particular question, Mr. Gross, beyond what I have already said this morning, I do think that it ought to be discussed further in closed session. I am a little handicapped in going into that in open session. Mr. GROSS. I wonder how you arrive at a figure of $917 million if you have doubts about the aid and assistance that you are going to give around the world. I will get back to that. Secretary RUSK. The $917 million is the total of the illustrative programs that we felt we might under certain conditions like to go ahead with. Mr. GROSS. As to the 5-year authorization, do you advocate it for all departments of Government, including the Defense Department? Secretary RUSK. We have, for example, in the Defense Department a continuing authorization. We have in our normal State Department budget a continuing authorization. Mr. BELL. Open ended. Mr. GROSS. Do you or don't you advocate it for all other departments of Government, a 5-year program? A blanket authorization? Secretary RUSK. I wouldn't want to speak for the administration as a whole, and all the departments and agencies. That would be for the Bureau of the Budget to get into. I do advocate it for the foreign aid program. Mr. GROSS. I am well aware of that. Tell me, why is the United States engaged in a boycott of Rhodesia? I would like to know as a matter of public record. Secretary RUSK. The Ian Smith group separated itself, or tried to separate itself, from Britain without having resolved the internal problem of effective consideration for the some 4 million blacks in that country. The British Government that was responsible for the Government of Rhodesia refused to follow the procedures by which many dozens of new members of the United Nations have come into being because Britain felt that they had a responsibility for the interest, the well-being, and the future of all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not just the white group. So from a structural point of view, we have not recognized the Ian Smith group as the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The international position of that group is that it is not a legal authority, that Britain continues to have responsibility for it; and in an effort to make that policy clear, Britain, and indeed the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, decided that pressures should be mobilized against the Ian Smith group until they found a much better answer than they had come up with. Mr. GROSS. We took unilateral action to boycott as far as this country was concerned. That was not the United Nations. Secretary RUSK. It is a policy in which most countries have joined. In this context we took action; and we acted with respect to our own economic relationships with Southern Rhodesia. Mr. GROSS. Are there not thousands of whites in various countries of Africa? Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Mr. GROSS. Do you know of any white officials in any of those governments, and if so please identify them for me? Secretary RUSK. I would be glad to submit some material on that for the record. (The information follows:) A partial list of white officials in African governments follows: Kenya: Minister of Agriculture, Bruce McKenzie (an elected M.P.) Air Force: Group Capt. Ian Stockwell Navy: Comdr. M. C. Walker A number of senior civil servants Tanzania: Minister of Agriculture, Derek Bryceson (an elected M.P. from a predominantly African constituency) One appointed Member of Parliament Some senior civil servants Zambia: Attorney General John Skinner 10 white Members of Parliament Commanding Officer, Army: Brigadier C. M. Grigg Air Force: Wing Commander W. A. Griffith A number of senior civil servants Malawi: Attorney General Brian Roberts Three white Members of Parliament Commanding Officer, Army; Lt. Col. T. P. J. Lewis A number of senior civil servants Senegal: Jean Collin, Minister of Finance Malagasy Republic: Eugene Lechat, Minister of Equipment and Communications In addition there are a number of white advisers and other officials in most African governments. (In the Arab north African states almost all of the indigenous population is nonblack.) Mr. GROSS. I mean holding responsible positions in any of those governments. Secretary RUSK. The people I deal with basically are the Prime Ministers or Presidents and the Foreign Ministers, and I do not know a white President or Foreign Minister among the Negro African states. Mr. Gross, most of those states are trying to work on a basis in which different races will be adequately accommodated and have full rights within their countries. Mr. GROSS. There has been no demonstration of it, Mr. Rusk, and you well know there has been no demonstration of that. Moreover, Rhodesia represents one of the few stable governments on the continent of Africa at this time. There have been nine revolutions, nine Negro governments overthrown, in less than a year on the continent of Africa. I ask you how long the Ethiopian Government has been in existence? For longer than this country has been in existence, is that not true? Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Mr. GROSS. How many whites are recognized in that Government? Secretary RUSK. In most of these African states, places like Kenya, Zambia, white people do live. Those who are settled citizens enjoy the usual rights of citizenship. Most of them are there engaged in business or mining or in teaching or activities of that sort. There are numbers still in the civil service of those countries. An effort has been made in most of the black African countries to make people of other races feel at home, to give them all the usual opportunities. I do not myself think, Mr. Gross, the situation in Southern Rhodesia can be properly described as stable. Here you have a group of about 223,000 members of the white community in Southern Rhodesia surrounded by 4 million blacks in that country, and beyond that surrounded by a hostile continent. I just find it hard————— Mr. GROSS. Mr. Rusk-and I am sure you know it-there are more seats allocated to African Negroes in the Rhodesian Parliament than there are in the British Parliament and there are more Negroes in the Rhodesian Parliament than in the U.S. Congress. Don't you think we ought to solve our own racial problems in this country before we start sticking our long noses into the racial problems in Rhodesia? Is there no place where we can stay out of this business? Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Gross, in this mid-20th century we must move as rapidly as possible to solve all these problems we have remaining in our own society. Mr. GROSS. Is their trouble the fact that they have not been on the foreign aid gravy train? Secretary RUSK. That is not their problem. This problem was taken up last November in the United Nations Security Council. At that meeting the Council adopted a resolution calling upon all states to refrain from-to desist from-sending arms and equipment and military material and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. This is a resolution with which practically all members of the United Nations are complying. Mr. GROSS. In ordering this boycott you were in violation of the U.S. Constitution, and you know it, which gives to Congress sole authority to regulate foreign trade Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has expired. Mr. Fascell. Secretary RUSK. It may be useful to the committee if I submit a legal brief on the last point as to the law. Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered. (The information follows:) EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES TAKEN On November 11, 1965, the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia declared unilaterally its independence from the United Kingdom and purported to establish a new state of Rhodesia. The British Government considered this action unconstitutional and as having no legal validity. It took steps in accordance with its constitutional processes to restore British authority in Southern Rhodesia. On November 20, the United Nations Security Council met for a second time to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia. At that meeting, the Council adopted a resolution calling upon all states to refrain from actions that would assist and encourage the illegal regime and "in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military materiel, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products." The United Kingdom had, on November 11, banned all exports to Southern Rhodesia of military equipment, including spare parts and all aircraft. On November 12, Ambassador Goldberg announced that the United States would impose an arms embargo in support of the British action and of the Security Council resolution. On November 20, 1965, the President directed discontinuance of the sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for 1965, prohibited establishment of a sugar quota for 1966, and directed that the necessary steps be taken to see that no sugar originating in Southern Rhodesia would be imported into the United States thereafter (30 F.R. 15285). 60-929-66-pt. 1————6 On December 17, the Government of the United Kingdom issued an order in Council making it illegal to supply or deliver, or to agree to supply or deliver, petroleum to Southern Rhodesia. The U.S. Government has at all times recognized the sovereignty and legal authority of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, our Government recommended that all U.S. companies comply with the British Government's order. In support of the British action, and again following the recommendations of the Security Council, the U.S. Government, on December 28, imposed export controls on the shipment of petroleum and petroleum products from the United States to Southern Rhodesia. On January 20, 1966, the British Government issued a further order, prohibiting the export of chromite from Southern Rhodesia and certain ancillary transactions. We again recognized the authority of the United Kingdom in this matter and recommended that U.S. companies comply with the order. On February 7, Her Majesty's government issued an order prohibiting the export of tobacco from Rhodesia and certain other transactions involving the sale of this year's crop of Rhodesian tobacco. We recommended that U.S. brokers who normally trade this tobacco comply with the order. A. Export controls GOVERNMENT CONTROLS (1) Generally.-Section 3 of the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, provides that: "To effectuate the policies set forth in section 2 hereof the President may prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its territories, and possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe.' Section 2 of that act provides: "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to use export controls to the extent necessary. *** (b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities. * * *'' In the circumstances summarized above, the measures taken by the United States to limit exports to Southern Rhodesia are authorized by the quoted provisions of the Export Control Act. (2) Arms.-Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, provides that: "(a) The President is authorized to control, in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the export and import of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, other than by a U.S. Government agency.' In the same set of circumstances, a U.S. embargo on shipment of arms to Southern Rhodesia is authorized by the quoted provision of section 414 of the Mutual Security Act. B. Sugar quota Section 202(d) (1) (B) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965, provides that: "Whenever and to the extent that the President finds that the establishment or continuation of a quota or any part thereof for any foreign country would be contrary to the national interest of the United States, such quota or part thereof shall be withheld or suspended, and such importation shall not be permitted.' In the circumstances outlined above, the withholding of the 1966 sugar quota, and refusal to permit importation of the 1965 sugar quota, for Southern Rhodesia was authorized by section 202(d) of the Sugar Act. REQUESTS FOR VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS The Executive does not need specific legislative authorization to request private cooperation in measures determined to be in the national interest. Chairman MORGAN. I am informed that Kenya has a white cabinet minister. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Bell, pending submission of the brief I will mention my own legal opinion that it is not contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Mr. GROSS. Does the committee have a legal counsel? Chairman MORGAN. We have several international lawyers who are members of the committee. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Bell, for several years now since I have been on this committee we have worked very diligently and I must say somewhat successfully in recasting the foreign aid program of the United States toward certain basic general lines with which both you and Mr. Bell have cooperated. Among these objectives has been concentration of assistance; a new emphasis on the program; emphasis away from grants, toward loans; the establishment of self-help criteria for recipient countries, and long-range planning. It seems to me that the agencies, both State and AID, have been extremely responsive to the investigations and committee decisions in reshaping the programs. I am happy to state that under the leadership of both of you that there is a new vibrancy and new force of direction as to policy and administration in the foreign assistance program. It appears as if I have seen both of you every day in committee since January and also have seen you on television or listening to you on radio or heard you testify and I state with conviction and a deep sense of appreciation that I think the United States of America is extremely fortunate that we have Mr. Dean Rusk as Secretary of State and Mr. David Bell as Administrator of AID. I want to pursue something that Mr. Bell brought up in discussing some of our international problems. He cautioned that notwithstanding the intensity of our interest in southeast Asia and Vietnam, we are not unmindful of other commitments and problem areas around the world. We have discussed these in executive session extremely carefully, particularly the problems in South America, which are emphasized as a result of the Communist tricontinent conference which recently took place in Havana. This raises a question about what the United States can do and what it can't do in achieving its international objectives. We have tried in this committee every legislative action that I can think of. I have supported those initiated by others, I have initiated some myself, and I have cosponsored some. We By legislative action we prohibited any program aid to Communist Cuba. We withheld assistance from any country that was going to offer assistance to Cuba. We authorized an embargo on trade. prohibited assistance to any country which had its ships and airlines transporting goods to and from Cuba. We closed U.S. ports to ships trading with Cuba. Substantially as a result of our policies the economic situation in Cuba is extremely bad; their international credit is nonexistent. They have had to live, as they want to live, in the Communist orbit from an economic standpoint; this has been costly for the external Communists and less than satisfactory for the Cuban Communist Government. While free-world shipping has declined, nevertheless one of our strongest allies and friends continues to do a considerable amount of trade. I have recently pointed this out again in some statements I made in the record yesterday. |