EXTRACTS OF STATEMENTS BY HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA ON THE OUTLOOK IN SOUTH VIETNAM (JANUARY 1, 1963, THROUGH JANUARY 1, 1966)

1. January 30, 1963, House Armed Services Committee

"As I have said before on several occasions, victory over the Vietcong will most likely take many years."

2. February 10, 1963, AP interview

Question. What is your assessment of the prospects in South Vietnam a year after this country started its big drive to help the pro-Western government stamp out the Communist guerrillas?

Answer. You may recall that while I have expressed satisfaction on several occasions during the past year with the progress of the operations in South Vietnam, I have on each occasion cautioned against the conclusion that the progress is leading toward a near-term victory. On each occasion I have indicated that a period of years would be required to wipe ont the Communist aggression in that country. Progress has been made, however, during this past year. I can cite some of the factors that lead me to make that statement * * *

I cite these as favorable factors indicating that we believe the South Vietnamese Government and we have made progress during this past year. But I don't wish to indicate to you that that progress has resulted or will result in the near future in defeat of the Vietcong. We have blunted the attack, but we haven't defeated it.

3. February 19, 1963, Senate Armed Services Committee

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I have noticed a release of a statement by you in relation to Vietnam in which you said in substance it would be a long hard struggle. Could you specify a little more, you are not expecting any victory or any accomplishment there or termination of goals or anything like that for several years; is that right? That is what I inferred from your statement any

way.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the influence of the Vietcong. I think this will go on, I hope it will go on, for a substantial period in the future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be maybe 3 or 4 years.

4. February 28, 1963, press conference

Question. Mr. Secretary, you were optimistic in your foreword to your budget message about the progress of things in South Vietnam. General Wheeler was also optimistic. Are you still optimistic or do you think it may take a little longer?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe I have ever indicated it would be other than a long, hard struggle extending over a period of years. I have felt that way in the past after each of my meetings with our commanders in South Vietnam and with the Ambassador in South Vietnam. I have so reported after each of the visits I have held with those individuals both in Honolulu and Saigon. I feel exactly the same way today. I am optimistic in the sense that progress is discernible. The drive of the Vietcong supported by the North Vietnamese against the established Government in South Vietnam has been blunted.

There are a number of factors that are favorable, a number of indications that the South Vietnamese are stronger in relation to the Vietcong than they were a year ago. In that sense there has been progress. For that reason I am optimistic. But I am not predicting the termination of the conflict. It will be a long, hard, dangerous conflict. * * *

I want to repeat again that although there has been a favorable development in the ratio of Vietcong versus South Vietnamese casualties, a favorable development in the improvement in the ratio of arms captured by the South Vietnamese versus the Vietcong, a favorable development in the reduction in Vietcong incidents, nonetheless the Vietcong have been able to reinforce their forces, they have been able to replace all their losses, and they continue to function as a very dangerous arm of the North Vietnamese and Red Chinese Communist Parties. 5. June 13, 1963, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Although the conflict (in Vietnam) will continue for some time to come, I believe we are making significant gains, particularly in the carrying through of the vital strategic hamlet program, in the gradual extension of Government control,

and in the key indexes of comparative defection and the growth in spontaneous intelligence reflecting the growing loyalty and confidence of the people of Vietnam in their Government. It may be of interest to note that in recent weeks we have talked to representatives of other allied and neutral nations who have been observing the picture closely; they share the judgment that we are making significant progress against the Vietcong.

Senator AIKEN. I noticed that you, * * *, were more optimistic over the situation in Vietnam, and feel that that is coming to a successful conclusion. Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Aiken, I would not wish to obscure the very serious crisis in that country associated with the conflict between the Buddhist sect and the Government. I think this is a cause for great concern. But excluding that factor, progress against the Vietcong, which I specifically referred to in my statement, has been very satisfactory indeed.

6. July 19, 1963, press conference

Question. Do the religious problems in Vietnam have an active effect on the military effort?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the effect of the religious controversy, or what started out, at least, as a religious controversy in Vietnam, has been limited to date on the military effort. The military operations in South Vietnam have been proceeding very satisfactorily and this is true no matter what method you apply to them. If you examine the casualty rates, the rate of incidents, the relative exchange of weapons, those gained versus those lost, the number of prisoners taken, the number of defectors, for example -any one of these measures that you apply to current military operations compared with those of a year ago, or 2 years ago, indicate that they have been proceeding very, very satisfactorily indeed. We are quite pleased with the results. But I don't think they can help but be affected if the current controversies, religious and/or political, continue into the future for any extended period of time. ***

7. September 23, 1963, planeside press interview, Andrews Air Force Base Question. Could you summarize the purpose of your visit (to South Vietnam)? Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Until very recently the progress of the military effort of the South Vietnamese, assisted by the United States, against the Vietcong was proceeding very satisfactorily. It is our purpose to determine whether that military effort has been adversely affected by the unrest of the past several weeks. For that purpose President Kennedy, after consultation with Ambassador Lodge, has asked General Taylor and me to visit Saigon and extensively review the military program there.

