other State."

sec. 1.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Constitution of the United States, art. 4,

"The said records and judicial proceedings

shall

have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, c. 11.

The judgment of a court of a sister State may not be impeached for errors either of law or practice. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 1482, and cases cited; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 316; Central Trust Company v. Seasongood, 130 U. S. 482; The President, Directors and Company of the Bank of Wooster v. Stevens, 1 Ohio St. 233.

The judgment of a state court cannot be impeached collaterally in the courts of the United States. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 149; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. Wiggins Ferry Company, 108 U. S. 18.

A judgment obtained in a foreign State cannot be reviewed when suit is brought on it. Lewis, Executrix, v. Adams, 70 California, 403.

A foreign judgment in personam cannot be impeached when sued on here, though the defendant was denied the benefit of our rule of evidence and the judgment was based on false testimony and was erroneous. Hilton v. Guyott, 42 Fed. Rep. 249.

The record of a foreign judgment, properly certified, must be regarded as a verity. Coughran v. Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442.

The decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in another State, that service of process on a president and cashier was a sufficient service, is conclusive. Glenn v. Semple, 80 Alabama, 159.

When, in an action on a foreign judgment, it is determined that the court had jurisdiction, no question can be raised whether service was had according to the laws of such States. Hall v. Mackay, 78 Texas, 248.

If it appears affirmatively from the record of the judgment, and as a matter of adjudication, that the defendant had legal notice of the suit, or duly authorized an appearance to be;

Opinion of the Court.

entered for him, then he is no longer at liberty to allege a want of jurisdiction. 2 Black on Judgments (1891), § 901; Gleason v. Dodd, Administrator, 4 Met. (Mass.) 333; Bennett v. Morley, 10 Ohio, 100; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481.

In the case at bar, the defendants, in the courts of Rhode Island, raised the issue that they were not legally served with process. That is one of the questions litigated and adjudicated in this case, and cannot again be raised here. Capwell v. Sipe, 17 R. I. 475.

LURTON, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit upon a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island against John F. Sipe and Carl C. Sigler, the plaintiffs in error, and in favor of Roger F. Capwell, the defendant in error.

The defense interposed by the answer was that the judg ment was void because jurisdiction was obtained by the service of process upon the defendants thereto when they were in attendance upon the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, as parties defendant to a suit then pending for trial. A demurrer to the answer was sustained (51 Fed. Rep. 667), and judgment rendered for the plaintiff in default of further defense. The judgment of the Circuit Court upon the demurrer filed by the plaintiffs in error is now assigned as

error.

Is the judgment of the Rhode Island court void? We think it is not. That court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. This is not contested. It had jurisdiction of the defendants by personal service of the writ of summons. The defendants pleaded in abatement the circumstances under which they had been summoned, and insisted that they were exempt from summons while in attendance as parties to another suit then and there pending against them in the same court. This presented an issue for adjudication. It was decided adversely to the contention then and now urged by the plaintiffs in error. Capwell v. Sipe, 17 R. I. 475. The determination of that question was clearly within the jurisdiction of the Rhode

Opinion of the Court.

Island court. Its solution depended upon the statute or common law of that State. It decided that the Rhode Island statute exempting witnesses from arrest or summons while in attendance as witnesses did not apply to any other than witnesses. It further decided that there was nothing in the public policy of that State which exempted parties to pending suits from service of process in new suits. Whether these questions were rightly or wrongly decided is a matter of no importance in the present aspect of the question. The court had jurisdiction to determine these issues. The soundness of the adjudication cannot be questioned in a collateral attack. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Central Trust Company v. Seasongood, 130 U. S. 482; Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. Wiggins Ferry Company, 108 U. S. 18. It is not a question as to the effect of constructive or substituted service, as in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. There was actual service of process. Whether there was an abuse of the process of the court was a question for the determination of the court whose process is complained of. Fitzgerald and Mallory Construction Company v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 105. The decision of the Rhode Island court at most would be erroneous, and in no view of the case is the judgment void. Having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person by actual service of process, it had the power to determine for itself that its process had not been abused, nor the jurisdiction acquired fraudulently. Its judgment is entitled to full respect, and cannot be reviewed by the Circuit Court.

It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the Circuit Court be

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

ASHLEY v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF PRESQUE ISLE (2).

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.

No. 116. Submitted January 8, 1894. Decided February 5, 1894.

The rulings of this court in Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Presque Isle (1), ante, p. 656, adhered to and a petition for a rehearing of the case denied.

Board of Supervisors of Dickinson County v. Warren, 98 Michigan, 144, distinguished.

Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit Judges, and SEVERENS,

District Judge.

On petition for a rehearing of Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Presque Isle (1), ante, p. 656. The grounds of the application are fully stated in the opinion of this court.

Mr. Henry M. Duffield for defendant in error, petitioner.

SEVERENS, District Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In support of this application four reasons are assigned by the petitioner.

First. It is suggested that the opinion of the court as announced in regard to the original organization of Presque Isle County proceeds upon the theory that the later organization in 1875 continued the previous one, whereas, it is urged, the people of the county from the first treated the act of 1871 as invalid, and the legislature by the act of 1875 recognized the invalidity of the former act. The only action of the people of the county which is referred to as being in repudiation of the original organization consists of their applications to the board of supervisors of Alpena County, in July, 1871, first, for the annexation of territory to the township of Rogers,

Opinion of the Court.

and second, for the formation of Presque Isle Township, upon both which applications the latter board took favorable action, to which no objection was made, but, on the contrary, it was acquiesced in. As to this, it is to be observed that we were of opinion that the act of 1871 provided for an organization thereafter to take place, the consequence of which was to leave the county of Presque Isle in its existing governmental relations with the county of Alpena until such organization should be effected. It was entirely consistent with this that, if the organization of the new county had not then been had, the people thereof should have made these applications to the Alpena County board, and that the board should have acted upon them, as it did. Indeed, it may be that these applications were made for the very purpose of qualifying the county to organize under the act.

In regard to the supposed disregard of the previous organization under the act of 1871 by the legislature in 1875, we do not think it necessary to repeat what was said in the former opinion. What was then said was aimed not so much to demonstrate that the legislature affirmatively recognized the organization already made as a valid one, as to show that in our judgment there was no good reason for treating the later act as a repudiation of what had been done by the county, and, further, to express our opinion that rights which had in the meantime become vested could not, at all events, be defeated by this legislative action, however construed.

Second. It is said that the decision already made is in irreconcilable conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425. Having already fully considered that case, and, as we think, shown the distinction between it and this, we do not think it necessary to go over the ground again. All the cases and reasons mentioned by the petitioner on this head were presented by the brief and arguments on the original hearing, and have been carefully considered by the court.

Third. The reason next assigned why a rehearing should be had is that the holding of the court that because "the bonds were issued to refund a debt, and not to raise money