Butcher v. Butcher, 14 Beav. 222; Lord ROMILLY.-I think it is settled upon the authorities that a mere contingency, which remains a contingency during the coverture, is not within a covenant of this description. I think that property within the covenant must be a vested interest at some time during the coverture. By that I do not mean that it must actually fall into possession, but must not remain a contingency. As I am of that opinion, it is not necessary now to go into the question of whether, if the estate tail had fallen into possession during the coverture, anything more would have been affected by the covenant than a life interest. The only question in the case must therefore be answered in the affirmative. : Dangerfield and Fraser. Solicitors: V.C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. March 4, 6, and 7. SAYRE v. HUGHES. Parent and Child-Joint investment—Advancement Resulting trust. Where a mother transferred stock into the joint names of herself and her daughter and received the dividends during her life, the fact of the relationship between the parties was held, on her death, to raise a presumption of intended benefit to the daughter, which rebutted the resulting trust. This was an administration suit. The facts were as follows: The husband of the testatrix, Susannah Barling, died in Aug. 1861, and at the time of his death several sums of India Five per Cent. Stock amounting in the whole to 21007, purchased by him, but standing in the joint names of himself and his wife, became the property of the testatrix by survivorship. Shortly afterwards the testatrix transferred the stock into her own sole name. On the 2nd June 1862, the testatrix made her will, whereby, after bequeathing the interest of 10002. of the stock to her daughter, the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling, for life, and the remainder of that sum absolutely to her youngest and only other child, the plaintiff Susannah, wife of Edward Sayre, she directed the residue of her property to be divided between her two daughters equally. On the 30th July 1862 the testatrix transferred 1000% of the stock into the joint names of herself and the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling, and subsequently, in Dec. 1864, she made a similar transfer of 300%. The bill stated that at the time of making her will the testatrix informed her two daughters that she intended to place both of their names along with her own at the bank. Some little time after wards, however, she told the plaintiff Susannah Sayre that she had been advised not to transfer the stock into her name, on account of her husband, and she had accordingly placed it in her sister's conjointly with her own; but she added that this would make no difference to the plaintiff when she (the testa [V.C. S. trix) was gone. From the time of the transfer up to her death the testatrix always received the dividends of the stock, and applied them to her own use. The bill then stated that in Dec. 1864, shortly after the transfer of the 3001. stock, the testatrix told the defendant Joseph Hughes (one of the executors of her will) that she wished to make a new will, and that she then expressly mentioned to him amongst other things the two sums of stock. The will, however, was not then actually prepared or executed; but on the 31st Jan. 1865, the day before the testatrix died, the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling her mother, who was dying and desired to sign her called upon Hughes and asked him to go at once to will. Hughes accordingly saw the testatrix, and took from her instructions in writing from which he was to prepare a draft will. By this draft will the testatrix, after providing for payment of her debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, proposed to bequeath to the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling her household furniture, linen, wearing apparel, plate, china, and other effects; to the plaintiff Susannah Sayre, 350l. India Stock; to Mary Ann Featherstone 100Z.; and all the residue of her property to her executors to invest in the India Five per Cent. Stock, for the sole benefit of the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling during her life, and after her death that the same should be given absolutely to the plaintiff Susannah Sayre; and the testatrix directed that if Mary Ann Featherstone, should survive the last-named defendant, the sum of 300%. should be paid to her by the plaintiff. The bill also stated that before Hughes could find any person to witness the will the testatrix became anxious to sign it, and he accordingly permitted her to do so, promising to call the next day and have it properly executed. The testatrix, however, died on the following day (the 1st Feb. 1865), without executing the will. After her death the will of the 2nd June, 1862, was proved by the defendant Joseph Hughes. At the time of her death the testatrix was possessed of a freehold grave in Abney-park Cemetery, of some cash in the house and in a savings bank, some furniture, 550l. India Five per Cent. stock, standing in her own name, and of the 13004. like stock standing in the joint names of herself and her daughter Sarah Elizabeth Barling. The plaintiff alleged that the testatrix had always expressed a great abhorrence of Government duties, and had made the transfers of the stock in question in the hope that she might escape those duties; that she had retained the other part of the stock in her own name for the purpose of buying a house, and for which, in fact, she was in treaty shortly before her death; that