8. September 25, 1963, CBS interview

Question. Might the war (in South Vietnam) be won on the battlefield and lost in Saigon?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The current period is a difficult one to appraise. Certainly, instability has been accentuated in the last several weeks by the actions of the Government. It is entirely possible that they have alienated important elements of the population, and unless the Government and the population can work together in a unified effort to defeat the Vietcong, they won't be defeated. 9. October 2, 1963, White House statement

1. The security of South Vietnam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Vietnam.

2. The military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Vietnam are capable of suppressing it. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Vietnam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Vietnam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

10. November 19 1963, planside interview, Hickam Air Force Base

Question. We've heard several optimistic reports of General Harkins of the (SVN) war there and how our American boys are still dying over there, and we noticed today that there was another insurgency action. When can we expect that you are going to start ordering the American boys to start coming home from that war?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I expect that the return of certain U.S. personnel will be one of the subjects we will discuss at this meeting. It is our objective to provide the training and logistical assistance which the South Vietnamese Government has requested of us, and upon completion of certain facets of that training, small numbers of the U.S. personnel will be able to return by the end of this year.

Question. Do you consider that the change of regime in Vietnam makes possible a more decisive action now to end the war?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is quite clear that the previous regime had lost the support of large segments of the population, and a war of this typea war against guerrilla action, a war against subversion-can only be won with the full support of the people. I think this Government is bound to have, and is already receiving, more support than the previous one either had or deserved. 11. November 21, 1963, planeside statement, Andrews AFB

The meeting that was held yesterday (in Hawaii) was attended by Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and myself, and other representatives of this Government. It was a very fruitful, worthwhile discussion; we reviewed in great detail both economic and military programs of assistance to South Vietnam. We are very encouraged by the excellent working relationships which have developed between our representatives and the new Government in South Vietnam, and we are equally encouraged by the prospects for progress in the war against the Vietcong.

12. December 21, 1963, remarks at the White House

The members of my party and I returned this morning from South Vietnam. We have just completed our report to the President of our observations. We observed the results of the very substantial increase in the Vietcong activity, an increase that began shortly after the new Government was formed, and has extended over a period of several weeks.

During this time, the Vietcong have attacked, and attacked successfully, a substantial number of the strategic hamlets. They have burned the houses, the fortifications, and in many cases have forced the inhabitants to leave. The rate of that Vietcong activity, however, has substantially dropped within the past week to 10 days.

This rapid expansion of activity, I think, could have been expected. It obviously was intended to take advantage of the period of organization in the new Government, a period during which there was a certain amount of confusion-confusion that you might have expected would result from the replacement of the province chiefs and other key administrators in the Government. We reviewed in great detail the plans of the South Vietnamese and the plans of our own military advisers for operations during 1964 We have every reason to believe they will be successful. We are determined that they shall be. 13. January 27, 1964, House Armed Services Committee

The situation there continues grave. Last September we had hoped we could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Diem government to persuade it to abandon its oppressive measures against the Vietnamese people and get on with the task of winning the war against the Vietcong. Although the military situation in the delta region was still very bad, good progress had been made in the northern areas and especially noteworthy work had been done in the key coastal provinces where Vietcong strength had once threatened to cut the country in half. In the central area and the highlands, progress had been steady, though slower. The situation was still difficult in the provinces to the west and north of Saigon itself. Throughout the northern two-thirds of the country, the strategic hamlet program had developed very well and freedom of movement in the rural areas had grown steadily. We concluded then that top priority should

be given to the delta region which contains approximately 40 percent of the population. This region has traditionally resisted central authority. It is the center of Vietcong strength, and the swampy nature of the terrain makes it the most diffcult area to pacify.

The first step in that direction had already been taken by September when a third division was moved to the delta. But we felt that additional measures were needed, particularly the consolidation, rather than the further spread, of strategic hamlets; the elimination of many fixed outposts; better hamlet defenses; and more trained hamlet militia. We also felt that the regular Republic of Vietnam Army units should be reserved for use in mobile actions and for "clear and hold" operations in support of the strategic hamlet program.

With these further measures in view, we felt that a start could be made in reducing the number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam as their training missions were completed. Accordingly, we announced that about 1,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end of 1963 and expressed the hope that the major part of the U.S. military task could be completed by the end of 1965, although we recognized that there might be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. advisory personnel.

