tain such value. But affidavits estimating the value of freedom are entirely inadmissible; and no doubt is entertained of the jurisdiction of the court. Lee v. Lee, 8 Pet. 44.

15. (Jan., 1834.) On the opening of the record for the argument of this case, it was found that the sum in controversy was less than the amount which, according to the act of Congress, authorizes a writ of error, except on a special allocatur, from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to this court. The provisions of the law permit writs of error to be sued out without such allocatur, when the sum in controversy amounts to $1,000 and upwards. United States v. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150.

16. On the application of counsel, stating the questions in the case were of great public importance, and were required to be determined in order to the final settlement of other accounts in which the same principles were involved, the court gave the special allocatur. Ib.

17. (Jan., 1842.) A decree of a perpetual injunction on suits instituted on the common-law side of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, reversed, and the bill dismissed, the accounts between the parties having been erroneously adjusted in the Circuit Court. Nixdorff v. Smith, 16 Pet. 132.

18. (Jan., 1842.) In the District of Columbia a writ of error lies to the decision of the Circuit Court upon an agreed case. The same principle has been applied in cases brought before the Supreme Court from other parts of the United States. Cited: Faw v. Robertson's Executors, 3 Cranch, 173; Tucker v. Oxley, 5 Cranch, 34; Kennedy v. Brent, 6 Cranch, 187; Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Shankland v. The Corporation of Washington, 5 Pet. 390; Inglee v. Cooledge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. Nichols, 4 Wheat. 311; United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291.

19. (Jan., 1848.) The act of Congress passed on the 27th of February, 1801 (2 Stat. at Large, 103), authorizes a writ of error from this court to the Circuit Court for the District

of Columbia, in those cases only where there has been a final judgment, order, or decree in that court. Van Ness v. Van Ness, 6 How. 62.

20. Where the Orphans' Court directed an issue to be sent for trial in the Circuit Court, which issue was, "whether the petitioner was the widow of the deceased or not," and the Circuit Court proceeded to try the issue, and the jury, under the instructions of the court, found that the petitioner was not the widow, exceptions to these instructions cannot be reviewed by this court on a writ of error.

Ib.

21. The certificate of the finding of the jury, transmitted by the Circuit Court to the Orphans' Court, was not such a final judgment, order, or decree as is included within the statute. After a reception of the certificate, the Orphans' Court had still to pass a decree in order to settle the rights of the parties. Ib.

22. (Dec., 1859.) Where the matter in controversy was the right to the mayoralty in Georgetown, the salary of which office was $1,000 per annum, payable monthly, and the duration of which office was two years, this court has jurisdiction of a case coming up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. United States, ex rel. Crawford, v. Addison, 22 How. 174.

23. The fact that the salary is payable monthly makes no difference; the appropriation, when made, being made for the whole sum. Ib.

24. (Dec., 1862.) In order to give this court jurisdiction under the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the matter in dispute must be money, or some right the value of which can be calculated in money. De Krafft v. Barney, 2 Black, 704.

25. A claim to the guardianship of the person and property of children, not on account of any pecuniary value attached to the office, but upon other considerations, is not within the jurisdiction of this court. 1b.

26. Barry v. Mercein (5 How. 103) re-stated and re-affirmed. Ib.

27. (Dec., 1866.) Under the act of March 3, 1863, establishing the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the action of that court can be examined here in no case in which like action in the Circuit Court of the district, whose place it supplies, could not be re-examined. Brown v. Wiley, 4 Wall. 165.

28. Hence, it can be examined only in those cases where there has been a final judgment, order, or decree. Ib.

29. The certificate of the finding of a jury, on certain issues involving paternity, marriage, and legitimacy, sent from the Orphans' Court to the Supreme Court of the District, which certificate of finding is transmitted by the Supreme Court to the Orphans' Court, is not such a final judgment, order, or decree as this court can re-examine on error. Ib.

