C. One university or one not-of-profit organization should be selected to coordinate the work of the teams mentioned under A above, and also to make certain of very close communication and coordination with the office of Project Blue Book.

It is thought that perhaps 100 sightings a year might be subjected to this close study, and that possibly an average of 10 man-days might be required per sighting so studied. The information provided by such a program might bring to light new facts of scientific value, and would almost certainly provide a far better basis than we have today for decision on a long-term UFO program.

The scientific reports on these selected sightings, supplementing the present program of the Project Blue Book office, should strengthen the public position of the Air Force on UFO's. It is, therefore, recommended that:

A. These reports be printed in full and be available on request.

B. Suitable abstracts or condensed versions be printed and included in, or as supplements to, the published reports of Project Blue Book.

C. The form of report (as typified by "Project Blue Book" dated February 1. 1966) be expended, and anything which might suggest that information is being withheld (such as the wording on p. 5 of the above cited reference) be deleted. The form of this report can be of great importance in securing public understanding and should be given detailed study by an appropriate Air Force office. D. The reports "Project Blue Book" should be given wide unsolicited circulation among prominent Members of Congress and other public persons as a further aid to public understanding of the scientific approach being taken by the Air Force in attacking the UFO problem.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, September 28, 1965.

Memorandum for Military Director, Scientific Advisory Board.
Subject: Unidentified flying objects (UFO's).

In keeping with its air defense role, the Air Force has the responsibility for the investigation of unidentified flying objects reported over the United States. The name of this project is Blue Book (attachment 1). Procedures for conducting this program are established by Air Force Regulation 200-2 (attachment 2).

The Air Force has conducted Project Blue Book since 1948. As of June 30. 1965, a total of 9,267 reports had been investigated by the Air Force. Of these 9,267 reports, 663 cannot be explained.

It has been determined by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations that Project Blue Book is a worthwhile program which deserves the support of all staff agencies and major commands, and that the Air Force should continue to investigate and analyze all UFO reports in order to assure that such objects do not present a threat to our national security. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations has determined also that the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base should continue to exercise its presently assigned responsibilities concerning UFO's.

To date, the Air Force has found no evidence that any of the UFO reports reflects a threat to our national security. However, many of the reports that cannot be explained have come from intelligent and technically well qualified individuals whose integrity cannot be doubted. In addition, the reports received officially by the Air Force include only a fraction of the spectacular reports which are publicized by many private UFO organizations.

Accordingly, it is requested that a working scientific panel composed of both physical and social scientists be organized to review Projects Blue Book-its resources, methods, and findings-and to advise the Air Force as to any improvements that should be made in the program in order to carry out the Air Force's assigned responsibility.

Dr. J. Allen Hynek, who is the chairman of the Dearborn Observatory at Northwestern University, is the scientific consultant to Project Blue Book. He has indicated a willingness to work with such a panel in order to place this problem in its proper perspective.

Dr. Hyneck has discussed this problem with Dr. Winston R. Markey, the former Air Force Chief Scientist.

E. B. LEBAILLY,

Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director of Information.

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO'S) —AGENDA

Thursday, February 3, 1966:

0800-Welcoming remarks: commander or vice commander, FTD.

0810 "The Air Force Problem": Lieutenant Colonel Spaulding, SAFOI. 0830-Briefings on Project Blue Book: Major Quintanilla, FTD.

1000-Break.

1015-Review of selected case histories: FTD staff.

1145-Lunch.

1315-Executive and writing session.

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW PROJECT "BLUE BOOK"

Meeting statistics bearing on this report including all times, dates, places, a listing of persons in attendance and purposes therefor, together with their affiliations and material reviewed and discussed, are available in the SAB Secretariat offices for review by authorized persons or agencies.

Approved by Harold A. Steiner, lieutenant colonel, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.

Mr. GALLAGHER. [Security deletion.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. What would require a B-52 bombardment?
Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. A certificated target or believed to be target?
Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan, will you yield to me? I want to announce to the committee that there is an automatic "yea" and "nay" vote on daylight saving time.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, great stress has been laid today on the propriety of your coming to the Congress with one set of figures as against another and higher set. You know there is a legal doctrine that says one is never required to do a useless thing. I think that might very well apply in your case here. Certainly I don't feel that in view of the history of these requests you are required to figuratively be kicked in the chin every year. I am also sure that this is a matter in your mind of propriety rather than of serious challenge to the security of the country. I am sure that would be achieved in some manner through your recommendation.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, you are quite right. The proposal that we have presented to you, even though it is less than that recommended by the unified commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff, is, in my opinion, proper and appropriate and adequate in relation to our national security requirements.

Mr. MONAGAN. There are several statements in the testimony that Admiral Sharp gave yesterday that I would like to call to your attention, in relation to the situation in Vietnam at the present time. It seemed to me that the key words were that "we face a long and grim struggle." He said that "we have the prospect of the pendulum swinging slowly to our side." He said that "it is a difficult war," that our prospects are "good." Also that subsequent to the resumption of the bombing the Vietcong had been very effective in rehabilitating themselves, so to speak, by various techniques.

Would these statements represent your point of view?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I wouldn't have used some of the adjectives or the color words, such as "grim," for example; but, generally speaking, they would.

Mr. MONAGAN. "Long" was a significant one, too.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; again "long"-it could be weeks, months, or years. I hesitate to predict the length of the conflict just as General Wheeler hesitated to predict it. We do not know whether the will of the north will change. I wouldn't wish to emphasize the word "long," but I do not think that the termination of the conflict will occur in the near future-not in the next several months, for example.

