Statement of the Case. The act, however tortious, of an executive officer of a court, done under color of its process, is to be regarded as a proceeding of that court, with which comity and public policy require that courts of concurrent jurisdiction shall not interfere by injunctive or dispossessory process. A sale of land by a sheriff under an execution issued out of a court of equity in Kentucky is a proceeding in the court within the meaning of section 720 of the Revised Statutes, even if the levy made under the execution is improper in that the land to be sold belongs in fact to another person, a stranger to the proceedings, and the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction to restrain the sale by injunction. The purpose of section 720 of the Revised Statutes is not to preserve comity and harmonious action between courts of the same sovereignty exercising concurrent jurisdiction, but to obtain such an end and prevent unseemly conflict between courts of different sovereignties exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory, and the section should receive a liberal construction to accomplish its purpose. Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curtis, 645, disapproved. Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit Judges, and SEVERENS, District Judge. This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky which dismissed the bill of the appellant, the American Association, Limited, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for. The bill, after averring that the American Association, Limited, is a corporation and citizen of the Kingdom of Great Britain, and an alien, and that the defendants are citizens of Kentucky, and that the amount in controversy exceeds $2000, set forth that the complainant was the owner of real estate in Bell County, Kentucky, the legal title to part of which was in the name of the complainant, and the legal title to the rest of which was in the name of Alex. A. Arthur, trustee; that all of the property described had lately been levied upon by J. C. Colson, one of the defendants, as sheriff of Bell County, Kentucky, under an execution issued out of the Bell Court of Common Pleas in favor of the other defendant, E. Hurst, who was described in the execution as the master commissioner of said court; that this execution was issued against Alex. A. Arthur, trustee, and one John M. Brooks, for the sum of Counsel for Appellant. $14,834.63; that the levy was made by Colson against all of this property as the property of the complainant, and that, as sheriff, Colson had advertised that he would on a day subsequent to the filing of the bill offer the property for sale under the execution to the highest cash bidder; that before this there had been instituted in the Bell Court of Common Pleas a suit in equity to procure the sale of certain real estate, which was described in the proceeding as being the property of the heirs of one Robert George; that a judgment for the sale of the real estate was entered, and the defendant Hurst was thereby directed to make the sale; that at the sale the property was purchased by one Fish and another, who failed to comply with the terms of sale and subsequently transferred the benefit of their bid to one Alex. A. Arthur, denominated in the transfer as Alex. A. Arthur, trustee; that thereupon Arthur, trustee, and Brooks, above mentioned, executed two sale bonds as purchase money for the property, each in the sum of $10,827.25; that the execution levied upon the complainant's property was issued on these bonds (which are given by the statute of Kentucky the force of judgments); that Arthur had no authority as trustee for the complainant to purchase the property, to sign the bonds, or to make the complainant in any way liable to pay the purchase money; that the assignment was not made to him for the benefit of the complainant, and that he did not in fact intend and did not have any right to bind the complainant by the execution of the bonds; that, nevertheless, upon the claim that Arthur, as trustee, was acting merely for the complainant in signing the bonds, Hurst caused the execution upon said bonds to be issued; that Colson had levied the execution and was about to sell the property; that a cloud would be cast upon the title of the complainant to the property if Colson did sell it, and that the complainant would be unable to sell the same and would be thereby irreparably damaged. The prayer of the bill was that Colson be enjoined from selling the property under the execution, and that Hurst be enjoined from directing such sale. Messrs. Humphrey & Davie submitted a brief for the appellant. Opinion of the Court. No brief was filed for the appellees. TAFT, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. The court below held that the remedy sought by the complainant was forbidden in the Federal court by section 720 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that "the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." The questions necessary for us to consider are, first, whether the sale of land by a sheriff under an execution issued out of a Kentucky court of equity on a sale bond filed therein against the sureties thereon is a proceeding in that court within the meaning of said section 720; and, second, whether such a sale is a proceeding within the meaning of the section, if the levy be improper, in that the land to be sold in fact belongs to another person, a stranger to the proceeding. First. The provision which authorizes executions on sale bonds is to be found in chapter 