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taxes, within the meaning of the act of June 30, 1870, which makes it the duty of the court to give to causes, where the execution of the revenue laws of any state is enjoined or suspended by judicial order, preference, or priority over all other civil causes; and gives to the state or the party claiming under the laws of the state, the execution of whose revenue laws is enjoined or suspended, the right to have such cause heard at any time after docketing, in preference to any other civil cause between private parties. Davenport City v. Dows, 15 Wall. 390.

8. (Oct., 1875.) A cause will not, on the ground that it has no merits, be advanced for argument; nor will it be dismissed on motion simply because the court may be of opinion that it has been brought here for delay only. Amory v. Amory, 1 Otto, 356.

9. (Oct., 1875.) A motion to advance a criminal cause, made on behalf of the United States, must state the facts in such manner that the court may judge whether the government will be embarrassed in the administration of its affairs by delay. United States v. Norton, 1 Otto, 558.

10. (Oct., 1876.) The court will not, in preference to cases pending between private parties, set down for argument a case in which the execution of the revenue laws of a state has been enjoined, unless it sufficiently appears that the operations of the government of the state will be embarrassed by delay. Hoge v. R. & D. Railroad Co., 3 Otto, 1.

11. (Oct., 1876.) A cause, involving private interests only, will not be advanced for a hearing, in preference to other suits on the docket. Sage v. C. Railroad Co., 3 Otto, 412.

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The court will, at every session, announce on what day it will adjourn at least ten days before the time which shall be fixed upon; and the court will take up no case for argument, nor receive any case upon printed briefs, within three days next before the day fixed upon for adjournment.

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Whenever the plaintiff and defendant in a writ of error pending in this court, or the appellant and appellee in any appeal, shall at any time hereafter, in vacation and out of term-time, by their respective attorneys, who are entered as such on the record, sign and file with the clerk an agreement in writing directing the case to be dismissed, and specifying the terms on which it is to be dismissed as to costs, and also paying to the clerk any fees that may be due to him, it shall be the duty of the clerk to enter the case dismissed, and to give to either party which may request it a copy of the agreement filed; but no mandate or other process is to issue without an order by the court.

Rule 29. — Supersedeas.

Supersedeas bonds in the Circuit Courts must be taken, with good and sufficient security, that the plaintiff in error or appellant shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good. Such in lemnity, where the judgment or decree is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, must be for the whole amount of the judgment or decree, including “just damages for delay," and costs and interest on the appeal ; but in all suits where the property in controversy necessarily follows the event of the suit, as in real actions, replevin, and in suits on mortgages; or where the property is in the custody of the marshal under admiralty process, als in case of capture or seizure; or where the proceeds thereof, or a bond for the value thereof, is in the custody or control of the court, indemnity in all such cases is only required in an amount sutlicient to secure the sum recovered for the use and detention of the property, and the costs of the suit, and “just damages for delay," and costs and interest on the appeal.



1. (Feb., 1795.) The appeal itself suspends the decree of the inferior court; but a writ of inhibition is proper and necessary to enable the court of appeal to punish the inferior court for contempt, in case of disobedience; which the appeal does not do, as it is the act of the party and not of the superior court. Penhallow v. Donne, 3 Dall. 87, 105, 106.

2. (Feb., 1812.) This court will not quash an execution, issued by the court below, to enforce its decree, pending the writ of error, if the writ of error be not a supersedeas to the decree. Wallen v. Williams, 7 Cranch, 278.

3. (Jan., 1839.) An original decree was made in the Circuit Court of Rhode Island at June term, 1854, and an appeal was taken to January term, 1835, of the Supreme Court. This appeal was dismissed at January term, 1837, on the motion of the counsel for the appellees, without an examination or decision on the merits of the cause. At the November term of the Circuit Court the defendants prayed and were allowed a second appeal to the Supreme Court, which appeal had not been yet entered on the docket of the Supreme Court. The Circuit Court afterwards proceeded to order execution of the decree of 1834, and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court from this decree. Held, that this appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court, ordering the execution of the original decree, is not a supersedeas to further proceedings in the Circuit Court to execute the original decree; and that the Circuit Court is at liberty to use its discretion to proceed to execute the original decree. Held, also, that the decree of execution is not a final decree, in the contemplation of the act of Congress, from which an appeal lies. Carr v. Iloxie, 13 Pet. 460.