Mr. MONAGAN. Would you say that any suggestion about rapprochement with Communist China--we have seen some suggestions of this sort-would have to be viewed against the realities of the military situation, and also the lack of indication of any receptiveness on the other side?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think so. It would also have to be reviewed against its effect on relationships between this country and many other nations in the world, such as the Republic of China, and Korea and other Asian nations. When I say that, I don't in any way want to indicate that I support what might be called the policy of isolating Red China, because I don't. I think the movement of Red China out of isolation is a movement that requires action not only on the part of this country, but also on the part of Red China.

Mr. MONAGAN. How much is Spain buying in the way of equipment ? Secretary MCNAMARA. Spain is

Mr. MONAGAN. You can supply that.

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MONAGAN. I want to relate it to the military assistance program. You also spoke of loans of $56 million as against sales of $245 million. Just what is the function of that loan?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The loan is to make it possible for the foreign government to procure the item from this country. We have found that some foreign governments have the economic capabilities to finance their own defense forces. This is particularly true of [security deletion] for example. But they may not have the cash immediately available to buy today, and pay today for the item they need. Therefore, to encourage them to spend the money that they should be spending for defense: that is, to raise their defense budgets to the levels necessary to enable them to buy that equipment, we have utilized grant-aid money on a loan basis to finance, in whole or in part, such desirable equipment purchases by foreign governments. I say such desirable equipment purchases because we won't sell, for either cash or credit, to certain nations that shouldn't be buying. [Security deletion.]

We used loans to facilitate sales where sales are in the interest of both the prospective purchaser and the United States. Mr. MONAGAN. It would be repaid eventually?

Secretary MCNAMARA. These loans are repaid in dollars.

Mr. MONAGAN. You did refer to a discussion you had with the [security deletion].

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; if I could take it on my own time, I think the committee might be interested in this just as an illustration of what we have done to limit sales and prevent an arms race in Latin America.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to trespass on the time of the committee.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will show it to you separately.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. MONAGAN. Could that be made a part of the record?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It shouldn't be a part of the public record, Mr. Chairman. I will see that you get a chance to read it at your leisure.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have some questions that I will read into the record, and the response can be put in the record.

First, I would like to have a description of the existing mechanisms for the development in the OAS of joint plans.

Second, any proposed changes in such mechanisms.

Third, the specific steps being taken to bring joint plans into being. Fourth, the degree of consultation which has been undertaken since the adoption of the Fulbright amendment.

(The information follows:)

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 511 (b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, as

AMENDED

Answers to the four questions posed by Mr. Fraser are included in the "Report on Implementation of Section 511(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended" forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs on March 30, 1966. The report, which is required by section 511(b), is quoted below:

"Section 511(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides that the President shall submit semiannual reports to the Speaker of the House

of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on the implementation of the provisions of the above-mentioned section. This section directs that: "To the maximum extent feasible, military assistance shall be furnished to American Republics in accordance with joint plans (including joint plans relating to internal security problems) approved by the Organization of American States." This is the first report since enactment of the amendment on September 6, 1965, and covers the period from September 6, 1965, to December 31, 1965.

REPORT

"Progress toward fulfilling the intent of section 511(b) has been limited by the lack of an effective military planning body within the Organization of American States as presently constituted. There is a provision in the Charter of the Organization of American States (articles 44-47) for an Advisory Defense Committee. This committee is intended to be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States; however, the committee has never been convoked. There is no other military organ provided within the present Organization of American States Charter.

"There is a regional military organization, however, within the inter-American system which has representatives from all of the member nations of the Organization of American States, that is, the Inter-American Defense Board which was created in 1942 by the third meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. The Inter-American Defense Board is made up of military officers detailed from each of the member nations of the organization of American States for military planning for the Americas on a hemispheric basis. These officers represent their respective nations rather than the Organization of American States or any other international body. Although the Inter-American Defense Board does not have a formal status within the Organization of American States framework, it has addressed itself to the problem of hemisphere defense planning. U.S. military assistance provided pursuant to bilaterally developed military assistance plans is fully consistent with the general military plan of the Inter-American Defense Board.

[Security deletion.]

"There is also a subregional body in Central America which offers an opportunity for multilateral cooperation in military planning. It is the Central American Defense Council with membership from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica which was formally installed in June 1964 for the purpose of providing an organ of consultation in questions of regional defense and to monitor the collective security of member states. [Security deletion.] The military assistance program has provided materiel and training in support of the Central American Defense Council through its member states with particular emphasis on communications systems and mobility requirements." Mr. FRASER. Next, and you may have covered this before I came in, I would like a statement that describes the change in the nature. of your planning. I understand you are now on a 5-year program basis with respect to these countries. I would like to know what you have been doing, and what you are doing now, and a description of this to the extent that it is not already covered in the record. (The information follows:)

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLANNING PROCESS

The new feature in the planning process is the reappraisal of selected countries referred to in my opening statement. This reappraisal consisted of a "hard look" at the nature of the threat for certain countries and an assessment of the increased ability of U.S. forces to meet the threat. Otherwise, the planning process is the same as in the past; that is, long-range military assistance plans prepared by the Unified Commanders and reviewed by the Ambassadors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State. The program now before the Congress represents the first year of fiscal year 1967-fiscal year 1971 Unified Commanders' plans, amended to reflect the results of the plan review and the reappraisal of selected country programs.