upon whom they first fall. The proposition now relied upon was considered and refuted in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515, where the court said:

"The commands of the Constitution in this, as in all other respects, must be obeyed; direct taxes must be apportioned, while indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. But distinctions, while yielding implicit obedience to these constitutional requirements, it is no part of the duty of this court to lessen, impede or obstruct the exercise of the taxing power by merely abstruse and subtle distinctions as to the particular nature of a specified tax, where such distinction rests more upon the differing theories of

political economists than upon the practical nature of the tax itself.

"In deciding upon the validity of a tax with reference to these requirements, no microscopic examination as to the purely economic or theoretical nature of the tax should be indulged in for the purpose of placing it in a category which would invalidate the tax. As a mere abstract, scientific or economical problem, a particular tax might possibly be regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter pertaining to the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be indirect. Under such circumstances, and while varying and disputable theories might be indulged as to the real nature of the tax, a court would not be justified, for the purpose of invalidating the tax, in placing it in a class different from that to which its practical results would consign it. Taxation is eminently practical, and is, in fact, brought to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who are experts in the science of political economy."

Concluding, then, that the tax under consideration is not direct within the meaning of the Constitution, but, on the contrary, is a duty or excise, we are brought to consider the question of uniformity. The contention is that because the statute exempts legacies and distributive shares in personal property below ten thousand dollars, because it classifies the rate of tax according to the relationship or absence of the relationship of the taker to the deceased, and provides for a rate progressing by the amount of the legacy or share, therefore the tax is repugnant to that portion of the first clause of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, which provides that "the duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

I

Practical

results to be

considered.

Inheritance

tax a duty or excise.

Does the feature vioprogressive late the clause? uniformity

Two views

On the one side, the proposition is that the command that duties, T imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States uniformity relates to the inherent and intrinsic character of the tax; that it rule.