It can ferve to no good Purpose to give Men a great Opinion of themselves, and of the confiderable Figure they make in the Universe; nor can it be done with Truth and Juftice. Experience, which fhews us daily our own and the Follies of those about us, will be too hard for all Reasonings upon this Foot; and the Mind of Man, conscious of its own Defects, will fee through the Flattery, which afcribes to it Perfections and Excellencies with which it feels itself to be unacquainted. Or, could a Man, in spight of his own Experience, be perfuaded to think himself very confiderable, and worthy of all that God has done for him; this Opinion could tend only to make him proud and conceited, and to think the Difpenfations of Providence with regard to himself to be rather Acts of Justice, and due to his Merit, than the Effects of Goodness and Benignity in the Governor of the World. Such an Opinion would in a great Measure exclude a Senfe of Dependence, and in a greater ftill a Senfe of Gratitude; which are vital and fundamental Principles in Religion.

But, if we fet out with taking a proper View of ourselves in the first place, and with confidering the many Imperfections and Follies to which we are liable as rational

Agents,

Agents, the many Weakneffes and Infirmities which furround us as animal Creatures; and then furvey the Works of Providence, and the great Care of God over us, manifefted in his various Difpenfations in the natural and moral World; we shall eafily enter into the true Spirit of the holy Pfalmift's Reflection, What is Man, that thou art mindful of him? or the Son of Man, that thou visitest him? Iť is a Reflection naturally proceeding from the Sense of our Dependence on God, and leading to the highest Degree of Gratitude, whilst we contemplate with Admiration the greatest of his Favours, and confider ourselves as unworthy of his leaft.

This is the natural Sense which the Reflection in the Text fuggefts to us: Yet has it, as I observed before, been used to other Purposes; and fome have thought it unworthy of God to suppose that in the great Works of Providence he had any special Regard to fo inconfiderable a Part of the Whole, as the Race of Mẹn appears to be. The Objection, they think, grows ftronger, when the Scheme of Providence displayed to us in the Gospel of Chrift for the Salvation of Man is laid before them; and it appears to them astonishing, that God should intereft himself so particularly in an Affair, which

feems,

feems, when compared to the Whole, of fo little Importance. If we afcribe this great Work to the Divine Love and Goodness, it cannot be controverted that they are strongly and evidently expreffed and manifested in this Proceeding; too ftrongly, it may be thought; fince Divine Love and Goodness muft be bounded by Divine Wisdom, and can never degenerate into Fondness and Partiality; confequently, his Love and Goodness can never do what his Wifdom does not approve as fit to be done.

Upon this Foot it may be afked, Where is the Wisdom of erecting fuch a Building as this for the Service of fuch a Creature as Man? The Works of Nature are fo immense and wonderful, that, if they are formed for the fake of providing a proper Habitation for Man, the House feems to be of far greater Dignity than the Mafter, and the End proposed by no means to answer and justify the Means made use of. So again, in the Work of our Redemption, if the only Son of God came down from Heaven, and did and fuffered all that is reported of him in the Gofpel; what is there in Man, confidered in the most advantageous Light, that bears any Proportion to this wonderful Method made ufe of to fave him, or to justify the Wisdom

of

of God in fending the Lord of Power, and of the whole Creation, to die for the meanest, perhaps, of all intelligent Beings belonging

to it?

Now, whether thefe Reflections upon our own weak and infirm Condition, and the low Rank we hold in the Order of intelligent Beings, be a fufficient Ground for calling into question the Credibility of the great Things faid to be done for us, is a Matter deferving ferious Confideration. And

The first Question we should ask ourselves, is, whether we are proper Judges in this Matter? It is a great Undertaking to judge of the Wisdom of God, and to fay what is fit, or not fit, for him to do; especially where the Subject of the Inquiry is the Counfels of God in governing the natural and moral World; Points, not only of the highest Confequence, but of all others the most removed out of our Sight.

In human Affairs we pretty well know the Powers and Abilities of Men, and can oftentimes judge of the Ends they propose to themselves; and this Knowledge of their Powers, and this Ability to judge of the Ends they propofe, qualifies us in many Cafes to estimate comparatively the Means and the End, and to difcern whether the

Thing aimed at is worth the Expence of Labour employed in obtaining it. This Judgment cannot be made merely by con→ fidering and comparing the Means and the End together; but Confideration likewise must be had of the Power and Ability of the Agent. The End of building an House is for the Habitation of Men: But, whether the House be too big, or too little, too magnificent, or not magnificent enough, can never appear from confidering merely the End of building of an Houfe, which is for Men to dwell in; but you must take into the Account the Power, Station, Wealth, and other Circumftances of the Builder, and then you may reasonably fay whether too much or too little Pains and Cost have been beftowed on it. To apply this to the prefent Cafe: When you view the Works of Nature, you think them too great and too magnificent to be intended for the Use of Man: But confider a little, Who is the Builder? Is it not One of whofe Power and Ability you cannot poffibly judge? How do you know then that it was not as eafy (and doubtless it was as eafy) to God to produce this beautiful and wonderful Order of Things, as to have produced a much worfe, and more adapted, as you may ima