thus: "those who are not candid [or uncandid] are not good reasoners: most infidels are not candid; most infidels are not good reasoners. Univocal, СПАР. Ѵ. SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [This Supplement may be studied either before or after the preceding three Chapters.] § 1. THE usual divisions of nouns into univocal, equivocal, and analogous, Analogous. and into nouns of the first and second intention, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of the manner of employing them; the same word may be employed either univocally, equivocally, or analogously; either in the First-intention, or in the Second. The ordinary logical treatises often occasion great perplexity to the learner, by not noticing this circumstance, but rather leading him to suppose the contrary. (See Book III. § 8.) Some of those other divisions of nouns, which are the most commonly in use, though not appropriately and exclusively belonging to the Logical system,-i.e. to the theory of reasoning,-it may be worth while briefly to notice in this place. Singular and Common terms. Absolute and Relative. Let it be observed, then, that a term expresses the view we take of an object. And its being viewed as an object, i.e. as one, or again as several, depends on our arbitrary choice; e.g. we may consider a "troop of cavalry" as one object; or we may make any single "horse with its rider," or any "separate man" or horse, or any limb of either, the subject of our thoughts. 66 1. When then any one object is considered according to its actual existence, as numerically one, the name denoting it is called Singular; as, this tree," the " 'city of London," &c. When it is considered as to its nature and character only, as being of such a description as might equally apply to other single objects, the inadequate or incomplete view (see B. I. § 3, and § 6,) thus taken of an individual, is expressed by a Common-term; as "tree," "city," "minister-of-state.' 2. When any object is considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole or to another part, of a more complex object of thought, the name expressing this view is called Relative: and to Relative-term is opposed Absolute; as denoting an object considered as a whole, and without reference to any thing of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. Thus, "Father," and "Son," "Rider," "Commander," &c. are Relatives; being regarded, each as a part of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, &c.; the same object designated absolutely, would be termed a Man, Living-Being, &c. Nouns are Correlative to each other, which denote objects related Correlative to each other, and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King is a ruler of men, King" and "Man" are not correlative, but "King" and Subject, are. 66 and opposite. 3. When there are two views which cannot be taken of one single Compatible object at the same time, the terms expressing these views are said to be Opposite, or Inconsistent [repugnantia]; as, "black," and "white;" when both may be taken of the same object at the same time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible [convenientia]; as "white," and "cold." Relative terms are Opposite, only when applied with reference to the same Subject: as, one may be both Master and Servant; but not at the same time to the same person. 4. When the notion derived from the view taken of any object, is Concrete expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term; as, foolish," or "fool;" when without any such reference, by an Abstract 50 term, as "folly." 66 and abstract tive, and 5. When a term applied to some object is such as to imply in its Attributive signification some "attribute" belonging to that object, such a term or Connotais called by some of the early logical writers" Connotative;" but Absolute or non-Connowould perhaps be more conveniently called "Attributive." It tative. connotes," i.e. "notes along with" the object [or implies] something considered as inherent therein: as "The capital of France;" "The founder of Rome." The founding of Rome, is, by that. appellation, "attributed" to the person to whom it is applied. A term which merely denotes an object without implying any attribute of that object, is called "Absolute" or "Non-connotative;" as 66 "Paris;" "Romulus." The last terms denote respectively the same objects as the two former; but do not, like them, connote [imply in their signification] any attribute of those individuals. 61 e.g. or Every Concrete-common-term is "attributive," [connotative] whether in the adjective or substantive form; as "Man," "human,' "triangle," "triangular," "saint," "holy:" for, "man "human,' are appellations denoting, not the attribute itself which we call "human-nature," but a Being to which such a term is applied in reference to, and by virtue of, its possessing that attribute. An Abstract-common-term, being the name of an Attribute-itself— as “human-nature," "triangularity," "holiness,"-is "Absolute" [non-connotative] except where there is an attribute of an attribute implied in the term; as the term "fear" e.g. may be considered as 50 It is unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all "Common terms" Abstract-terms. 51 Some logical writers confine the word to adjectives; but there seems no essential difference in reference to the Positive, Privative and Negative. implying some hope of escape; without which the apprehension of evil would be called "despair." It is to be observed that many a term is employed-and to a certain degree, correctly employed, i.e. not misapplied-by persons who do not clearly and fully take in its signification;—who do not know, or do not bring before their minds, exactly what is implied [connoted] by it. E.G. A child learns to apply the term "money to the bits of metal he sees pass from hand to hand, long before he has any clear notion (which some never fully attain) of what it is that constitutes "money," and is implied [connoted] by the term. So also it is conceivable that a person might, under certain circumstances, know perfectly what individuals are Aldermen, Senators, &c. while he had but a very vague and imperfect notion of the Office which such a term implies. And such a familiarity as this with any term, (together with one's being able to comprehend processes of reasoning in which it occurs) tends to conceal from men their imperfect apprehension of its signification, and thus often leads to confusion of thought, and error. (See B. IV. Ch. IV. § 2.) 