4. (Jan., 1841.) An execution issued in the court below, after a writ of error has been sued out, a bond given, and a citation issued, all in due time, may be quashed either in the

court below or this court, — these things operating as a stay of execution. Stockton v. Bishop, 2 How. 74.

5. (Jan., 1846.) After a case has been docketed and dismissed, under the forty-third rule of court, and the plaintiff in error sies out another writ of error, this court will, when the case appears to require it, order a supersedeas to stay all proceedings pending the second writ of error.

Hardeman v. Anderson, 4 How. 640.

6. The supersedeas is issued under the fourteenth section of the act of the 24th of September, 1789. Ib.

7. The form of a supersedeas is given in this case. Ib.

8. (Dec., 1850.) Where a case was dismissed by this court for want of a citation, and the plaintiff in error sued out another writ, and applied to this court for a supersedeas to stay execution in the court below, the application cannot be granted. Hogan v. Ross, 11 How. 294.

9. This court is not authorized to grant a supersedeas, unless the writ of error has been sued out within ten days after the rendition of the judgment, and in conformity with the provisions of the twenty-third section of the act of 1789. 16.

10. The cases of Stockton and Moore v. Bishop (2 How. 74) and Hardeman v. Anderson (4 Ilow. 610) explained. 16.

11. (Dec., 1851.) Where an appeal was taken in a common-law case, instead of a writ of error, and after the lapse of ten days the plaintiff issued an execution upon his judgment, and the defendant then sued out a writ of error to bring the case up to this court, it was error in the court below to quash the execution and supersede the judgment. Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 12 IIow. 387.

12. The appeal did not remove the case, and the writ of error was sued out too late to stay execution. It is immaterial whether it was a mistake of the party or the court. Ib.

13. (Dec., 1855.) The distinction pointed out between appeals which operate as a supersedeas and those which do not. Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 low. 531.

14. (Dec., 1857.) Where an appeal from a decree is taken within ten days from the rendition of the decree, it is in time to operate as a supersedeas, and so, also, if taken within ten days after the decree is settled and signed. Silsby v. Foote, 20 How. 290.

15. (Dec., 1866.) A case being properly in this court by appeal, the court has a right to issue any writ which may be necessary to render its appellate jurisdiction effectual. Ex parte Miluaukee Railroad Co., 5 Wall. 188.

16. Accordingly, it will issue the writ of supersedeas, if such writ be necessary for that purpose, the circumstances otherwise making it proper. 1b.

17. It will issue this writ rather than attain the same end by issuing a manlamus to the court below, in a case where the issuing of a mandamus would control judicial action in a matter apparently one of discretion; as, ex. gr., the approval or rejection of a bond offered for the court's approval. 1b.

18. Ilence, where, after an appeal to this court, the judge below refused to approve a bond for a supersedeas, because all the sureties were non-residents of the district, this court (though not agreeing with such judge in the opinion that mere non-residence within the district was a sufficient reason for rejecting a bond, if, in all other respects, it were unobjectionalile) declined to issue a mandamus to compel the judge to approve the bond and allow a supersedeas, considering its right to do this doubtful; but ordered that, on filing a bond to be approved by the clerk of this court, a supersedeas should issue from this court. 16.

19. (Dec., 1867.) A writ of error not sealed until eleven days after the judgment which it would seek to reverse was rendered cannot operate as a supersedeas. City of Washington v. Dennison, 6 Wall. 495.

20. Nor one where there has been an omission to serve the citation before the return-day of the writ. Ib.

21. (Dec., 1868.) To make a writ of error operate as a

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