fect. The only countries likely to be affected are Communist countries, which are already excluded from assistance by section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act (and comparable provisions in the bills now before the Congress). Thus, there appears to be little prospect that the proposed amendment would operate as an added sanction against subversive actions.

For these reasons the executive branch opposes the amendment.

Mr. FULTON. Another part is: I have strongly recommended the AID programs have room for us people who are of retirement age, mature people in their particular fields to work for the pacification, which is redevelopment really on economic terms of the towns and villages of South Vietnam. I have given AID five people who had written to me on such a basis, one of whom was ready for retirement. I believe he was a fire chief or police chief of a local community in western Pennsylvania. The Agency has written to me saying that, in the fifth case, "Despite this fine record of public service in his specialty we were unable to match his training and experience to a vacancy. Our letter advises you of this fact."

My criticism is that your Agency seems to restrict the help in Vietnam on a civilian basis on the redevelopment of towns and villages to superbureaucrats who have education of topnotch level, college degrees, and are only high-level policy people. My recommendation is that this policy be changed to permit U.S. citizens to volunteer for a year, 18 months, 2 years, who have successfully served in various public capacities in American towns and villages and translate on a village-to-village and town-to-town level what our U.S. methods of handling community problems are. So my criticism is serious, because these U.S. citizens are patriotic, they want to serve and participate, and they don't want to go on salaries of $12,000, $15,000, $18,000 a year. Many of these citizens would serve for $50 or $100 a month. This would be the equivalent in your agency of just what the Peace Corps does in countries that are less under pressure.

Also it extends the people-to-people's foreign policy, a policy started under President Eisenhower of people-to-people's foreign policy. Why don't we extend the program in Vietnam under the AID agency? 1 fail to grasp the reason. You can put a statement in the record. Mr. BELL. I would like to respond right now, if I may, because your conception of our attitude and policies is not correct.

We feel exactly the way you do about it. We do not have any requirements for college degrees for people working in the countryside in Vietnam. We have people there now who we have recruitedMr. FULTON. May I interrupt you so we can finish?

Look up your correspondence with me previously because it is specifically stated you want people with college degrees.

Mr. BELL. It all depends on the job, Mr. Fulton. Some jobs require it, and some do not. Certainly the jobs of provincial representative, for example, does not require that. We have necessarily applied very severe health requirements to our people. I would like to augment this for the record.

(The information follows:)

AID PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR DUTY IN VIETNAM

One of the greatest problems facing the AID Vietnam program today is the recruitment of top quality personnel. Locating provincial representatives is the most critical element of that problem. This does not generate from the

absence of candidates. Thousands of citizens have offered to serve with AID in Vietnam-many without pay. But AID's positions, for the most part, are professional in nature and all require the most qualified candidate available. Provincial representatives, including those who work on refugee relief, fill the key positions of the mission in Vietnam. Such staff represent U.S. policy, attitudes and philosophies to the people of South Vietnam. This requires a considerable degree of sophistication. First, AID looks for qualified young people because such staff must continually rough it and be exposed to personal health hazards and danger. Older employees, on the whole, do not maintain the required provincial work pace in Vietnam's subtropical environment. Second, candidates should have worked with people to effect social or political change and should possess some knowledge of the American equivalent of village and provincial political action.

AID does not limit selection to persons with degrees, but all things being equal, the Agency would usually select the individual with a degree over the applicant who does not possess such evidence of academic achievement. AID does have people serving in the provinces today whose background and experience have been accepted as substitutes for academic training. AID will continue to maintain this qualification standard because it has been most successful. Only after it has been demonstrated that AID cannot maintain such high standards and keep positions filled will the Agency consider lowering the qualifications. AID has initiated dynamic recruitment programs for Vietnam through the United States, which are expected to yield the quantity and quality of individuals required. Successful candidates will undoubtedly include some who have not completed 4 years of college.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Roybal.

Mr. ROYBAL. I will have only one comment because of the rollcall. You said the President was recommending increased activity by AID in the field of health, on page 8. You also say that you expect to obligate about $154 million, and, in addition, contributions to international organizations for health activities will total some $24 million. I believe that the problem that weighs most heavily upon the youth of our Nation is the problem of narcotics addiction. More lives are being ruined every day by narcotics, marihuana and heroin, than lives lost by TB, for example, and other communicable diseases.