30. Nor where the finding of the jury was at special term held by a single judge of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, under instructions by such judge, and a motion for new trial, on exception to such instructions, and other grounds, has been heard at general term by all the judges, and overruled, is such overruling a final judgment, order, or decree reviewable on writ of error by this court. Ib.

31. (Dec., 1866.) The eighth section of the act of Congress of 1863 (12 Stat. at Large, 764), to reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia, and which says, "that if, upon the trial of the cause, an exception be taken, the bill containing it need not be sealed or signed," does not dispense with a regular bill of exceptions in the way usual in Circuit Courts of the United States, when the rulings of the court, in admitting or rejecting evidence, or in giving or refusing instructions, are meant to be brought from the Supreme Court of the district to this court for review. The provision has reference to carrying such rulings from the special to the general term of the Supreme Court of the district itself.

Pomeroy's Lessee v. Bank of Indiana (1 Wall. 602) approved. Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663.

32. (Dec., 1868.) An actual allowance of an appeal may be inferred, where the record shows that an appeal was prayed for in open court, and an appeal-bond filed and approved by one of the judges. Railroad Co. v. Bradleys, 7 Wall. 575.

33. (Dec., 1869.) An appellee may ask the dismissal, when the appeal has not been allowed, or when the case comes from the District of Columbia, and the amount in controversy is less than $1,000. Pierce v. Cox, 9 Wall. 786.

34. (Dec., 1870.) Where a case has been tried in the District Court of the District of Columbia, the judgment or decree rendered therein must be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the district before the case can be brought before this court for examination. Garnett v. United States, 11 Wall. 256.

35. (Dec., 1871.) An appeal from a proceeding in bankruptcy, disposing, under the first section [of the Bankrupt Act] of such a claim [by an assignee, of a fund, as the property of his bankrupt], lies (other requisites allowing it) from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to this court. Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419.

36. (Oct., 1873.) A writ of error lies from this court to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on a judgment. confirming an assessment for damages by the use of the street in front of the church of defendants in error, although the proceedings before the jury and the marshal, and in the Supreme Court, are governed by a statute of Maryland, which, by the construction of the courts of that State, does not allow an appeal or writ of error. Railroad Co. v. Church, 19 Wall. 62.

37. The early decisions of this court held that the right to the writ exists, in such cases, by virtue of the appellate power of this court, as defined in the act of 1801, creating the Cir

cuit Court of the district; and we are governed by the same act. Ib.

38. (Oct., 1875.) Where the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at the general term thereof, rendered a decree vacating and setting aside a judicial sale of lands, which had been confirmed by an order of the special term of said court, and directing a resale of them, Held, that the decree was not final, and that no appeal would lie therefrom to this court. Butterfield v. Usher, 1 Otto, 246.

39. (Oct., 1876.) Writs of error from this court to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia are governed by the same rules and regulations as are those to the Circuit Courts. Stanton v. Embrey, 3 Otto, 548.1

40. (Oct., 1878.) The jurisdiction conferred upon this court by sec. 847 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia was taken away by the act of Congress approved Feb. 25, 1879, which enacts that a judgment or a decree of the Supreme Court of that district may be re-examined here where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of $2,500." This court, therefore, dismisses a writ of error sued out Dec. 6, 1875, to reverse a final judgment of that court, where the matter in dispute is of the value of $2,250. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 8 Otto, 398.

41. (Oct., 1879.) Where a judgment for the recovery of money, affirmed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, is brought here for re-examination, the amount thereof, without adding interest or costs, determines the value of the matter in dispute," under the act of Feb. 25, 1879 (20 Stat. 320), and, if it does not exceed $2,500, this court has no jurisdiction. Railroad Co. v. Trook, 10 Otto, 112.

42. (Oct., 1879.) A bill filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by A. against B. and C., alleging that each held certificates of indebtedness belonging to him, was, on final hearing, dismissed, and he appealed. Held, that, as

1 See Rule 4, Bill of Exceptions.