The right to discharge rain-water from the roof of a Easement of drip. house, either by means of a spout, or by drip, which is a nuisance in the absence of a prescriptive right, may be acquired by user, and is not destroyed by a mere alteration in the height of the eaves not increasing the burthen on the servient tenement. No corresponding right to the flow of rain-water from the roof of a house can be acquired by prescription.2 Extinguishment of Easements of Water. "The modes by which easements may be lost," says Gale,3 "correspond with those already laid down for their "acquisition. 1. Corresponding to the express grant is "the express renunciation. 2. To the disposition by the "owner of two tenements, the merger by the union of "them. 3. To the easement of necessity, the permission "to do some act which of necessity destroys it. 4. And "to the acquisition by prescription, abandonment of release. An express release at law to be effectual must be by By express deed, but in equity an easement may be lost by agreement or acquiescence." Easements are also extinguished by operation of law if By merger. 1 Harvey v. Walters, L. R., 8 C. P. 162; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 C. M. & R. 34; 1 Gale, 61; see Gale on Easements, p. 613; and ante, Chap. III. p. 133. 2 Wood v. Waud, supra; Greatrex v. Hayward, 8 Ex. 291. 3 Gale on Easements, p. 578, 5th edit. 4 Where an easement is granted for a particular purpose by Act of Parliament, the easement ceases when the particular purpose is accomplished. Thus, where a canal company, who had a right to take water for a canal, were recon stituted a railway company by Act 5 Gale on Easements, p. 578; By licence. Abandonment By nonuser. the seisin of the dominant and servient tenements are united in one and the same person. Unity of possession only suspends an easement,-it requires unity of seisin to destroy it.2 A natural right to water coming from another tenement is not destroyed by unity. "There is a difference," says Whitelock, J., in Sury v. Piggott,3 "between a way or common and a watercourse. These begin by private right, by prescription, by assent as a way or common, being a particular benefit to take part of the profits of "the land. This is extinct by unity; because the greater "benefit shall drown the less. A watercourse doth begin ex jure naturæ, having taken this course naturally, and "cannot be averted."4 66 It has already been stated, that a licence by the dominant owner to do an act incompatible with the existence of an easement, may work its extinguishment, even when the licence is by parol.5 The mere suspension of the exercise of a prescriptive of enjoyment. right is not sufficient to destroy the right, without some evidence of an intention to abandon it; but a long-continued suspension may render it necessary for the person claiming the right to show that some indication was given during the period that he ceased to use the right of his intention to preserve it. Thus where the owner of an old pond had an acquired right to draw water for it from a well, and had disused the old pond for thirty years, and during that time drew water for three new ponds; it was held that the right to draw water to the old pond was not destroyed, as it was impossible to conceive that he intended 1 Goddard on Easements, p. 364; Gale, p. 581; see ante, p. 215 et scq; 2 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 C., M. & R. 34; Simper v. Foley, 2 John. & H. 555; James v. Plant, 4 A. & E. 761; Co. Litt. 313 a. 3 3 Bulst. 339; Poph. Rep. 166. 4 See Bright v. Walker, 1 C., M. & R. 219; and Goddard on Easements, p. 365. 5 Ante, p. 208. Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R., 2 Ch. 478; 3 Eq. 279. to abandon the right, when he was actually drawing water into three new ponds instead of into the old one.1 So a right of way along a stream has been held not to be lost if the owner allows part of it to be choked with mud, even though it may be impassable for sixteen years; for the mud may be removed if the way is required.2 of dominant tenement. Where the dominant tenement is altered in such a way By alteration as will make it "incapable any longer of the perception of "the particular easement," or where the alterations are of such a permanent character as will evince an intention on the part of the dominant owner to abandon it, the easement will be extinguished, although the abandonment has not existed for twenty years. Thus, in Crossley v. Lightowler,3 where the owners of dye works had a privilege or easement of pouring foul dye water into a river, it was held, that though the mere nonuser of this easement was not in itself a proof of abandonment of it, without some evidence of intention to abandon it, yet the nonuser of the mills for twenty years, and the fact that they had been allowed to go to ruin, was sufficient to destroy the right. An encroachment by the dominant owner, which will By encroachrender the easement necessarily more onerous to the servient tenement, will have the effect of destroying the easement; but a mere alteration, causing no injury to the servient heritage, will not destroy the right." Thus, in Cawkwell v. Russell, where the plaintiff had a prescriptive right to send waste water down the defendant's drain, and sent down also foul water from his 1 Hale v. Olroyd, 14 M. & W. 789. See per Wood, V.-C., in Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R., 3 Eq. p. 293. 2 Bower v. Hill, 1 Bing. N. C. 549. 3 L. R., 2 Ch. 478; L. R., 3 Eq. 279; see Reg. v. Chorley, 12 Q. B. 518; Ward v. Ward, Ex. 838; Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Ad. at p. 16; Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 693. Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208; Brown v. Best, 1 Wils. 174; Cross- 5 Luttrel's case, 4 Rep. 86; Hall 626 L. J., Ex. 314. ment. privies, the Court held that defendant had a right to stop the whole drain, as the encroachment could not be prevented in any other way; but in the subsequent case of Hill v. Cock, where the plaintiff increased a prescriptive right to water by lengthening a gutter, the defendant was not held justified in stopping this excessive user, by means which altogether prevented plaintiff's enjoyment of the water. 1 26 L. T., N. S. 185; see post, Ch. X. CHAPTER V. OF CANALS, WATER SUPPLY, AND DOCKS. It is proposed in the present chapter to treat of the rights, duties and liabilities of-I. Canal Companies; II. Water Companies; and III. Dock Companies. are but sub All such bodies are either combinations of adventurers These bodies incorporated under Acts of Parliament in order to supply stitutes for a public want for their own profit, or are public bodies individual invested with the like powers for the public benefit. In both cases, however, they are but substitutes for individual enterprise. 66 "It is well observed," says Blackburn, J.,1 "by Mr. "Justice Mellor in Coe v. Wise,2 of corporations like the present, formed for trading and other profitable purposes, that though such corporations may act without "reward to themselves, yet in their very nature, they are “substitutions on a large scale for individual enterprise. "And we think that, in the absence of anything in the "statutes (which create such corporations) showing a "contrary intention in the legislature, the true rule of "construction is that the legislature intended that the liability of corporations thus substituted for individuals "should, to the extent of their corporate funds, be co"extensive with that imposed by the general law on the "owners of similar works. If, indeed, the legislature has "by express enactment or necessary intendment enacted "that they shall not be subject to such a liability, there is "an end of the question." 66 enterprise. Since all these bodies are almost universally in- Rights and 1 Delivering the opinion of the judges in the House of Lords in Mersey Docks Co. v. Gibb, L. R., 1 H. L. 93; 11 H. L. Cas. 686. duties of |