Since the President wants more action in this field are you contemplating making available to international organizations sufficient funds to try to remedy the situation with regard to narcotics. Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYBAL. Particularly with regard to countries to the south that I understand have such a problem?

Mr. BELL. The short answer is "Yes," and let me put a fuller statement in the record on it, Mr. Roybal.

(The information follows:)

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO COMBAT NARCOTICS

ADDICTION

INTERATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS

The worldwide control of narcotic drugs rests upon 10 multilateral treaties concluded between 1912 and 1961, the last of these being the Single Convention of 1961, which came into force on December 13, 1964. The operation of the international system is based on national control by individual States within the limits of their jurisdiction. In compliance with the stipulations of the narcotics treaties, the States are bound to adopt appropriate legislation, introduce necessary administrative and enforcement measures and cooperate with the international control organs as well as with other countries.

The organs, functioning under the auspices of the United Nations, include a policymaking organ, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and two specialized administrative organs, the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Super

visory Body, charged particularly with the supervision of provisions of the narcotics treaties dealing with measures of quantitative control (statistics and estimates). These two organs will, after a period of transition, be replaced under the Single Convention of 1961 by one body known as the International Narcotics Control Board. Both the Commission and the Board report to the Economic and Social Council, as will the new Board.

The Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs formulate policies, coordinate activities, and supervise the implementation of international conventions and agreements. They make particular or general recommendations to governments on these matters and so far as medical problems are concerned they take advice from the World Health Organization.

The scheme of international control results from the realization of the necessity of close association of nations for the accomplishment of a purpose important to each one of them. The cooperation of governments is essential, for the system can function successfully only to the extent that governments fulfill their obligations under international treaties.

Governments provide to the control organs the information on which the operation of the system depends. They maintain an import certificate and export authorization system in foreign trade, furnish annual reports and texts of laws and regulations enacted by them to implement the narcotics treaties, and report seizures of narcotic drugs from the illicit traffic and other relevant data. They notify the United Nations about newly developed substances with possible addiction-producing properties, and they are pledged to place under control drugs which are found by international control organs to have such properties or to be convertible into drugs having such properties.

The import certificate and export authorization system constitutes one of the most important institutions of international narcotics control. According to this system, no legitimate shipments can be sent from one country to another without an import authorization from the government of the receiving country and a corresponding export authorization from the government of the sending country. Thus, by controlling the movements of the legal drugs, this provision enables detection of any country's exceeding its import maximum.

The real power behind international narcotics control, however, is the power of public opinion. The most effective means of assuring compliance with international obligations according to the terms of the various narcotics treaties is therefore the weapon of publicity. While overdramatization by information media of drug addiction, illicit traffic, and other aspects of narcotics control has often been found rather harmful to the efforts of national and international authorities, publicity given to the lack of cooperation of a government in this sphere generally has a salutary effect. Governments and their representatives, conscious as they are of their standing in the international community and among their own citizens, are extremely sensitive to any public accusation that they have failed to cooperate in this social and humanitarian venture. Such publicity is provided by reports of the organs of international control based on information furnished by governments (annual reports, laws, statistics, estimates, seizure reports) and by discussions in the various United Nations bodies. With the aim of assisting developing countries to fulfill their obligations under the treaties and to help them meet special problems that they might face, the United Nations has been giving increasing attention to technical cooperation in the field of narcotic drugs.

