368. (Oct., 1879.) The decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York that, in the absence of fraud or intentional wrong, the members of the board of assessors for the city of Albany are not personally liable in damages to a party for any error they commit in officially assessing his shares of national-bank stock, does not present a federal question, and cannot be reviewed here. Williams v. Weaver, 10 Otto, 547.

369. (Oct., 1880.) The decisions of this court affirming the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the laws of the United States, or where a state is a party, cited and commented on. Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 12 Otto, 135.

370. (Oct., 1880.) This court, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1 Wheat. 85), affirmed the constitutionality of sec. 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 85, re-enacted in sec. 709, Rev. Stat.), which, in certain cases therein mentioned, confers on this court jurisdiction to re-examine, upon a writ of error, the final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had. The doctrine then asserted, and ever since maintained, cannot be questioned here. Williams v. Bruffy, 12 Otto, 248.

371. That jurisdiction attaches whenever the highest court of a state, by any decision which involves a federal question, affirms or denies the validity of the judgment of an inferior court over which it can by law exercise appellate authority, whether the decision, after an examination of the record of that judgment, be expressed by refusing a writ of error or supersedeas, or by dismissing a writ previously allowed. 1b.

372. This court, when it has once acquired jurisdiction, may, in order to enforce its judgment, send its process to either the appellate or the inferior court. Ib.

373. (Oct., 1880.) A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had, may, in the class of cases provided for in sec.

709, Rev. Stat., be re-examined here upon writ of error, although it was rendered upon an equal division of opinion among the judges. It is immaterial whether that court, in rendering it, was exercising original or appellate jurisdiction. Hartman v. Greenhow, 12 Otto, 672.

374. (Oct., 1880.) Where the marshal of the United States, to whom was directed a warrant of provisional seizure, sued out of the proper court sitting in bankruptcy, levied it upon certain goods in the possession of a third party claiming title to them, Held, that this court has jurisdiction to reexamine the judgment of a state court, whereby it was held, in a suit against the marshal, that, by reason of such possession, he had no authority under the laws of the United States to so levy the warrant. Sharpe v. Doyle, 12 Otto, 686.

Precedence of Writs of Error to State Courts in Criminal Causes.

SEC. 710. Cases on writ of error, to revise the judgment of a state court in any criminal case, shall have precedence, on the docket of the Supreme Court, of all cases to which the government of the United States is not a party, excepting only such cases as the court, in its discretion, may decide to be of public importance.

SEC. 719. Writs of injunction may be granted by any justice of the Supreme Court in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme Court.1 . . .

334.

March, 1793, c. 22, s. 5, V. 1, p. 13 Feb., 1807, c. 13, v. 2, p. 418. 10 April, 1869, c. 22, s. 1, v. 16, p. 44.

1 June, 1872, c. 255, s. 7, v. 17, p. 197.

1 See sec. 716: "They shall have power to issue all writs," &c.

SECTION 719. INJUNCTION. DECISIONS 1-13.

1. (Aug., 1792.) JOHNSON, Justice. In order to support a motion for an injunction, the bill should set forth a case of probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated, without this special interposition of the court. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402, 405.

2. JAY, Chief Justice. The only point to be considered is, whether under these circumstances it is not equitable to stay the money in the hands of the marshal till the right to it is fairly decided, and so avoid the risk of putting the true owner to a suit for the purpose of recovering it back.

For my part, I think that the money should remain in the custody of the law till the law has adjudged to whom it belongs; and therefore I am content that the injunction issue. An injunction granted. Ib.

3. (Feb., 1793.) JAY, Chief Justice. All the court, except the judges who have just delivered their sentiments, are of opinion that, if the State of Georgia has a right to the debt, due originally from Spalding and Brailsford, it is a right to be pursued at common law.

The bill, however, was founded in the highest equity; and the ground of equity for granting an injunction continues the same, namely, that the money ought to be kept for the party to whom it belongs. We shall therefore continue the injunction till the next term; when, however, if Georgia has not instituted her action at common law, it will be dissolved. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 415, 418.

4. (Aug., 1799.) An injunction will neither be granted by the court, nor a single judge, without reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney. New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1.

5. What is reasonable notice. 1b.

6. (Aug., 1799.) An injunction will not be granted to stay proceedings in common-law suits, at the instance of a

state not a party thereto, nor interested in their decision. New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 3.

7. (Jan., 1831.) Motion for an injunction to prevent the execution of certain acts of the legislature of the State of Georgia, in the territory of the Cherokee nation of Indians, on behalf of the Cherokee nation; they claiming to proceed in the Supreme Court of the United States, as a foreign state, against the State of Georgia, under the provision of the Constitution of the United States which gives to the court jurisdiction in controversies in which a state of the United States, or the citizens thereof, or a foreign state, citizens or subjects thereof, are parties.

The Cherokee nation is not a foreign state in the sense in which the term "foreign state" is used in the Constitution of the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.

8. The third article of the Constitution of the United States describes the extent of the judicial power. The second section closes an enumeration of the cases to which it extends, with" controversies between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects." A subsequent clause of the same section gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party: the State of Georgia may then certainly be sued in this court. Ib.

9. The bill filed on behalf of the Cherokees seeks to restrain a state from the forcible exercise of legislative power over a neighboring people asserting their independence, their right to which the state denies. On several of the matters alleged in the bill for example, on the laws making it criminal to exercise the usual power of self-government in their own country by the Cherokee nation this court cannot interpose, at least in the form in which those matters are presented. That part of the bill which respects the land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their possessions, may be more doubtful. The mere question of right

might perhaps be decided by this court, in a proper case, with proper parties. But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may well be questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political power, to be within the proper province of the judicial department. Ib.

10. (Dec., 1866.) The President of the United States. cannot be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional; nor will a bill having such a purpose be allowed to be filed. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475.

11. It makes no difference whether such incumbent of the presidential office be described in the bill as President, or simply as a citizen of a state. Ib.

12. (Dec., 1867.) A bill in equity filed by one of the United States to restrain the Secretary of War and other officers, who represent the executive authority of the United States, from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress, on the ground that such execution would annul and totally abolish the existing state government of the state, and establish another and different one in its place; in other words, would overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the state, by depriving it of all the means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might and otherwise would be maintained, — calls for a judgment upon a political question, and will therefore not be entertained by this court. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.

13. This character of the bill is not changed by the fact that, in setting forth the political rights sought to be protected, the bill avers that the state has real and personal property (as, for example, the public buildings, &c.) of the enjoyment of which, by the destruction of its corporate existence, the state will be deprived, such averment not being the substantive ground of the relief sought. Ib.