In this connection, we must recognize that the U.S. advisory effort cannot assure ultimate success. This is a Vietnamese war, and in the final analysis it must be fought and won by the Vietnamese. To leave our advisers there beyond the time they are truly needed would delay the development of Vietnam's initiative. Therefore it has been our policy to transfer U.S. responsibilities to the Vietnamese wherever this can be done without impairing the total war effort. Unfortunately, the Diem government did not choose to follow the advice we offered. In November that government was overthrown and replaced by a new government made up of military officers and civilians. The Vietcong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Vietcong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup.

The new Government, however, has considerably more popular support than its predecessor and the Military Revolutionary Committee is beginning to take action to intensify military operations and to improve civil administration. The strategic hamlet program which had been overextended in the delta area is now being built more solidly. And the new Government is now applying “clear and hold" tactics in that area.

We hope that, with our full support, the new Government can take hold and eventually suppress the Vietcong insurrection. The dry season will give us a firmer basis for this judgment. However, the survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of southeast Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory. We must prove that Communist aggression cannot succeed through subversion, but will fail as surely as it has failed in direct confrontation.

14. January 27, 1964, Brinkley on NBC

McNamara said the war in South Vietnam has improved very little, if any since the new Government took over, and he thought the United States must take all necessary measures to prevent a Communist victory.

15. January 27, 1964, CBS-TV

Cronkite reported that McNamara's progress report on the war against communism in Vietnam was far from optimistic. He confirmed reports that the enemy had successfully taken advantage of the change in regimes there.

Secretary MCNAMARA (in film clip). I think we should go back to the period immediately following the coup. As you might have expected, there was a period of instability during the reorganization of the Government. The Vietcong, the Communist insurgents, took advantage of that period of instability, increased the rate of their attacks and greatly increased the pressure they were putting on the South Vietnamese, particularly in the rice-rich delta area south of Saigon.

That period of increased Vietcong pressure endured both through November and December. Since that time, however, Government forces have been greatly strengthened, and we're seeing a reversal of that situation today. Much remains to be done.

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16. January 28, 1964, Pentagon press conference

Question. Could you expand a bit on your statement about the war in Vietnam which you made to the House committee yesterday?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The situation in Vietnam is this: The coup took place on November 2, and at that time the military junta took control of the political administration of the country, and there was what you might have expected-a period of turmoil and instability, uncertainty, as the responsibility for the Government shifted.

The Vietcong took advantage of that, as you would have expected they would. They increased the intensity of their attacks, increased the number of their attacks severalfold, and particularly in the area south of Saigon, the delta area, major portions of which had been under the control of the Communists for more than 20 years, way back into the early 1940's.

The Communists moved in, and never at any time since roughly 1940 have major areas of that delta been under control of anyone other than the Communists. In any event, the Vietcong, expanding from those Communists bases, those long-held Communists bases in the delta, raised the intensity of their attacks, and had many successes during the period of November and December as the new Government formed and consolidated its activities.

The Government was made up of military leaders primarily, as you know, excluding the Prime Minister To, who was a civilian. But General Don, General Minh, General Dinh-all of the others that are members of that committee-in effect held dual roles. They retained their responsibility for direction of military operations while at the same time they assumed this additional responsibility for the administration of the political and economic institutions of that country, a country under severe attack from the Communists.

You can imagine, therefore, that something suffered, and I think that what suffered was the military administration or the administration of military operations, as their attention was forced onto these political and economic problems. They took action, as I remember, toward the latter part of December or early in January, to divide their responsibilities, appointed additional military commanders, sorted out the responsibilities so that greater concentration on military problems was possible, and there has been a very noticeable improvement in the operations as a result.

The Vietcong attacks have decreased in intensity and number and the Government successes have increased. The situation in the delta remains grave, but I am encouraged by the progress of the last 2 weeks.

17. February 3, 1964, joint Senate Armed Services-Appropriations Committees Question. Would you make a few comments about the new South Vietnamese government?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't speak with any real authority on it. I spent considerable time with General Khanh during my visits to Vietnam. He has impressed me as a very intelligent, articulate, courageous, aggressive, determined army commander. I felt that before he entered the Government last week and I feel it today. But I speak of him in my association with him as an army commander, not as a chief of state. I am not prepared to evaluate his qualities in that latter role, although I think that many of the characteristics that I have observed in him as an army commander will stand him in good stead in his role as chief of state.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Last fall I was not as optimistic perhaps about the course of the war as I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments. I still am hopeful of doing that. We did, of course, bring back a thousand men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful we can bring back additional numbers of men. I say this because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. It is a guerrilla war that must be fought by Vietnamese countering the local Vietcong guerrillas. I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training. We can provide advice and logistical assistance. But after all, the training, by the very nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point. We will have started this expanded training program and carried it out for a period of 4 years, by the end of next year.

I don't believe we should leave our men there to substitute for Vietnamese men who are qualified to carry out the task. This is really the heart of our proposal. I think it was a sound proposal then and I think so now. I don't in any way wish to minimize the difficulties we face in Vietnam. I think they are great but I do