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lands confirmed to the city of San Francisco by an act of Congress, the validity and operative effect of which were not questioned, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of California was adverse to the defendant, who endeavored to make out such possession as would, under the operation of the city ordinance and the act of the legislature, transfer, as he claimed, the title of the city to him, — Held, that this court has no jurisdiction. McStay v. Friedman, 2 Otto, 723.
350. (Oct., 1876.) If, by any direction of a Supreme Court of a state, an entire cause is determined, the decision, when reduced to form and entered in the records of the court, constitutes a final judgment, whatever may be its technical designation, and is subject, in a proper case, to review by this court. So held, where, upon appeal from an interlocutory order made by a Circuit Court of Indiana, granting a temporary injunction, the Supreme Court of the state reversed the order, and remanded the cause to the lower court, with directions to dismiss the complaint. Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Co. v. Lucas, 3 Otto, 108.
351. (Oct., 1876.) Where a statute of, or authority exercised under, a state is drawn in question, on the ground of its repugnance to the Constitution of the United States, or a right is claimed under that instrument, the decision of a state court in favor of the validity of such statute or authority, or adverse to the right so claimed, can be reviewed here. Home Ins. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 3 Otto, 116.
352. (Oct., 1876.) Judgments in the state courts against the United States cannot be brought here for re-examination upon a writ of error, except in cases where the same relief would be afforded to private parties. United States v. Thomp80n, 3 Otto, 586.
353. (Oct., 1876.) No party to this record can raise the question, that the statute of Wisconsin violates the obligation of the consolidated company, under the land grant to the Wisconsin and Superior Railroad Company, to keep the part
of its road which formerly belonged to the latter company open as a public highway for the use of the government of the United States, free from toll, &c. Peik v. Chicago f Northwestern Railway Co., 4 Otto, 165.
354. (Oct., 1876.) This court has no jurisdiction to reexamine the decree of the highest court of a state, reversing that of an inferior court, and remanding the cause for further proceedings. Davis v. Crouch, 4 Otto, 514.
355. (Oct., 1876.) Where the judgment of the highest court of a state is here for re-examination, the federal question, which, it is claimed, arises in the record, will be considered here as it comes from that court. Where, therefore, the point there arising was whether the evidence in the record sustained a finding of fact upon which the judgment of an inferior court had been entered, and the appellate court was permitted by its rules to set aside the judgment as against the weight of evidence, only where there was no evidence to support it, or such an absence of evidence that it might be presumed to have been given through the influence of prejudice, passion, or favor, this court will not, iipon a question of preponderance of testimony alone, reverse the judgment of the latter court. So held, where the question below was, whether a party, when he purchased property, had reasonable cause to believe that his vendor was insolvent, and was making the sale in fraud of the bankrupt law. Melendy v. Rice, 4 Otto, 796.
356. (Oct., 1877.) Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a state gives the force of law, is a statute of the state, within the meaning of the act regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of the state courts. Williams v. Bruffy, 6 Otto, 176.
357. (Oct., 1877.) Wherever rights, acknowledged and protected by the Constitution of the United States, are depied or invaded by state legislation, which is sustained by
the judgment of a state court, this court is authorized to interfere. Its jurisdiction, therefore, to re-examine such judgment cannot be defeated by showing that the record does not, in direct terms, refer to some constitutional provision, nor expressly state that a federal question was presented. The true jurisdictional test is, whether it appears that such a question was decided adversely to the federal right. Murray v. Charleston, 6 Otto, 432.
358. (Oct., 1877.) A decree dismissing a bill in chancery brought to recover a debt, and set aside an alleged fraudulent sale of property, was, on appeal, reversed, and a decree rendered by the Supreme Court of the state against the appellee for the amount of the debt, and an execution awarded. Thereupon the appellee, who, pending the appeal, and more than three years before the date of the decree, had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy, petitioned the Supreme Court to set aside its decree, and either permit him to plead his discharge there, or remand the cause, so that he might plead it in the inferior court. The court, upon the ground that no new defence could be made there, refused the petition, and permitted the decree to stand as entered. Held, 1. That upon the face of the record proper no federal question was raised. 2. That the action upon the subsequent petition did not place the petitioner in a better position to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Wolf v. Stir, 6 Otto, 511.