66 6. A term which denotes a certain view of an object as being actually taken of it, is called Positive: as speech," "a man speaking" a term denoting that this view might conceivably be taken of the object, but is not, is Privative; as “dumbness," a "man silent," &c.52 That which denotes that such a notion is not and could not be formed of the object, is called Negative; as, a dumb statue," a "lifeless carcase, &c. 66 Many negative-terms which are such in sense only, have led to confusion of thought, from their real character being imperfectly perceived. E.G. "Liberty," which is a purely negative term, denoting merely "absence of restraint," is sometimes confounded with "Power." 53 It is to be observed that the same term may be regarded either as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, according to the quality or character which we are referring to in our minds: thus, of "happy" and "miserable," we may regard the former as Positive, and the latter (unhappy) as Privative; or vice versâ; according as we are thinking of enjoyment or of suffering. 7. A Privative or Negative term is also called Indefinite [infini 62 Many Privative epithets are such that by a little ingenuity the application of them may be represented as an absurdity. Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced in this treatise) that a jest is generally a mock-fallacy, i.e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as involving a contradiction: for the design to deceive," it might be said, "is essential to a fallacy." In the same way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of "a dead man" eg indefinite. tum] in respect of its not defining and marking out an object; in Definite and contradistinction to this, the Positive term is called Definite [finitum] because it does thus define or mark out. Thus, "organized Being," or "Cæsar," are called Definite, as marking out, and limiting our view to, one particular class of Beings, or one single person; "unorganized," or "not-Cæsar," are called Indefinite, as not restricting our view to any class, or individual, but only excluding one, and leaving it undetermined, what other individual the thing so spoken of may be, or what other class it may belong to. tory It is to be observed, that the most perfect opposition between terms Contradioexists between any two which differ only in respectively wanting opposition and having the particle not (either expressly, or in sense) attached of terms. to them; as," organized," and "not-organized;" "corporeal," and "incorporeal." For not only is it impossible for both these views to be taken at once of the same thing, but also, it is impossible but that one or other should be applicable to every object; as there is nothing that can be both, so there is nothing that can be neither. Every thing that can be even conceived, must be either " Cæsar,' "not-Cæsar;"—either “ corporeal," or "incorporeal." And or in this way a complete twofold division may be made of any subject, being certain (as the expression is) to exhaust it. And the repetition of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there is occasion, is thence called by Logicians "abscissio infiniti;" i.e. the repeated cutting off of that which the object to be examined is not; e.g. "1. This disorder either is, or is not, a dropsy; and for this or that reason, it is not; 2. Any other disease either is, or is not, gout; this is not; then, 3. It either is, or is not, consumption, &c." This procedure is very common in Aristotle's works. (See B. II. Ch. III. § 4.) Such terms may be said to be in Contradictory-opposition to each other. terms. On the other hand, Contrary terms, i.e. those which, coming Contrary under some one class, are the most different of all that belong to that class, as "wise" and "foolish" both denoting mental habits, are opposed, but in a different manner: for though both cannot be applied to the same object, there may be other objects to which neither can be applied: nothing can be at once both "wise" and “foolish;" but a stone cannot be either. § 2. The notions expressed by Common-terms, we are enabled (as has been remarked in the Analytical Outline) to form, by the faculty of abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively to some particular circumstances belonging to it, [some certain parts of its nature as it were,] and quite withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus Generaliza contemplating several individuals which resemble each other in some part of their nature, we can (by attending to that part alone, and not tion. to those points wherein they differ) assign them one common name, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all agree; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them: (which process is called generalization) and each of these names is called a common-term, from its belonging to them all alike; or a Predicables. predicable, because it may be predicated-affirmatively of them, or of any of them. (See B. I. § 3.) Species. Generalization (as has been remarked) implies Abstraction; but it is not the same thing; for there may be abstraction without generalization. When we are speaking of an Individual, it is usually an abstract notion that we form; e.g. suppose we are, speaking of the present King of France; he must actually be either at Paris or elsewhere; sitting, standing, or in some other posture; and in such and such a dress, &c. Yet many of these circumstances, (which are separable Accidents, and consequently) which are regarded as non-essential to the individual, are quite disregarded by us; and we abstract from them what we consider as essential; thus forming an abstract notion of the Individual. Yet there is here no generalization. 54 § 3. The following is the account usually given in logical treatises of the different kinds [heads] of Predicables; but it cannot be admitted without some considerable modifications, explanations and corrections, which will be subjoined. Whatever Term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their whole essence, which is called the Species; or a part of their essence (viz. either the material part, which is called the Genus, Differentia. or the formal and distinguishing part, which is called Differentia, or in common discourse, characteristic) or something joined to the essence; whether necessarily (i.e. to the whole species, or, in other words, universallu, to every individual of it), which is called a Property: or contingently (i.e. to some individuals only of the species), which is an Accident. Property. |