the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling had repeatedly admitted that the sums of 1000l. and 3007. were not her own property, but belonged to the testatrix. In June 1866 the plaintiff, after several ineffectual attempts to obtain from Hughes payment of that amount of the testatrix's property which she claimed as her due, filed this bill against him and Sarah Elizabeth Barling, praying that the testatrix's will might be administered and the trusts carried into effect by the court; that it might be declared that the said sums of 1000l. India Five per cent. stock, and 3007. like stock, were part of testatrix's estate at her death; and that the defendant, Sarah Elizabeth Barling, was a trustee thereof for the testatrix's estate; that the defendants might be decreed to account for the said sums of stock; and that the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling might be restrained by injunction from selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of the said stock or any part thereof, and from receiving or otherwise disposing of the dividends. The defendant Joseph Hughes, by his answer, SAYRE v. HUGHES. V.C. S.] after stating that previously to the death of the testatrix he was not well informed as to her affairs, went on to say that about a month before the testatrix died she told him that she desired to alter her will, but nothing whatever was said or done with reference to the making such alteration until the 31st Jan. 1865, the day before the testatrix died. Early on that day the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling called on him, and informed him that the testatrix wished to see him, and he thereupon called on the testatrix. The testatrix then stated to him that she was desirous of altering her will by giving the sum of 350%. India Stock absolutely to the plaintiff Susannah Sayre, and the reversion in a sum of 1000l. India Five per Cent. Stock after the decease of the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling; but that she, the testatrix, did not intend the plaintiff Susannah Sayre to have any share in the residuary estate. That he then put these instructions into writing, and the testatrix signed them-the signature, however, was not attested. He afterwards carried the instructions to a Mr. Prendergast for the purpose of having them formally embodied in a will or codicil, but the testatrix died (as already stated) without executing theproposed will. The defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling, by her answer, stated that the two sums of 1000l. and 3007. India Stock were intended as a provision for her in the event of her surviving the testatrix. The investment had been made in their joint names for that purpose, and that the mode had suggested itself to the testatrix from the fact of her having herself become absolutely entitled to the stock by surviving her husband. The defendant also stated that she had always been subject to fits, and that during her mother's lifetime she had invariably resided with and was maintained by her. In the year 1862, about the time of the transfer of the stock into their joint names, she had expressed her apprehension to the testatrix that after her death the plaintiff Susannah Sayre, would interfere with her, and thereupon the testatrix replied, "You need not be afraid, I have settled all that." She also stated that on one occasion in January, 1865, the testatrix went to the bank to receive her dividends, but, as she either neglected to ask for the right sum, or did not sufficiently describe the stock, she was unable to receive them. In speaking of this on her return home, she said to the defendant, in the presence of one of the servants, "This comes of endeavouring to make all secure for Sarah," meaning the defendant. On the next day the testatrix again went to the bank, taking her stock receipts with her, and she then received the dividends. The defendant further stated that about eight months before her death the testatrix was desirous of purchasing the house in which she resided, with the view of providing a permanent home for her, the defendant, but that the negotiations for the purchase had been broken off, in consequence of the owner of the house being unable to make out a good title. Upon these grounds she claimed to be entitled to the sums in dispute. Bacon, Q. C. and Cecil Russsell, for the plaintiffs, contended that the stock in question formed part of the testatrix's residuary estate, and devolved accordingly. The investment could not be considered an advancement for the benefit of Sarah Elizabeth Barling. In the absence of proof such a presumption could not arise. A mother did not stand in loco parentis, and the law imposed no duty on her, like it did on a father, to make a provision for her child. The onus of proving an intention to advance was with the defendants; but the evidence they adduced by no means justified such an inference. They cited Re Derisme, 2 De G. J. & S. 17: Powys v. Mansfield, 3 M. & C. 366; Soar v. Forester, 4 K. & J. 152; Holt v. Frederick, 2 P. W. 356; Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. W. 448. [V.C. S. Greene, Q. C. and Renshaw, for the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling, argued that, primâ facie, the inference to be drawn from the stock being in the joint names of mother and daughter was that it was intended as a provision for the daughter in the event of survivorship. In questions of advancement the same rule applied equally to a father and mother. It was beyond dispute that the testatrix wished to provide substantially for her daughter Sarah, and this, coupled with the fact of her previous knowledge of the effect of the joint investment, could only lead to the conclusion that the stock was meant for the daughter's benefit. They cited Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swan. 594; Currant v. Jago, 1 Col. 261; Christy v. Courtenay, 13 Beav. 96; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 456; Beecher v. Major, 2 D. & S. 431. W. Renshaw appeared for the defendant Hughes. