prescribed by the act of the 8th of May, 1792, ch. 137, s. 9; and the writ itself need not state that it is directed to a final judgment of the state court, or that the court is the highest court of law or equity of the state. Buel v. Van Ness, 8 Wheat. 312.

21. The appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases brought from state courts, arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the Union, is not limited by the value of the matter in dispute. Ib.

22. Its jurisdiction in such cases extends to a cause where both parties claim a right or title under the same act of Congress, and the decision is against the right or title claimed by either party. Ib.

23. (Jan., 1827.) Under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, where the construction of any clause in the Constitution, or any statute of the United States, is drawn in question in any suit in a state court, the decision must be against the title or right set up by the party, under such clause of the Constitution or statute, or this court has no appellate jurisdiction in the case. It is not sufficient that the construction of the statute was drawn in question, and that the decision was against the title of the party: it must appear that his title depended upon the statute. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117.

Williams v.

24. Where, in such a case, the validity of a statute of any state is drawn in question, upon the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision has been in favor of its validity, it is necessary to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this court that it should distinctly appear that the title or right of the party depended upon the statute. Ib.

25. (Jan., 1827.) Under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, this court has no appellate jurisdiction from the final judgment of the highest court of a state, in a suit where is drawn in question the construction

of a statute or of a commission held under the United States, unless some title, right, privilege, or exemption, under such statute, &c., be specially set up by the party, and the decision be against the claim so made by him. Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129.

26. Where a suit was brought in a state court, upon a marshal's bond, under the act of April 10, 1806, ch. 21, by a person injured by a breach of the condition of the bond, and the defendants set up as a defence to the action that the suit ought to have been brought in the name of the United States, and the court decided that it was well brought by the party injured, in his own name, -Held, that the exemption here set up, being merely as to the form of the action, and no question arising as to the legal liability of the defendants under the act of Congress, this court had no authority to re-examine the judgment, so far as respected the construction of that part of the act which provides that suits on marshals' bonds" shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years after the said right of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards." Ib.

27. (Jan., 1827.) The judgment of the highest court of law of a state, deciding in favor of the validity of a statute of a state drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, is not a final judgment within the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, if the suit has been remanded to the inferior state court where it originated, for further proceedings, not inconsistent with the judgment of the highest court. Winn v. Jackson, 12 Wheat. 135.

28. (Jan., 1828.) In the construction of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act passed 24th of September, 1789, this court has never required that the treaty or act of Congress under which the party claims, who brings the final judgment of a state court into review before this court, should have been spread upon the record. It has always deemed it essential

to the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case that the record should show a complete title under the treaty, or act of Congress, and that the judgment of the court is in violation of that treaty or act. Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 94.

29. (Jan., 1828.) Both the plaintiff and defendants claimed title under the provisions of the act of Congress passed 3d March, 1803, entitled "An Act regulating the grants of land, and providing for the disposal of the lands of the United States south of the State of Tennessee;" and the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi was upon the construction given to that act by the commissioners acting under its authority. This is a case which draws into question the construction of an act of Congress; and the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction on a writ of error by which the decision of the court of the State of Mississippi is brought up for revision under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Ross'v. Doe, 1 Pet. 655.

30. (Jan., 1829.) This court has frequently decided that, to sustain its jurisdiction in appeals and writs of error, it is not necessary to state, in terms upon the record, that the Constitution or a law of the United States was drawn in question. It is sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act, if the record shows that the Constitution or a law of the United States must have been misconstrued, or the decision could not have been made; or that the constitutionality of a state law was questioned, and the decision was in favor of the party claiming under such law. Willson v. Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. 31. (Jan., 1829.) Objections to the jurisdiction of this court have been frequently made, on the ground that there was nothing apparent on the record to raise the question. whether the court from which the case had been brought had decided upon the constitutionality of a law, so that the case was within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This has given occasion for a critical

examination of the section, which has resulted in the adoption of certain principles of construction applicable to it. One of those principles is, that if the repugnancy of a statute of a state to the Constitution of the United States was drawn into question, or if that question was applicable to the case, this court has jurisdiction of the cause; although the record should not in terms state a misconstruction of the Constitution of the United States, or that the repugnancy of the statute of a state to any part of that Constitution was drawn into question. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.

32. (Jan., 1829.) The power of this court to revise the judgments of state tribunals depends on the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. That section enacts "that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a state, in which a decision in the suit could be had," where is drawn in question the validity of a statute, or of an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity, "may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States." Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449.

33. The city council of Charleston, exercising an authority under the State of South Carolina, enacted an ordinance by which a tax was imposed on the six and seven per cent stock of the United States; and in the Court of Common Pleas of the Charleston district an application was made for a prohibition to restrain them from levying the tax, on the ground that the ordinance violated the Constitution of the United States. The prohibition was granted, and the proceedings in the case were removed to the Constitutional Court, the highest court of law of the state; and in that court it was held that the ordinance did not violate the Constitution of the United States, and a writ of error was prosecuted on this decision to this court. Held, that the question decided by the Constitu

tional Court was the very question on which the revising power of this court is to be exercised. Ib.

34. A writ of error to this court may be prosecuted where, by the judgment of the highest court of the State of South Carolina, a prohibition, issued in a state court, to prevent the levying of a tax which was imposed by a law repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, was refused, on the ground that the law was not so repugnant to the Constitution. Ib.

35. The term suit is certainly a very comprehensive one, and is understood to apply to any proceeding in a court of justice in which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the law affords him. 1b.

36. The words "final judgment" in the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act must be understood in the section under consideration as applying to all judgments and decrees which determine the particular cause; and it is not required that such judgments shall finally decide upon the rights which are litigated, that the same shall be within purview of the section. Ib.

37. (Jan., 1830.) This court has no authority, on a writ of error from a state court, to declare a state law void on account of its collision with a state constitution, it not being a case embraced in the Judiciary Act, which gives the power of a writ of error to the highest judicial tribunal of a state. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280.

38. (Jan., 1830.) It has often been decided in this court that it is not necessary that it shall appear, in terms, upon the record that the question was presented in the state court, whether the case was within the purview of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to give jurisdiction to this court in a case removed from a state court. It is sufficient if, from the facts stated, such a question must have arisen, and the judgment of the state court would not have been what it is, if there had not been a misconstruction of