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more for defensive than offensive purposes in their own waters. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ADAIR. Nuclear submarines?

General WHEELER. Not nuclear. They are diesel-powered submarines. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ADAIR. Do you anticipate as a matter of fact any hostile submarine activity in the Far East or southeast Asia in the immediate future?

General WHEELER. Not under the present circumstances of the war, Mr. Adair. Saying this, I would like to assure you that the elements of the fleet which are operating in those waters take the necessary prudent precautions to make sure that if I am wrong they are not going to get hurt.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Secretary, in your statement on page 23 you make reference to NATO infrastructure, $90 million, and go ahead and discuss it in the following paragraph.

My basic question is, in the light of uncertainty concerning De Gaulle's attitude, if that is a wise provision at this time?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe it is, Mr. Adair, [security deletion]. I don't believe that at this time we could say with any certainty at all that the infrastructure money would not be needed.

Second, we have within the past 3 months renegotiated the infrastructure agreement. Previously the United States share was 30.85 percent. We have obtained the agreement of NATO to a reduction in that share to 25.7 percent, a reduction of 5 percentage points, or 17 percent in absolute terms in the U.S. infrastructure contribution.

Moreover, in the course of the renegotiation, we emphasized, as did some other nations, that we thought the total absolute level of the infrastructure program could be cut back. That too was agreed to. The result has been that in the future there will be a saving of about [security deletion] a year to the United States as a result of these two new infrastructure agreements.

Under the circumstances, I think it would be very undesirable for us to be a drag on the infrastructure program of NATO, which we would be if we did not provide these funds.

Mr. ADAFR. If General de Gaulle proceeds on his apparent present course of divorcing his military elements from the NATO forces, what effect will that have on the pipelines and upon our great supply depots?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't answer your question because I don't know what he will do, or when he will do it. I don't know in particular what authority he would agree we should have over those facilities in the event of military conflict. He hasn't spelled any of this out as yet. I can't answer the question.

We have examined a number of possibilities. We have examined the possibility of moving all our stocks and depots out of France. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ADAIR. If General de Gaulle persists in his present attitude, is it your opinion that SHAPE headquarters will be moved? Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ADAIR. My final question, Mr. Chairman.

Would you bring us up to date on the matter of the harbor facilities at Saigon and Da Nang, so forth? Is the off-loading process being accelerated any?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I will speak only with respect to the military shipping, but I think my comments would apply perhaps equally to nonmilitary shipping as well.

On November 22, I believe, there was a backlog of 122 military cargo ships.

Mr. ADAIR. At Saigon?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I was going to say being unloaded in South Vietnamese waters, awaiting unloading, or awaiting movement to South Vietnam from holding ports in such areas as the Philippines. One hundred and twenty-two ships were, therefore, being unloaded or awaiting unloading.

That had declined to 40, or perhaps 37 is the proper number, a week or 10 days ago. We think that is about normal. [Security deletion.] I doubt very much that it will develop again in the future, even though we continue huge movements of equipment into that area, because between January and July of this year we expect a 75-percent increase in the port capacity of South Vietnam.

The specific answer to your question is that I don't think port facilities will be a bottleneck with respect to our force buildup. Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Beckworth.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Mr. Secretary, the officials of the State Department make some rather significant decisions about economic aid with reference to many countries. To what extent do their officials consult with you about those decisions with reference to economic aid?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe there is any need for them to consult with the Defense Department on most economic aid matters. As a matter of fact, in practice we do frequently discuss them. I don't think there is any official requirement. It isn't something that really affects us very often in Defense. It is more a personal relationship that has developed between us over the years which happens to lead to informal discussions on a broad range of subjects, including economic aid.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Do you find yourself in conflict with what they frequently decide about economic aid?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't find myself in frequent conflict. I don't remember any major difference between us on economic aid. Mr. BECKWORTH. If there were significant reductions in economic aid, do you feel that that would have any effect particularly over your military assistance?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I feel very strongly that the military assistance program, and as a matter of fact our entire defense program, is a complement to the economic portion of our foreign aid program. Both are tools of foreign policy. You can't redesign one tool without presumably affecting the design and quantity of other tools.

Any major change in the economic aid program, in my opinion, would require a reanalysis not only of the military assistance program but of the entire defense budget, because it would require a review of our whole foreign policy.

Mr. BECKWORTH. General Wheeler, occasionally I get letters that have in them sentences like this: "We should pursue a win policy." What comment would you make on that, very briefly?

General WHEELER. I would say very briefly that is what we are pursuing, Mr. Beckworth, to the best of our ability.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. To me the proposal by West Germany to construct for Red China a massive steel complex is not only an economic problem but a military problem. Because of that, I would like to register through you to the Department of Defense my strong protest on the military threat that proposal raises, not only to the security of the United States, but particularly to the future possibility of U.Š. troops staying in the Pacific or Asiatic waters or on the Asiatic mainland. I believe the proposal goes much beyond diplomacy and hope that your Department is actively taking steps to prevent this occurrence from happening. Is it possible for you, your Department, to act in this particular instance?