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-There is no doubt considerable difficulty in this case, but I think, by a careful attention to the principle involved, the difficulty may in a great measure be removed. The court never presumes a resulting trust without some good cause. If money is found invested in the names of two persons, the presumption of law is that it is their joint property. But if it is proved that one of two purchased the stock, and that the name of the other was used without any consideration proceeding from him, the fact of the want of consideration, as Lord Chief Baron Eyre very clearly shows, induces the court to presume a resulting trust. The more simple case, and the one generally referred to in reported decisions, is that of a purchase by one person in the name of another. There, as soon as you have the fact of the purchase in evidence, and show that the purchase-money was paid by another than the one to whom the convey ance was made, the want of consideration almost necessarily, in the contemplation of equity and even of law, gives rise to the presumption of a resulting trust. In the case, however, of a father purchasing property in the name of his son, the circumstance of the relationship be tween the two is sufficient to induce the court to presume a benefit to the son, which would rebut the notion of a resulting trust. In the ordinary case of a purchase, where the conveyance is made to one person, and the purchase-money is paid and the rents received by another, it would generally be presumed that the person who has paid the money is the direct owner of the property. Between father and son, however, in such a case, an intended benefit to the son might be presumed from the relationship. The same doctrine extends to a purchase by a person in loco parentis. Lord Cottenham, commenting upon the force and meaning of this expression, says that it may be applied to a person standing in such relationship to the individual in question as would raise a presumption of an intention to benefit him. In the present case it has been argued that a mother is not bound to make an advancement to her child, and that a widowed mother does not stand in such a relationship to her child as to raise a presumption that in a transaction like the present a benefit was intended. Now, in my opinion, that is not the law. If a stranger can stand in loco parent is in a matter of advancement, how much stronger must the V.C.S.] THE LONDON MONETARY ADVANCE COMPANY v. Bean. [V.C. M. position apply to the case of a mother. The relationship of a mother to a child is perhaps stronger than that of a father, although the duty may not be so strong. It is said to be the duty of the father to advance his child. That is a moral, but not a legal obligation; he is not legally bound to leave his child any portion of his property. The great value of the case of Dyer v. Dyer (supra) depends on the masterly exposition of the law on this subject by Chief Baron Eyre. He shows that the relationship between father and son is only a circumstance of evidence. The principle involved is so important, that the exposition of the learned judge is deserving of the greatest attention. He says: "The clear result of all the cases without a single exception is, that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold, whether taken in the names of the purchasers and others jointly, or in the names of others without that of the purchaser, whether in one name or several, whether jointly or successive, results to the man who advances the purchase-money. This is a general proposition supported by all the cases, and there is nothing to contradict it; and it goes on a strict analogy to the rule of the common law, that where a feoffment is made without consideration the use results to the feoffor. It is the established doctrine of a court of equity, that this resulting trust may be rebutted by circumstances of evidence. The cases go one step further, and prove that the circumstance of one or more of the nominees being a child or children of the purchaser is to operate by rebutting the resulting trust; and it has been determined in so many cases that the nominee being a child shall have such operation as a circumstance of evidence, that we should be disturbing landmarks if we suffered either of these propositions to be called in question, namely, that such circumstance shall rebut the resulting trust, and that it shall do so as a circumstance of evidence." Now, why does that circumstance of evidence rebut the resulting trust? Because it induces the presumption of a benefit intended for the child. The word "father" does not occur in Lord Chief Baron Eyre's judgment, and one is at a loss to understand upon what intelligible principle a mother should be presumed less disposed to benefit her child than a father. There seems to be no sense or meaning in the distinction. No doubt, from the constitution of society, benefits of this kind are much less likely to be conferred by the mother than the father; but that cannot affect the present question. There was an old notion with regard to the law of advancement, that the