359. (Oct., 1877.) It appearing from the record that the point that the prohibitory liquor law of 1869 impaired the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the company, was made on the trial of the case, and decided adversely to the company, and was afterwards carried, by bill of exceptions, to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, where the rulings of the lower court were affirmed, this court has jurisdiction. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 7 Otto, 26.
360. (Oct., 1878.) Where a case has been decided in an inferior court of a state, on a single point which would give
this court jurisdiction, it will not be presumed here that the Supreme Court of the state decided it on some other ground not found in the record or suggested in the latter court. Keith v. Clark, 7 Otto, 454.
361. (Oct., 1878.) A., charged with having committed murder in Tennessee, whilst he was there in the military service of the United States during the rebellion, was, by a court-martial, then and there convicted and sentenced to suffer death. The sentence, for some cause unknown, was not carried into effect. After the constitutional relations of that state to the Union were restored, he was, in one of her courts, indicted for the same murder. To the indictment he pleaded his conviction before the court-martial. The plea being overruled, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Held,... 2. That his plea, although not proper,
, inasmuch as it admitted the jurisdiction of that court to try and punish him for the offence, if it were not for such former conviction, would not prevent this court from giving effect to the objection, taken in this irregular way, to such jurisdiction. Accordingly, this court reverses the judgment, and directs the discharge of A. from custody under the indictment. Coleman v. Tennessee, 7 Otto, 510.
362. (Oct., 1878.) The court reaffirms the doctrine in Williams v. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176), that an enactment of the Confederate States, enforced as a law of one of the states composing that confederation, is a statute of such state, within the meaning of the act regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of the state courts. Ford v. Surget, 7 Otto, 594.
363. (Oct., 1878.) Where the record shows that a federal question was not necessarily involved, this court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, that the act passed Jan. 24, 1874, does not authorize the funding board of that state to fund the bonds of a railroad company whereon the state is liable only as a guarantor. Citizens' Bank v. Board of Liquidation, 8 Otto, 110.
364. Brown v. Atwell, Administrator (92 U. S. 327), cited and approved. 16.
36.5. (Oct., 1878.) A federal question is not presented by the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, that by the general principles of commercial law, if, during the late civil war, an indorser of a promissory note left his residence in loyal territory and went to remain permanently within the Confederate lines before the note matured, a notice of protest left at his former residence was not sufficient to charge him, if his change of residence was known, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have been known, to the holder of the note when it matured.
Bank v. McVeigh, 8 Otto, 332.
366. (Oct., 1878.) This court having, in Ex parte Lange (18 Wall. 163), held that the judgment against him, rendered Nov. 8, 1873, was not authorized by law, he brought an action against the judge who pronounced it. The court below decided that, even though the judgment was unauthorized, the defendant having, in pronouncing it, acted in his judicial capacity, and it not being so entirely in excess of his jurisdiction as to make it the arbitrary and unlawful act of a private person, was not liable in damages. Ield, that such decision does not present a federal question. Lange v. Benedict, 9 Otto, 68.
367. (Oct., 1878.) A statute of Illinois, passed in 1855, declares that all the property of the Northwestern University shall be forever free from taxation. As construed by the assessors and by the Supreme Court of the state, a statute of 1872, conforming taxation to the new constitution of 1870, limited this exemption to land and other property in immediate use by the institution. Held, . . . 2. That whether the statute of 1855 is a valid contract, or is void by reason of its conflicting with the state constitution of 1818, under which it was made, is a question on which the judgment of that court can be reviewed here. University v. People, 9 Otto, 309.