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TAXES ON NECESSARIES.

Statement of duties collected upon articles which may be deemed necessaries of life, with values and amount of duties collected, for the fiscal year 1886-87.

*The value of cans or packages made of tin, and imported filled, are included with the value of their contents, under "free fish."

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*Includes $380,000,000 as the estimated net ordinary receipts and $285,016,650 actual receipts from Loans.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NAVY.

METHODS ADOPTED TO PUT THE WORK ON A BUSINESS BASIS-THE HISTORY OF AN EFFORT TO DO HONEST WORK.

The Contrast which this Policy Presents to that in vogue for Nearly Twenty Years Under Republican Management-Some Serious Abuses which have Been Rooted Out.

In his first annual message to Congress, December 8, 1885, President Cleveland thus expressed his opinion of the Navy of the United States as he found it when he entered upon his work and his hopes of what it might be made:

All must admit the importance of an effective Navy to a nation like ours, having such an extended sea-coast to protect. And yet we have not a single vessel of war that could keep the seas against a first-class vessel of any important power. Such a condition ought not longer to continue. The nation that cannot resist aggression is constantly exposed to it. Its foreign policy is of necessity weak, and its negotiations are conducted with disadvantage, because it is not in condition to enforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice.

Inspired, as I am, by the hope, shared by all patriotic citizens, that the day is not very far distant when our Navy will be such as befits our standing among the nations of the earth, and rejoiced at every step that leads in the direction of such a consummation, I deem it my duty to especially direct the attention of Congress to the close of the report of the Secretary of the Navy, in which the humiliating weakness of the present organization of his Department is exhibited, and the startling abuses and waste of its present methods are exposed. The conviction is forced upon us with the certainty of mathematical demonstrations that before we proceed further in the restoration of a Navy we need a thorough reorganized Navy Department. The fact that within seventeen years more than seventyfive millions of dollars have been spent in the construction, repair, equipment, and armament of vessels, and the further fact that, instead of an effective and creditable fleet, we have only the discontent and apprehension of a nation undefended by war vessels, added to the disclosures now made, do not permit us to doubt that every attempt to revive our Navy has thus far, for the most part, been misdirected, and all our efforts in that direction have been little better than blind gropings, and expensive, aimless follies.

Unquestionably if we are content with the maintenance of a Navy Department simply as a shabby ornament to the Government, a constant watchfulness may prevent some of the scandal and abuse which have found their way into our present organization, and its incurable waste may be reduced to the minimum. But if we desire to build ships for present usefulness instead of naval reminders of the days that are past, we must have a

department organized for the work, supplied with all the talent and ingenuity our country affords, prepared to take advantage of the experience of other nations, systematized so that all effort shall unite and lead in one direction, and fully imbued with the conviction that war vessels, though new, are useless unless they combine all that the ingenuity of man has up to this day brought forth relating to their construction.

I earnestly commend the portion of the Secretary's report devoted to this subject to the attention of Congress, in the hope that his suggestions touching the reorganization of his Department may be adopted as the first step toward the reconstruction of our Navy.

The sad condition of the Navy at the advent of the present administration, is something which could not be believed unless its truth was known. If the reckless waste of money, the extravagance, the inefficiency, and the open, flagrant corruption which existed in this department of the Government had been told in a novel by a writer of recognized position in the literary world, the world would not have believed it. But it was known for many years that this waste, extravagance, inefficiency and corruption were going on, and that the Government of the United States was getting a great deal less than nothing for its money. This, too, in spite of the fact that ever since the organization of the Navy Department, the people of the country have taken great pride in it, and that its achievements in every war and its conduct in every port of the world during long periods of peace, have reflected the highest credit upon our national name.

In spite of these conditions, William C. Whitney, the new Secretary of the Navy, after occupying his office for nine months, during which he carefully familiarized himself with every detail of the service entrusted to his care, thus characterized this branch of the service committed to his charge, in his annual report to the President, in December, 1885:

WHAT IT COST TO HAVE NO NAVY.

At the present moment it must be conceded that we have nothing which deserves to be called a Navy, The highest official authority in our service said in 1876 :

"There is no navy in the world that is not in advance of us with regard to ships and guns, and I, in common with the older officers of the service, feel an anxiety on the subject which can only be appreciated by those who have to command fleets and take them into battle."

And so recently as 1884 the same distinguished authority stated that it was universally admitted "that we have no navy either for offense or defense."

The country has expended since July 1, 1868-more than three years subsequent to the close of the late civil war-over seventy-five millions of money on the construction, repair, equipment, and ordnance of vessels, which sum, with a very slight exception, has been substantially thrown away; the exception being a few ships now in process of construction. I do not overlook the sloops constructed in 1874, and costing three or four millions of dollars, and to avoid discussion they may be excepted also. The fact still remains that for about seventy of the seventy-five millions of dollars which have been expended by the Department for the creation of a navy we have practically nothing to show.

It is questionable whether we have a single naval vessel finished and afloat at the present time that could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important power-a single vessel that has either the necessary armor for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense. This is no secret; the fact has been repeatedly commented upon in Congress by the leading members of both parties, confessed by our highest naval authorities, and deprecated by all. Such is not the kind of navy which this country, with its extensive coast line, its enormous territorial area, and incalculable commercial resources, requires, nor such as it is entitled to have. This country can afford to have, and it cannot afford to lack, a naval force at least so formidable that its dealings with foreign powers will not be influenced at any time, nor even be suspected of being influenced, by a consciousness of weakness on the sea. While still strving to build up its merchant marine and

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