BENJAMIN F. MORGAN, Plaintiff in Error, v. ALFRED G. CURTENIUS and JOHN L. GRISWOLD. 20 H. 1. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE STATUTES. 1. The construction given by the State courts to the statutes of their own States concerning title to land, being a rule of property, must be followed by the circuit courts of the United States sitting in the same State. 2. Though the State courts may change their views of the statute pending a writ of error from the circuit court to this court, such a change cannot make that erroneous here which was rightly decided in the circuit court, whatever effect it may have on other cases in the circuit courts. THIS was a writ of error to the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois, and is fully stated in the opinion of the court. 20h L-ed 823 36f 835 Morg. n v. Curtenius. Mr. Washburne, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Ballance, for defendant. [ *2 ] * Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error, who was also plaintiff below, brought his ejectment for certain lots in the town of Peoria. On the trial, he gave in evidence a patent from the United States to John L. Bogardus, dated 5th of January, 1838; the will of Bogardus, proved 7th of July, 1838, in which he anthorizes his executrix to sell his lands; a deed from the executrix, dated September 25th, 1845, to Seth L. Cole; also, a deed from Cole to Frink, and from Frink to plaintiff. The defendants claimed under Isaac Underhill, to whom Bogardus had conveyed by deed, dated 5th August, 1834, purporting, for the consideration of $1,050, "to grant, sell, and convey," to Underhill, all Bogardus's "right and interest" to the land in dispute; "to have and to hold the same, unto the said Underhill, his heirs and assigns, forever." The defendants, moreover, proved that Underhill paid the purchase money for the land, and took out the patent in the name of Bogardus, in whose name the entry had been made. The plaintiff's counsel then moved the court to exclude from the jury all the evidence given by the defendants. This motion was overruled, and the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff had no title to the premises claimed in the declaration. To this instruction plaintiff's counsel excepted, and now alleges it as error. It was contended that the deed from Bogardus to Underhill was but an ordinary quit-claim deed, conveying only such interest as the releasor had in the premises at the time of its execution; and being without any direct covenants of warranty, or that implied in the terms "grant, bargain, and sell," Bogardus was not estopped from evicting Underhill, under his legal title afterwards vested in him by the patent. The defendants contended, that however this might be at common law, the title acquired by Bogardus inured to the benefit of his grantee by virtue of the 7th section of the statute of Illinois, passed in 1833, concerning conveyances of real property, which is as follows: "If any person shall sell or convey to another, by deed or conveyance purporting to convey an estate in fee-simple absolute in any tract of land or real estate, lying and being in this State, not then being possessed of the legal title or interest therein at the time of the sale of conveyance, but after such sale and conveyance the vendor shall become possessed of and confirmed in the legal estate to the land or real estate so sold and conveyed, it shall be taken and held in trust, and for the use of the grantee or vendee, Wynn v. Morris. and the conveyance aforesaid shall be held and taken, and * *3 shall be as valid as if the grantor or vendor had the legal [ 3 ] estate or interest at the time of sale or conveyance.' Now, this case was tried in the court below, on the 8th of June, 1849, and this section of the act of 1833 had been construed by the supreme court of Illinois, as to its application to the conveyance in question, in the case of Frisby v. Ballance, decided in that court in 1845, and reported in 2d Gilman, 141. It was held in that case that the fee in the premises inured under the statute to Underhill and his assigns. This construction of the statute was therefore a settled rule of property at the time of the decision of this case in the court below, which that court was bound to follow; and having so decided, there was certainly no error in the decision at the time it was made. But it is argued, that though the decision of the circuit court was in accordance with the established construction of the statutes of Illinois, and the rules of property as then declared by her highest tribunal, yet it has become erroneous, because of a change of the law since that time, by a decision of the supreme court of the State in 1853, in the case of Frink v. Durst, (14 Illinois, 305,) by which the case of Frisby v. Ballance was overruled and reversed. It is true that the same conveyance and the same statute were in question in the last case, and have received a contrary construction to that which had governed such conveyances as a rule of property for more than eight years. If the judgment of the circuit court in this case had been given. since the last decision of the supreme court of Illinois, this court might have been compelled to decide whether they considered themselves bound to follow the last decision of that court, or at liberty. to choose between them. But, however the latter decision may have a retroactive effect upon the titles held under the deed in question, it cannot have that effect upon the decisions of the circuit court, and make that erroneous which was not so when the judgment of that court was given. It is therefore affirmed with costs. ROBERT H. WYNN, Executor, &c., v. CHARLES B. MORRIS et al. 20 H. 3. JURISDICTION UNDER 25TH SECTION OF THE JUDICIARY ACT-TITLE TO LAND derived FROM UNITED STATES. 1. In a writ of error to a State court, it must appear that the judgment of the court below was against the right, title, or claim asserted under the United States. Vol. ii-16 Wynn v. Morris. 2. There is no jurisdiction where the plaintiff in error shows no such right, though the defendant in error asserts such a title, which is affirmed by the State court and contested by plaintiff in error. Owings v. Norwood, 5 Cr. 344; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311. WRIT of error to the supreme court of the State of Arkansas. Mr. Pike, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Watkins and Mr. Bradley, for defendants. [ * 4 ] *Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court. The complainant filed his bill in a State circuit court in Arkansas, to enjoin Morris from executing a writ of possession founded on a recovery by an action of ejectment for the northwest quarter of section 18, in township 16, south of Red river. Wynn alleges that the whole of the quarter section was cultivated by him, and had been for years before the inception of Morris's title, and that he, Wynn, claimed title to the land through the State of Arkansas, and that Morris had obtained a legal title in fraud of Wynn's superior right in equity. [ * Morris claims through Keziah Taylor. In 1829 and in 1830, when the occupant law of that year passed, she was a widow, and cultivated a small farm on the land in dispute; she sold 5]*out her possessions there in the latter part of 1830, left the country secretly, and settled permanently in the Mexican province of Coahuila and Texas, and there she remained without returning to Arkansas until December, 1842, when she made her appearance, proved her cultivation in 1829, and her continuing possession in May, 1830, in the form prescribed by the act of that year, had her pre-emption allowed, entered the land, and sold it to Morris. She got a patent in 1844. The reason why Mrs. Taylor did not enter the land at an earlier day was, that the township No. 16 was not surveyed until 1841, and within one year before the date of her entry. Wynn seeks a decree on the ground that Morris procured Mrs. Taylor to enter the land for Morris's benefit, when she had no right of pre-emption, because of the abandonment of her possession for more than ten years. The register and receiver held that a preference of entry was vested by the act of 1830, and they refused to investigate the fact of abandonment. This opinion was concurred in by the commissioner of the general land office. And, to correct this alleged error, the bill was filed. The State circuit court refused the relief prayed; |