per- Practice-Foreclosure-Pro confesso-Order absolute— son making the provision must be either the father or somebody standing in loco parentis; but it is enough, if the principle is worth anything, to show that a relationship existed between the parties which would raise a presumption that a benefit was intended. Both in the case of Dyer v. Dyer and that of Grey v. Grey (supra), the father received the rents after the purchase. Now, if the consideration proceeds from the father, and the property stands in the name of the son, as the legal proprietor, but the rent is not received by him, but by the father, it would be very difficult to say that even the relationship between the parties would give rise to the presumption of intended benefit to the son. But Lord Nottingham, who decided the latter case, seems to have considered that if a son, who is either not at all or but in part advanced, suffers his father, who has purchased an estate in his name, to receive the rents, this act of reverence will not be allowed to prejudice his claim to the estate as an advancement; but if the son be married in his father's lifetime, and a settlement has been made upon him fully advancing, and in a manner emancipating him, then in a purchase under similar circumstances a resulting trust would arise to the father. In the case decided by Lord Nottingham the subject-matter in dispute was real property; but if it had been personal property, or, as in this case, East India Stock, invested in the joint names of father and son, the circumstance of the receipt of the dividends by one of the two, as either might receive them, would amount to little or nothing. All of these cases come back to the purpose for which the purchase was made. In the present instance this lady, by surviving her husband, became entitled to a sum of East India Stock which had been standing in their joint names. She knew perfectly well that she had by survivorship become absolute owner of the stock without payment of legacy duty, and knowing this, she transfers 1000%. of it into the joint names of herself and her daughter. The question is for what purpose? There seems to have been no rational motive for making her daughter a trustee of the stock: such a course could not better the mother's security in the stock, but, on the contrary, tended to place it out of her control. I cannot therefore presume that a trust was intended. It is certain that the testatrix, by bequeathing other portions of the same stock to her daughter, wished to make a provision for her, and it may be assumed that, as she knew that she herself had obtained the stock by survivorship, it would belong to her daughter the same way. It has been suggested as a reason for the joint investment that the testatrix wished to avoid payment of legacy duty; but the result of escaping from this payment could be of no personal advantage to the testatrix while on the other hand if this stock is the property of the daughter, as it unquestionably is at law, it would certainly benefit her. The case has been most fully and ably argued on both sides, but, after a full consideration of all the circumstances, I can come to no other conclusion than that there is no resulting trust, and that the defendant Sarah Elizabeth Barling is entitled to the property. There will therefore be a declaration to that effect. A Solicitor for the plaintiff, Alfred Howard. V.C. MALINS' COURT. Reported by G. T. EDWARDS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Thursday, April 30. THE LONDON MONETARY ADVANCE COMPANY v. Order XXII., rule 15. defendant in a foreclosure suit having made default, Held, that there must be an order similar_to_that in Bristowe applied in this matter in consequence of a difficulty which had occurred in drawing up an order obtained from this court on the 5th March (vide p. 52 ante). That application was made under Order XXII., rule 15 (Morgan's Ch. Prac., 4th edit., 482; 3rd edit. 465) which provides that where a decree is not absolute under the 8th rule, the court may order it to be made absolute on the motion of the plaintiff made first after three weeks after service of the copy of the decree on the defendant within the jurisdiction; second, after the expiration of the time limited by the notice provided for by the 10th rule, where he is out of the jurisdiction; and, V.C M.] Crane v. Kilpin—The Velletri and TerraCINA COMPANY (LIMited). [V.C. G. deducting income tax, and Kilpin and John Jamesnow petitioned to carry the orders of the court into effect, and the only question was whether the creditors should receive the whole 1347. 11s. 6d. or 301. 4s. 10d., which would be the balance after deducting income tax. third, after three years from the decree when he has not been served with a copy. Three periods being provided for, it was the last that was now necessary to refer to. That was equivalent to a vesting order. The former motion was to make the decree absolute. It appeared now that it was not regular in form because it was partly an order to take the bill pro confesso; and when it went before the registrar to draw it up, Bevir, in support of the petition submitted that he felt unable to do more than draw up that inasmuch as Charles James Kilpin had paid income portion which made the decree absolute: (Smith v. tax, on his gross income, and as by the income tax Bouchier, 1 Sm. & G. 72.) The prayer of the bill Acts interest payable to creditors was liable to the was that the defendant might be ordered to tax, it ought to be deducted, no laches being chargeexecute a valid mortgage or be foreclosed. Lech- able against him. The annuity was not