pier built by the United States on submerged land forming a part of
the bottom of a river claimed by the plaintiff is properly reviewable
by writ of error or appeal by a Circuit Court of Appeals, and not by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Scranton v. Wheeler, 152.
See JURISDICTION, E, 3.

E. JURISDICTION OF THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES.

1. In this case it was held that an order of a Circuit Court continuing an
injunction must be reversed upon the ground that the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court had been obtained by collusion, the members of the
court not having concurred in directing a reversal upon any other
of the questions discussed in the opinions reported. Industrial and
Mining Guaranty Company v. Electrical Supply Company, 196.

2. In 1884, D. instituted a suit against B. & Sons in a Kentucky court.
This suit was duly removed to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Kentucky, and on December 22, 1886, D. recovered
judgment against B. & Sons for $3938.40, with interest and costs.
This judgment was forthwith assigned by D. to various persons, one
of whom was W., as trustee for D.'s wife, and notices of the assign-
ments were duly filed in the clerk's office. On December 11, 1886,
M. began suit in an Ohio state court against D. on certain notes,
and had issued a writ of attachment on the ground of D.'s non-
residence. This writ of attachment was served on B. & Sons on
December 13, 1886, to attach their debt to D. On July 8, 1890, the
Ohio state court rendered judgment by default in favor of M. against
D. for $2913.30, and ordered B. & Sons, the garnishees, to pay M. the
amount thereof. On June 16, 1891, B. & Sons filed a bill of inter-
pleader in the United States Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky.
Held, (1) That the defendant in the United States court was first
bound to answer fully the orders and judgments of that court, and
that, having done so, he was protected thereby; (2) that it made no
difference that the notice of garnishment from the state court was
served on B. & Sons before the judgment was rendered in the United
States court; and (3) that the several assignments of partial interests
in the original judgment in the United States court were valid, and
took precedence over the lien of the plaintiff in the garnishment pro-
ceedings in the Ohio state court, because the proceedings by D.
against B. & Sons in the United States court were instituted prior to
those in the Ohio state court by M. against D., and, consequently,
that the jurisdiction of the United States court, and the right of the
plaintiff therein to prosecute, had attached, and that such right could
not be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court.
Mack v. Winslow, 602.

3. As affecting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court the question of the
bona fides of the transfer of bonds where no issue on the subject was

framed in the court below, the question being one which arises for
the action of the court under section 5 of the judiciary act of March
3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, 472, c. 137, which requires the court of its own
motion to dismiss an action if it shall appear at any time that it has
been collusively brought, is, it would seem, in a case of fair doubt, a
question for the Circuit Court to determine, although a Circuit Court
of Appeals could and would deal with it if the fault clearly appeared.
In this case, however, as no such issue arose on the pleadings in the
court below, and as it appeared on the face of the record that the
court had jurisdiction, this court in sending the case back for a new
trial directed the Circuit Court to permit, in its discretion, an amend-
ment of the defendant's plea by appending to it a plea in abatement,
in accordance with the rules of practice of the Circuit Courts of the
State of Michigan, of the matter touching the jurisdiction, whereon
a separate verdict could be taken, or, if it should be deemed best, to
leave the question for its own disposition under said act of 1875.
Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Presque Isle (1), 656.
See CLERKS, B, 2;
JUDICIAL SALE, 4;

1

1. In this case the complainants' father, F., in 1839 became a tenant in
common with one P. of certain lands in the State of Tennessee, and
held that interest until his death in 1846. In 1844 P., without the i
consent or knowledge of F., conveyed the entire tract to one W., and
in concert with the latter fraudulently withheld the deed from reg-
istration until 1851. The defendants, M. and others, derived their
title to the lands in question by mesne conveyances from W. and his
grantees and their successors, who had been in possession claiming
the entire tract since F.'s death in 1846. At the time of P.'s fraudu-
lent conveyance to W. the complainants were infants of the ages of
from four to seven years, and the fraud was perpetuated by P.'s false
representations, which dissuaded the complainants, who knew that
their father had once had an interest in the lands, from inquiring
into the facts because of their confidence in P.'s integrity and rela-
tionship, he being their uncle. The complainants had no knowledge
of the fraud or of their father's interest in the lands until 1887. The
complainants having brought an action in 1892 praying for an equi-
table partition of the lands, it was held (1) that the adverse possession

of others was itself notice that they held the lands under a title the
character of which the complainants were bound to ascertain; and (2)
that the complainants were guilty of inexcusable laches, and were not
entitled to recover. Fuller v. Montague, 391.

2. A director and stockholder of an insolvent corporation, who, after
making a demand on the assignee of the corporation to institute the
suit, and after the assignee's refusal to comply with the demand,
would commence a suit to compel an officer of the corporation to
account for unauthorized acts in issuing and paying illegal notes,
must himself be free from laches; he must have used such diligence
and vigilance in protecting his own interests as the law requires from
one in his position; and he is chargeable with such knowledge as he
might have obtained upon inquiry if the facts actually known to him
were such as to put upon a man of ordinary intelligence the duty of
inquiry. Streight v. Junk, 608.

See CREDITOR'S BILL, 2;

FORECLOSURE, 2.

LANDS UNDER WATER.

1. In the United States the title to submerged lands within the banks
of navigable rivers belongs to the States respectively within which
such rivers are situated, and not to the United States. Scranton v.
Wheeler, 152.