The General Assembly in 1959 decided to establish a special program of technical assistance in this field. It initially appropriated for this purpose $50,000, which was later increased to $75,000. The program developed since then has given assistance to groups of countries in a region with similar problems or to specific countries. The assistance has taken various forms: the provision of experts; training for national officials concerned with narcotics problems; seminars and regional meetings to elucidate regional problems; visiting expert missions to selected groups of countries; and fellowships for the study of regional problems. In recent years, a number of fellowships have been awarded: for training in the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts; to officials concerned with enforcement for further training in the techniques of their profession; for scientific research on opium and cannabis problems, and for the control of the cannabis problem. For several years Iran has been given the services of an administrative expert to help the Government solve the manifold problems created by its total ban on opium cultivation and on the use of opium by addicts. In 1964 a pre

liminary survey mission was sent at the request of the Government of Burma to assist it to study the economic and social needs of an opium-producing area in that country with a view to assisting the Government to replace opium cultivation by another means of livelihood for the population affected. The same kind of aid has been requested by the Government of Thailand which has already had expert advice on the problem of resettling hill tribes engaged in opium production.

FINANCES

For the calendar year 1966 the U.N. regular budget includes approximately $718,000 for the costs of narcotics control bodies, the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat, and for technical assistance in the field of narcotics. The United States contributes slightly under 32 percent to the U.N. budget. In the same year, World Health Organization is spending about $56,000 for research on the medical aspects of narcotics and for support of the Expert Advisory Panel on Dependence-Producing Drugs. The United States contributes slightly over 31 percent of assessments for the WHO budget.

NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY AID PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

1. Through training programs developed and conducted in collaboration with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics:

A. One hundred and twenty-two police officers from the following 24 countries have received specialized training in narcotics enforcement in the United States under the auspices of AID:

B. Over 1,500 additional foreign police officers have received introductory training in narcotics enforcement.

2. In Iran the public safety program assigned a U.S. expert in 1958 and 1959 and again from 1964 to date to advise the Iranian police on narcotics enforcement. This expert works in close collaboration with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics agents in the area, with other U.S. officials who advise the Iranian gendarmerie on their narcotics control responsibilities, and with CENTO officials. As a result we have successfully influenced Iran to promulgate more effective narcotics control laws; to increase the effectiveness of narcotics control training; to reorganize police narcotics control activities including greater coordination with the Iranian military and to improve police narcotics control investigative techniques and overall narcotics control operations.

3. In Mexico, AID has assisted local government narcotics control efforts by providing various kinds of equipment including vehicles, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The aircraft have been particularly useful in transporting Mexican police quickly to locations where illegal narcotics activities have been reported. Currently, discussions are underway with the Mexican Government on additional assistance needs including replacements for a helicopter and a fixed-wing aircraft which were destroyed while on missions in search of marihuana plantings.

4. AID's public safety program provides another very valuable type of support to U.S. narcotics control activities throughout the world. In the 34 countries, public safety advisers have close professional contact with police forces numbering over 1 million personnel. Through these contacts the public safety advisers are able to provide very effective liaison between the police and the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics agents stationed in such cities as Tokyo, Bangkok, Beirut, Panama City, and Rome. Through these working relationships, the effectiveness of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics control activity is enhanced considerably as is the narcotics control work of the various foreign police agencies.

Mr. ROYBAL. I would appreciate that.

One other thing, and that is that it has been alleged by a member of this committee that there are men on your staff in Latin America that cannot be found at their jobs. I also understand that an investigation will be made. It is my understanding also that such a situation exists in El Salvador. Is this true? Is the AID director at his job in El Salvador or has he been absent from the job in the last 6 months?

Mr. BELL. I will have to check the point, sir. I was not aware he was absent.

What Mr. Hays was referring to was a visit he made to Colombia. He was given a roster, and it was not up to date, and many of the names on it were not people who were at that time assigned to the mission. That was a mistake in our keeping track of our own people. We have modified our system and it is much different and better today. That was a technical problem that he was talking about.

Your question relates to the elementary and sensible management principle as to men we hire to be on the job. Obviously we are paying them to do the work and they should be there.

I will check the specific case you mention. In general, I am quite confident we have a high attendance rate. Our people are exceptionally devoted to their duties. I am sure you have seen this, yourself, in inany of the visits you have made to our overseas missions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am happy to hear that the rosters have been improved. I want to report, however, last month I was in Vietnam and was handed an organizational chart showing a deputy director who had been gone for 6 months.

Mr. BELL. I will keep on it, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The committee stands adjourned, until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when we will hear Secretary Rusk.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned until Thursday, March 17, 1966, at 10 a.m.)