the subjectmere v. Clamp, 31 Beav. 578; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. matter in question, but the interest on the debts 411 (the case of Smith v. Bouchier being referred which it went to pay. The annuity being payable to), was very nearly the same as this case. There out of Mr. Kilpin's income was itself subject to the was a certificate that the mortgage money was deduction of the tax. Moreover the annuity was due, and the order being drawn up, the plaintiff only to be received until the debts were paid, and was entitled to the fund free from any equity of if the tax was not deducted that would sooner redemption, and the defendant was a trustee, there happen, as it had : being an affidavit that he could not be found, order that the premises should be vested in the plaintiff ; there was evidence of the amount, of attendance at Temple-hall, and of default made. The decree was now sought to be made absolute, declaring that the defendant was a trustee, and asked to have a conveyance. Ordered, that such deduction should be made. Under a settlement dated in April 1836, Charles James Kilpin was entitled to the life interest of the funds settled with remainder to his children, and in default of children, as to one third to his own appointment, and as to the other two-thirds as therein mentioned. In March 1841 Charles James Kilpin executed a deed of assignment to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, whereby 300l. a year out of his life interest was vested in such trustees towards satisfaction of his debts, with 57. per cent. interest, after payment of costs, charges, and expenses, and the surplus (if any) was to be paid to Charles James Kilpin. The trust funds were paid into court in the suit in 1842, the decree directing the trusts of the settlement to be carried into execution, and containing certain provisions as to incumbrances effected by Kilpin, and referring to certain proceedings in insolvency, and a vesting order which was discharged; various orders had been made in the suit, and Kilpin had assigned his life interest to John James to secure the repayment of certain moneys borrowed of William Hopkins Kilpin. The 300l. a year had been applied by the trustees for the time being of the deed of assignment of March 1841, with 57. per cent. interest, towards satisfaction of the debts, and there was now due to the creditors 134/. 11s. 6d. But these payments had been made in full without Bebb v. Bunny, 1 K. & J. 216. Kekewich, for the trustees, contended that the interest was to be calculated without the deduction of the tax, because the half-yearly payments of the annuity were made subject to the payment of income-tax, and that, consequently, Mr. Kilpin was not chargeable with it, and was not, therefore, entitled to any allowance for it. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-This point is, I think, reasonably clear. Mr. Kilpin, having a certain income of some hundreds a year, out of that income contracted that he would pay 3007. a year for the discharge of the debts due to his creditors. The creditors for a considerable period received this sum, and the interest on these debts at 51. per cent., without deduction of any kind. Meanwhile, Mr. Kilpin had been paying income-tax on the whole of what he was entitled to under his settlement. In adjusting the rights of the creditors having a right to receive the 51. per cent. interest without deduction, Mr. Kilpin says, "I ought to have Now, I am clearly of deducted income-tax." opinion that that is so, not only in my own view of the question, but as it was decided in Bebb v. Bunny, (supra), where it was held that where there was a delay in completion of a contract, the purchasemoney in the mean time bearing interest, the purchaser might deduct from that interest the income-tax. So here, the creditors are in the situation of incumbrancers on Mr. Kilpin's interest, and he would, by himself or his trustees, be entitled to deduct for income-tax, and now that the error has been discovered, Mr. Kilpin insisting that he is entitled to have the account adjusted, he is, I think, so entitled, and the amount which, therefore, the creditors have a right to receive is 301. 10s. instead of 1344. 11s. 6d. Solicitors for the petitioners, Garrard and James. Solicitors for the trustees, Leighton, Tattershall, and Co. V.C. GIFFARD'S COURT. Reported by W. H. BENNET, and R. T. BOULT, Esqs, Barristers-at-Law. Friday, March 20. THE VELLETRI AND TERRACINA COMPANY (LIMITED). Practice-Service of petition to wind-up. Service on the subscribers to the memorandum af associa- V.C. G.] UNDERWOOD V. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA. on the seven subscribers who had signed the memorandum of association referred to in the prospectus of the intended company. The address inserted therein was stated to be in Coleman-street, London, but no place of business in Coleman-street could be found. The company had been incorporated, but the place of business had not been registered. Cracknall in support of the petition. The VICE-CHANCELLOR made the order on condition that a proper affidavit should be filed that all attempts to serve the company at the alleged place of business had failed. Solicitor: C. P. Greenhill. Wednesday, May 6. UNDERWOOD v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR Costs-38th Consolidated Order, Rule 2-Meaning of [IN PARLIAMENT. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that he had heard nothing in the course of the arguments that would not apply to a copyright case, where copies of the books formed part of counsel's brief. Take, for instance, the example of a French dictionary, or a blue book, or a charity commission, or where a great many patents were in question, and it became necessary for counsel to be furnished with numerous copies of specifications; no one could think that a solicitor would be justified in charging fourpence a folio for such documents. Whatever existed in print antecedently to the institution of the suit would not, in his opinion, come within the meaning of the order in the schedule. In his opinion, the orders meant only to include the case of copies made for the purposes of the suit. Any other view would lead to monstrous hardships. Even had the costs been directed to be taxed as between solicitor and client, no greater allowance ought to be made for furnishing these copies than the taxing-master had allowed as between party and party, that is, the cost of obtaining the printed documents. En Parliament. Where counsel had been furnished us part of their briefs with printed copies of a record in a previous suit Reported by FREDERICK CLIFFORD and PEMBROKE S. STEPHENS, analogous to the suit in which they were engaged: Held, that such documents did not come within the Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Friday, March 27. meaning of the 2nd schedule to rule 2 of Order xxxviii., (Before Mr. DODSON, Mr. RICKARDS, and Colonel and could not be allowed to be charged for as "copies." STUART.) BILL. Petition of the CORPORATION OF BRIGHTON. Railway-Increase of fares-Municipal corporation— Power to limit locus. A Bill promoted, among other objects, to sanction the raising of fares upon its line by an existing railway company, was opposed by the corporation of the town principally affected by the raising of the fares. The Bill was referred, with others, to a committee, one of these Bills for carrying into effect an amalgamation between the company and other railway companies having previously been petitioned against by the same corporation, which, however, failed to obtain a locus standi: Held, that the corporation in this case had an undoubted locus standi as far as the question of tolls was concerned ; and as this Bill formed part of a general scheme, the Referees would not limit the locus to the question of tolls. Kay, Q. C. and Cecil Russell for the plaintiffs LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY (whose costs had been ordered to be paid by the defendant as between party and party) excepted to the taxing master's report so far as he had disallowed charges made for certain printed documents furnished to counsel as part of their briefs, the ground of his disallowance being that such documents could not be called "copies " within the meaning of the 2nd schedule to the 38th Consolidated Order. The words in the schedule are, "Copies of all documents are to be at the rate of per folio 4d." Their argument was that the order did not say that the 4d. a folio was for copying, or even that copies were to be in writing. What it meant was that for everything used as copies the payment was to be at that rate. Everybody knew that the cost of copying was only 1d. per folio, and the object of allowing 4d. a folio was to insure in this indirect way that solicitors should be properly remunerated. If as other charges now stand they were not paid in some such way, the practice of their profession would be a positive loss: (See the observations of Lord Langdale in Lucas v. Peacock, 8 Beav. 5.) In the present case the taxing master had found that copies were properly used on the present occasion, but were not prepared for the occasion; but there was not a word in the order or schedule implying that the copies were to be prepared for the occasion. The documents in question had been procured from a public office, being in fact printed copies of the record in a previous case analogous to the present. Suppose only one print of this record had been obtained, and the plaintiff's solicitor had given it to a law stationer to copy. No one could contend that he would not have been entitled to be paid. The fact that they were printed lessened the expenses of the trial, for if this voluminous matter had been in writing, additional fees to counsel would have been rendered necessary. Then, too, when the method of preparing affidavits was altered in 1862, and affidavits were directed to be printed, notwithstanding the diminution of expense, solicitors were still held entitled to the same charge. E. Macnaghten, for the defendants, was not called on. Power of Referees to limit the locus standi of municipal bodies considered and affirmed, but waived in this particular instance. In this case the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses petitioned, under their common seal, as the municipal authority, and also as the local board for the district of Brighton. They set forth, which was not denied, that this Bill, amongst other things, proposed to authorise the relinquishment by the Brighton Company of certain of their authorised lines and works; and, on the other hand, to sanction the raising of their tolls upon passengers. Another Bill, called the Amalgamation Bill, established a working union of the South-Eastern and Brighton Companies, and confirmed an agreement under which an immediate amalgamation was to take place between those two companies, on the basis of "the North-Eastern Amalgamation," that is to say, each company was to keep its own capital separate, and to be solely responsible for its own existing liabilities, the whole system being worked as one and under one management, and the total net profit after paying working expenses, being |