38, art. 11, of the General Statutes of Kentucky, Bullitt & Feland's edition, page 560. The first section of the chapter is as follows: "Every bond taken on the sale of property under an order or judgment in chancery, or on the sale of property under execution, and every replevin and forthcoming bond, shall be signed by the principal and sureties, and attested by the person taking the same, or by some one in his presence. (1) A bond so taken shall be returned to the proper office, with a report of the acts of the person taking it; and if taken under an execution, the latter must be returned with the bond. (2) All such bonds shall have the force and effect of a judgment, and on which, if not paid at maturity, an execution may issue, and shall be indorsed that no surety of any kind is to be taken." Under the foregoing statute, the sale bond is a judgment against the principal and the sureties thereon. In Kentucky the sale made by the commissioner in equity is not complete until a report of its terms and the sale bond taken Opinion of the Court. shall have been returned to the court and approved by a decree of confirmation. The right of the purchaser to take the property depends upon the sanction of that decree. Arnett v. Anderson's Adm'r, 11 Kentucky Law Reporter, 671, 672; Forman v. Hunt, 3 Dana (Ky.), 614, 621; Busey v. Hardin, 2 B. Mon. 411; Taylor v. Gilpin, 3 Met. (Ky.) 544; Freeman on Executions (2d ed.), § 304a. When the order confirming the action of the commissioner is entered, it gives life to the sale bond, which then becomes an accepted obligation on the principal and sureties to complete the sale in accordance with the terms of the bond, and is in effect a confessed judgment for the amount of the bond. It was formerly the practice in Kentucky in proceedings in equity for the chancellor to make a special provision in the order of sale that a sale bond for the deferred payments should be taken, which sale bond should have the effect of a judgment upon which an execution might issue. The bond was then taken by the commissioner, reported to the court, and his proceedings were confirmed. Debard v. Crow, 7 J. J. Marsh. 7; Leavitt v. Goggin, 11 B. Mon. 229. It would hardly be contended that the execution, issued on a sale bond which has been given the effect of a judgment by special order of the court, is not a proceeding in that court. Now that by express statute every order of sale impliedly requires the giving of a sale bond which shall have the effect of a judgment, it is equally clear that the approval of the sale bond makes the execution issued thereon in accordance with the statute a proceeding of the court in which the bond is filed. The claim of counsel that it is a mere ministerial process issuing from the office of the court without judicial sanction cannot be sustained. It has been held in a number of cases that a purchaser at a judicial sale becomes a quasi party, and that where credit is given to him under an order of a court of equity the court retains jurisdiction to compel payment by him of the residue through attachment or by a resale of the property. Wood v. Mann, 3 Sumner, 318; Clarkson v. Read, 15 Grat. 288; Stephens v. Magruder, 31 Maryland, 168; Freeman on Executions (2d ed.), Opinion of the Court. The statutory provision which we are considering merely gives another remedy by which the court shall secure to the parties in the case before it payment of the purchase price which is bid at the sale had and confirmed in accordance with its decree. Second. But it is said that, even if an execution on a sale bond levied on the property of the obligees be a proceeding of the court in which the bond is filed, an attempt to levy such execution on the property of another, as the property of an obligor in the bond, is void, and, as it is not authorized by the execution, and is without the authority of the court, neither the levy nor the sale under it is a proceeding of the court within the meaning of section 720 of the Revised Statutes. Counsel for the appellant, to sustain this contention, rely on the case of Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curtis, 465, in which it was held by Mr. Justice Curtis on the circuit that the fifth section of the act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat. 333, 334, now section 720 of the Revised Statutes, did not prevent a United States court from enjoining a sheriff from levying on the property of A under a process issued by a state court against B. In that case, Mr. Justice Curtis said: "It must be admitted that an attachment on mesne process out of a state court, which the sheriff is authorized by that process to make, is a proceeding in a court of a State, within the meaning of this act of Congress; for the word 'proceedings' may properly include all steps taken by the court, or by its officers under its precepts, from the institution of the suit to the close of the final process which may issue thereon. But it is equally clear that an attachment on mesne process, which the sheriff was not authorized by that process to make, is in no sense a proceeding of the court from which such process issued. Thus, if a sheriff under a writ of attachment against the property of A should take his body or the property of B, this would not be a proceeding of the court, but a mere trespass, for which any appropriate remedy may be instantly sought in any court having jurisdiction. As Chancellor Kent remarked in his first Commentary, p. 410: If a marshal of the United States under an execution in favor of the United States against A should seize |