under the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. 1b.

7. Quaere, Whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not only original, but exclusive of the Circuit Courts, in "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls," within the true construction of the second section. of the third article of the Constitution. Ib.

8. (Jan., 1828.) In a case where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by his name, but by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character, the state itself may be considered a party in the record. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazzo, 1 Pet. 110.

9. (Jan., 1831.) The third article of the Constitution of the United States describes the extent of the judicial power. The second section closes an enumeration of the cases to which it extends, with "controversies between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." subsequent clause of the same section gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party. The State of Georgia may then certainly be sued in this court.

A

The Cherokees are a state. They have been uniformly treated as a state since the settlement of our country. . . Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.

10. (Jan., 1831.) . . . On several of the matters alleged in the bill, for example, on the laws making it criminal to exercise the usual power of self-government in their own country by the Cherokee nation, this court cannot interpose, at least in the form in which those matters are presented. That part of the bill which respects the land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their possessions, may be more doubtful. The mere question of right might perhaps be decided by this court, in a proper case, with proper parties. But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and

to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may well be questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political power to be within the province of the judicial department. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 2.

11. (Jan., 1831.) It has been settled on great deliberation, that this court may exercise its original jurisdiction in suits against a state, under the authority conferred by the Constitution and existing acts of Congress. New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284.

12. (Jan., 1833.) Juan Madrazzo, a subject of the King of Spain, filed a libel praying admiralty process against the State of Georgia, alleging that the state was in possession of a certain sum of money, the proceeds of the sale of certain slaves which had been seized as illegally brought into the State of Georgia; and which seizure had been subsequently, under admiralty proceedings, adjudged to have been illegal, and the right of Madrazzo to the slaves, and the money arising from the sale thereof, established by the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia. The counsel for the petitioner claimed that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction of the case, alleging that the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that the judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits in law or equity, did not take away the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in suits in the admiralty against a state. Held, that this is not a case where property is in custody of a court of admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of any private person. It is a mere personal suit against a state to recover proceeds in its possession, and such a suit cannot be commenced in this court against a state. Ex parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627.

13. (Jan., 1838.) Jurisdiction is the power to hear and

1 See "Practice," "Process," &c.

determine the subject-matter in controversy between the parties to a suit; to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet.

657.

14. (Jan., 1841.) It is one of the most familiar duties of a court of chancery to relieve against mistake, especially where it has been produced by the misrepresentations of the adverse party. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 15 Pet. 233.

15. (Jan., 1846.) It is doubtful whether a Court of Chancery could relieve against a mistake committed by so high an agency in a recent occurrence. It is certain that it could not, except on the clearest proof of mistake. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 How. 591.

16. (Jan., 1849.) There being a bill and a cross-bill, each state is a defendant, and this court can pass such a decree as the case requires. Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660.

17. (Dec., 1854.) In cases in which this court has original jurisdiction, the form of proceeding is not regulated by act of Congress, but by the rules and orders of the court. Florida

v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.

18. (Dec., 1855.) This court has power, in a case of original jurisdiction, to award costs against either of the parties.2 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, &c., Bridge Co., 18 How. 460.

19. Moreover, this court has equity jurisdiction in certain cases under the Constitution of the United States. . . . Ib.

20. (Dec., 1860.) In a suit between two states, this court has original jurisdiction, without any further act of Congress regulating the mode and form in which it shall be exercised. Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 66.

21. A suit by or against the governor of a state, as such, in his official character, is a suit by or against the state. Ib. 22. (Dec., 1867.) A bill in equity filed by one of the United States, to enjoin the Secretary of War and other officers who represent the executive authority of the United

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States, from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress, on the ground that such execution would annul and totally abolish the existing state government of the state and establish another and different one in its place, in other words, would overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the state, by depriving it of all the means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might and otherwise would be maintained, calls for a judgment upon a political question, and will therefore not be entertained by this court. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.

23. This character of the bill is not changed by the fact that, in setting forth the political rights sought to be protected, the bill avers that the state has real and personal property (as, for example, the public buildings, etc.), of the enjoyment of which, by the destruction of its corporate existence, the state will be deprived; such averment not being the substantive ground of the relief sought. Ib.

24. (Dec., 1868.) But in order to the exercise by a state of the right to sue in this court, there needs to be a state government competent to represent the state in its relations. with the national government, so far at least as the institution and prosecution of a suit is concerned. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 701.

25. While Texas was controlled by a government hostile to the United States, and in affiliation with a hostile confederation waging war upon the United States, no suit instituted in her name could be maintained in this court. It was necessary that the government and the people of the state should be restored to peaceful relations to the United States, under the Constitution, before such a suit could be prosecuted. Ib.

26. (Dec., 1870.) In a suit against a corporation by one state, an averment that the defendant is a body politic by the law of another state named, and "doing business" in it, is not sufficient to give jurisdiction to this court. Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 10 Wall. 553.

27. This court has no original jurisdiction of a suit brought by a state against its own citizens. Ib.

28. (Dec., 1870.) This court has original jurisdiction, under the Constitution, of controversies between states of the Union concerning their boundaries. Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39.

29. This jurisdiction is not defeated because, in deciding the question of boundary, it is necessary to consider and construe contracts and agreements between the states, nor because the judgment or decree of the court may affect the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the states that are parties to the suit. Ib.

30. (Oct., 1875.) Held, first, that the state has a direct interest in the railroad, by reason of holding the $4,000,000 of bonds, which were a statutory lien on the road; that, as the title to the lands composing the internal improvement fund were vested in the trustees, merely as the agents of the state, for a particular purpose, her interest is sufficient to give her a standing in court whenever the interests of that fund are brought before a court for inquiry. It is competent for her, therefore, in seeking equitable relief against citizens of another state, for the protection of her interests, to file an original bill in this court. Florida v. Anderson, 1 Otto, 669.

31. (Oct., 1877.) Where Congress has, in the exercise of its lawful authority, inaugurated or adopted a system for the improvement of a harbor, and is, by appropriating the public moneys, carrying it out, this court has no authority to prescribe the manner in which the work shall be conducted, or to forbid its completion, or to require the undoing of that which has been done. Wisconsin v. Duluth, 6 Otto, 379.