Secretary MCNAMARA. This is a State Department responsibility. Secretary Rusk has spoken publicly on it and is directing action in relation to it.

Mr. FULTON. There is the factor of military threat inherent in this action, which I believe does affect your Department, too.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is still a matter, I think, for the State Department to handle through diplomatic channels.

Mr. FULTON. My next point is this: [Security deletion.]
Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FULTON. What is being done to jam or to make ineffective the Russian trawler off the coast of Guam on sending the signals ahead which give the word prior to our B-52's really clearing the runway for Vietnam? Is anything being done to negate that particular action by the U.S.S.R.?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me ask General Wheeler to comment [security deletion].

Mr. FULTON. You can put a statement in the record.

(A classified memorandum was subsequently furnished in response to Mr. Fulton.)

Mr. FULTON. My other point is this: We are always hearing a figure of 4,500 infiltrators per month from North Vietnam as a set figure. It sounds as if it was a regular allotment that came through almost by post without variation. Certainly in the case of infiltrators it is clearly a composite figure that we are making up from all sorts of shreds of evidence and it must vary. So it isn't really an exact figure. I question that figure.

Could you make a comment on that, General?

General WHEELER. Yes. This is a capability; in other words, an assessment of the routes of infiltration and an assessment of actual identified troop units within South Vietnam-which of course accrue over a period of months-showing they can infiltrate this many and have infiltrated this number in the past.

Mr. FULTON. It is a composite estimate then?
General WHEELER. That is correct.

Mr. FULTON. One other point that we should look to on Haiphong as another alternative possibility. There is the possibility of quarantining certain imports into the port of Haiphong. For example, we could pick out one or two easily identifiable imports such as POL, petroleum products. Or we could pick out something that has missile characteristics or aircraft characteristics that you could identify without boarding a ship.

I was in the Navy in World War II, so that makes me more than interested in this type of policy. The question is, Why shouldn't the United States consider a quarantine policy on certain strategic products that come into Haiphong from either so-called friendly peaceloving countries or Communist countries. We could state to the world at large and to the countries bringing these products into Haiphong that in our U.S. military posture we can't have this adverse action and therefore the United States must deny the harbor to this type of imports?

Petroluem products particularly are used to power the trucks that are bringing in infiltrators and military equipment of all kinds.

Could that be done?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the answer is, It could be done. [security deletion].

Mr. FULTON. If they were petroleum ships you could tell it ahead

of time.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We could tell it but we couldn't stop them without some form of military action. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FULTON. You wouldn't even then make the public statement that we would try our best to stop it if they continued this practice? Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FULTON. That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wheeler, I would like to call to your attention Thailand [security deletion].

General WHEELER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. I was in Thailand last December with the Far East Subcommittee. We visited the northeast area [security deletion]. I would also like to ask this question: [security deletion] dollars has been set forth this year for military assistance to Thailand which is comparatively a small sum. [Security deletion.]

General WHEELER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, for the improvement of our relations with Pakistan, do you believe we will improve our relations in the event that we give India military assistance?

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. At the present time there is great resentment by Pakistan because of our aid to India during the Sino-India conflict of 1962. Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. The two countries are in different categories. Pakistan was an ally of ours and is a member of SEATO and CENTO. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was India a member of CENTO or SEATO?
Secretary MCNAMARA. NO.

Mr. MURPHY. Was India an ally or a nonalined nation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. India was under attack from Red China. and it was entirely in our interest, and I believe greatly in the interest of Pakistan, that we assist India in combating that Red Chinese aggression. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. We talked to the Pakistani last December. They stated that the aid that was given to India in the event of a SinoIndian conflict was used against them in Kashmir.

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. We did not have a very good reception in Pakistan because of our aid to India.

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MURPHY. One more question: Were we committed under any military assistance pact with Pakistan to defend Pakistan in the event of an invasion? Pakistanis claim they had an agreement with our country, and that we did not live up to it, especially in the invasion of Pakistan by India east of Lahore.

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]
Mr. MURPHY. They raised that question.
Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, if you don't mind, we are going to suspend for one moment if Mr. Gallagher will yield to Mr. Fascell for a little committee business.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Certainly not. (Discussion off the record.)

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wheeler and Mr. Secretary: It may not be related at the present time to foreign aid, but it may be as a source of new customers and clients. And in view of your fellow Michigan resident yesterday asking for a full-scale investigation of unidentified flying objects, do you have an interest in this, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Off the record.

(Statement off the record.)

Secretary MCNAMARA. On the record.

Of course we have an interest in it. We treat each of these reports as though it were the report of a sincere individual, and we seek to find the explanation of what it was that led him to make the report he did. We have a very definite interest in it. It is our responsibility to defend this country against potential aggressors. We don't know what form that aggression might take. We recognize the possibility that it might take a form different than anyone has anticipated in the past. Therefore, we must investigate thoroughly each of these proposals, each of these reports. We believe we do. I have complete confidence in the Air Force's objectivity in this area. If anything, I am inclined to think the investigations are more extensive than actually required.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Is there anything at all to any of this, in view of the publications like Life and the rest of them starting to take some of it serious?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think not. I have talked to the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of Research and Engineering, and

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