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for what I have not, I have no Reason to complain.

Had God indeed given us only the Faculties of Men, and required of us the Service of Angels, we might then with fome Justice have lamented the unequal Weight: But now that he requires nothing of us but what we are able to perform, and what, according to our prefent Degree of Understanding, it is highly reasonable we should perform, it is great Perverfenefs to hang back for want of more Light, and a greater Capacity to understand what it is no way neceffary for us to understand. Our prefent Faculties, if rightly applied, will lead us to a Certainty. of the Being of a God, to the Knowledge of his Excellency and Perfection, and will inftruct us wherein our reasonable Service to him does confift: And shall we, when we know there is an all-fufficient Being, and that it is our Duty to ferve him, shall we, I fay, fufpend our Duty, because we meet with great Difficulties in trying to comprehend his Nature and Manner of Existence? As weak as we are, we may affuredly know, That God will one Day judge the World in Righteoufness, and reward every Man according to his Doings: And shall we not liften

to this great Motive to Obedience, because we are not able to know how the Soul can act diftinctly from the Body, or how it can be united to it again? It would be altogether as reasonable for a Merchant not to trade to the Indies, though he is fure there is great Wealth and Riches there, till he can account to himself for the Nature of all the furprizing Objects in that other World; or for a Man not to eat, though he is fure it would nourish and support his Life, till he can fee the Reason of Nutrition, and give an Account of all the fecret Ways by which Nature forms the Work.

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God has given us Knowledge fufficient to be the Foundation of our Duty; and, if we will use the Light we have, we shall be happy. The great Mistake which Men commit in reflecting upon these Matters, is, That they suppose they should have better Evidence for the Things of another World, could they overcome thefe Difficulties, which crofs them perpetually in the Search after Nature: And this would indeed be a real Advantage to Religion,, if it were fo; but that it is not, will appear in the following Confiderations: For,

Secondly, The Difficulties which arife in confidering the natural Properties of Things, do no way affect the Certainty, and Reality of their Existence: If they did, we could be certain of the real Exiftence of no one Thing; fince there is nothing but what affords us very great Difficulties, when we come to account for the Nature and Properties of it: Let what will be the Subject, I think, there cannot be two more different Inquiries, than when we examine whether the Thing really is, and when we examine what it is: They are Inquiries which do not at all depend one upon the other. We can examine the Properties of fome Things, without fo much as reflecting whether there ever were fuch Things, or no. When the Mathematician confiders the Properties of an exact Circle or Square, it matters him not whether there be fuch perfect Figures in the World, or no; nor does he trouble himself to inquire. So, on the other hand, we can examine and come to the Certainty of the Existence of Things, without knowing, or attempting to know, their Natures and Properties. The Peafant knows there is a Sun and a Moon, as well as the Aftronomers; and his Certainty, as to their Existence, is

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as great and as well-grounded as theirs. Nor is this only true in Things which are Objects of Sense, but will hold likewife with refpect to fuch Things, the Existence of which we collect from Reason. From vifible Effects to invifible Causes the Argument is conclufive; though in many Cafes it extends only to the Reality of the Caufe, and does not in the least lead us to the Knowledge of the Nature of it. When we fee Diftempers cured by the Ufe of Plants or of Drugs, fome Virtue we are fure there is in them, upon which the Effect depends, though what we seldom or never can tell. This being the Cafe then, That we can arrive at the Knowledge of the Existence of Things, when we are perfectly ignorant of their Natures and Properties; and can, on the other fide, examine and know the Properties of Things, without confidering whether they exist, or no; 'tis plain that these are diftinct Acts of Knowledge, which do not depend on each other, and that we may be certain as to the Reality of Things, however we may be puzzled and confounded when we enter into the Confideration of their Nature.

And now pray confider, as to the Cafe before us, what fort of Knowledge it is that

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is néceffary to fupport Religion in the World. If we are sure there is a God who will judge the World, is not that a fufficient Foundation for Holiness? Does it fignify any thing, as to the Neceffity of our Obedience, to inquire into the Manner or Nature of his Being? Does not the whole of Religion evidently depend on this Question, Whether there çertainly be a God who will judge the World? And, if it appears there is, is it of any Confequence to say there are great Difficulties in conceiving how thefe Things can be? For, if they certainly will be, they will be fome Way or other, no doubt; and it concerns not us to know which Way. Since therefore our Saviour has given the greatest Evidence that can be of the Certainty of a future State, and the Soul's Existence after Death, 'tis impertinent and unphilofophical to confront this Evidence with Difficulties arifing from our Conceptions as to the Nature and Manner of thefe Things: It is in truth to fet up Ignorance against Knowledge; for our Difficulties fpring from our Ignorance of Nature, which is an Argument we ought rather to be ashamed of, than to bring into Competition with the clear Evidence we have for the Certainty and Reality of the

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