2. As an incident to the ownership of land on the margin of navigable
streams, the law of Michigan attaches the legal title to the submerged
land under the stream comprehended within parallel lines extending
perpendicularly to the general trend of the shore along the owner's
land to the center of the stream. Ib.

3. The State of Michigan holds the soil beneath her navigable rivers under
a high public trust to preserve them forever free as public highways,
subject only to the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
States, and the legal title which, under her law, becomes vested in the
owners of the soil beneath her navigable waters is subject to the same
public trust, and is therefore subordinate to the rights of navigation
and to the power of Congress to control and use the soil under such
streams whenever the necessities of navigation and commerce should
demand it, and such right of Congress to regulate commerce, and, as
an incident, navigation remains unaffected by the question as to
whether the title to the soil submerged is in the State or in the owner
of the shore. Ib.

4. Under the provisions of the act of Congress of September 26, 1850,
9 Stat. 469, c. 71, the United States granted unto P. and to the heirs of
N. certain lands on the Sault Ste. Marie, (now known as the St. Mary's
River,) in Michigan. The grant was made in 1874. Prior to the date
of the grant and after the enactment of the act of Congress of Septem-

ber 26, 1850, the United States granted to the State of Michigan cer-
tain land through the military reservation at Sault Ste. Marie for the
construction of a ship canal, the selection and location of the site to be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of War. The canal was begun
in 1853 and completed, as it was originally constructed, in 1855. The
river in front of the claim of P. and the heirs of N. was navigable
in its natural state, but immediately below were the rapids and falls,
to avoid which the canal was built. The river with its connecting
waters formis an important highway for interstate and international
commerce. After the grant to P. and the heirs of N. Congress appro-
priated certain moneys for the construction, repair, preservation and
completion of the canal "to be expended under the direction of the
Secretary of War." As part of the work of the completion of the
canal a pier was constructed by the United States Government upon
the submerged land forming a part of the bottom of the St. Mary's
River in front of the upland owned by the plaintiff. This pier cov-
ered the entire water front of the plaintiff, and is upon and within
the riparian rights which he claims. The pier is a prolongation
westward into deep water of the bank of the government canal,
shelters the Lake Superior entrance to the canal, and is such an exten-
sion thereof as to cut off the plaintiff's direct access to deep water.
Subsequently to the construction of the canal the State of Michigan
transferred it to the United States. An action in ejectment was
brought by the plaintiff, the owner of a portion of the land granted
by the United States under the act of Congress of September 26, 1850,
against an officer of the United States who was superintendent of the
canal and in charge and possession of the pier, holding the same for
the Government, upon the claim that he was the owner of the sub-
merged land upon which the pier was built. Held, upon the applica-
tion of the foregoing principles, (1) that under the law of Michigan
the plaintiff was seised of the legal title to the submerged land upon
which the United States had constructed the pier; (2) that with the
legal title the plaintiff took such proprietary rights as were consistent
with the public right of navigation and the control of Congress over
that right; (3) that submerged lands could only be disposed of by the
State when that could be done without injury to the interests of the
public in the waters, and subject to the paramount right of Congress
to control their navigation, so far as necessary for the regulation of
commerce with foreign nations and between the States; and (4) that
the plaintiff had sustained an injury that was wholly a consequence of
the erection of a structure by Congress in aid of the general and public
right of navigation, and that if Congress could lawfully use the soil
as a support for a pier, without acquiring the naked title outstanding
in the plaintiff, then the damages which the plaintiff had sustained
for merely consequential injuries were damages absque injuria. Ib.
See COMMERCE, REGULATIONS OF;
JURISDICTION, D.

LAND UNDER WATERS OF THE ST. MARY'S RIVER.

See EJECTMENT, 2;

LANDS UNDER WATER, 4;

PATENT FOR PUBLIC LANDS.

LAW AND EQUITY.

See CREDITOR'S BILL, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, 1.

LAW AND FACT.
See INSURANCE (LIFE), 1.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

See ADMINISTRATOR, 5.

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
See ADMINISTRator, 1.

LIBEL.

1. An arrangement by all the newspapers of a city that they will not pub-
lish the fact that a libel suit has been brought against any one of them
may not be unlawful, but, in a suit for libel, the jury may properly
consider that the defendant's newspaper being a party to an agreement
which would have the effect of preventing one whose reputation would
be injured by unfounded charges in the defendant's columns from
securing the partial remedy of publishing to the world, in the ordinary
way, his denial under oath and his intention to vindicate his character,
indicates on the defendant's part an indifference to the possible wrong
it may do to such a person. If the motive for such an agreement can
be found in the newspaper's desire not to impair its credit by publish-
ing the fact of a suit for large damages against it, this is an argument
to be addressed to the jury in explanation of the circumstance, but it
is not so conclusive in its character as to prevent the circumstance
from being relevant for the reason above stated. Post Publishing Com-
pany v. Hallam, 613.

2. If, in approving a publication, the general manager of a newspaper is
moved by malice or its equivalent, he so far represents the corporation
which publishes the paper of which he is the general manager that his
malice is, in law, the malice of the corporation.

Ib.

3. Where a newspaper offers rumors to show good faith in publication of
an alleged libel, and the plaintiff shows other widespread reports which
offer an explanation of the transaction in question, consistent with the
plaintiff's integrity, and which make it appear probable that the de-
fendant had, or could have had, on the slightest inquiry, the benefit