The United States v. Breitling. adverse possession of the premises sued for under color of title for three years next before the commencement of this suit; and that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued more than three years next before the commencement of said suit. The fifteenth section of the act of 1841 (Hart. Dig. 729) declares that every suit to recover real estate as against any one in possession under title, or color of title, shall be instituted within three years next after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards. The defendants had both title and color of title, as required by the act; and they, or some of them, had been in actual possession of their lands more than three years before this suit was commenced. The younger title, owned and occupied by the defendants, lapped over one side of the grant to Morales, and to this interference the dispute extends. But no one of the defendants had been in actual. possession of the disputed part for three years when the suit was brought. The act of 1841, section 15, requires suit to be instituted within three years "next after the cause of action shall have accrued." And we think it too plain for reasoning or authority to make it plainer, that, until the land of the plaintiff was trespassed upon, this action of trespass, to try title, could not be maintained. Such are the decisions of the elder States on statutes having corresponding provisions. (Trimble v. Smith, 4 Bibb, Ky.; Pogue v. McKee, 3 Mar. Ky.; Talbot v. McGavock, 1 Yer. Ten. R. 262.) We have endeavored carefully to follow the doctrines of the supreme court of Texas in this opinion, because we are bound to follow the settled adjudications of that State in cases affecting titles to lands there. On the effect of excess of quantity in a grant, and on the three years' act of limitations, we had no direct guide, and therefore have expressed our independent views on these questions. For the reasons here stated, it is ordered that the judgment of the district court be affirmed. Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented. THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff in Error, v. GOTLIEB BREITLING. 20 H. 252. PRACTICE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS. 1. This court has repeatedly held that, where an exception has been taken at the trial to a ruling of the court, it may be reduced to writing and signed by the judge afterwards, and, indeed, after the term. The United States v. Breitling. 2. Where the circuit court has, by rule, adopted the State practice, which forbids the signing of the bill of exceptions after the term, the court may suspend its own rule in this, as in other cases, in aid of justice. 3. As the bill of exceptions purports to give all the evidence offered by defendant, a charge of the court based upon hypothetical statements not found in the evidence is erroneous, and the judgment must be reversed. THIS is a writ of error to the circuit court for the southern district of Alabama, and the case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Black, attorney general, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Percy Walker, for defendant. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. This action was brought by the United States against the defendant in error, as one of the sureties in the official bond of David E. Moore, who was receiver of the public moneys at Demopolis, in the State of Alabama. Under the instructions given by the court to the jury, the verdict and judgment were in favor of the defendant. A bill of exceptions to these instructions, signed and sealed by the judge who tried the case, is set forth in the transcript. But the defendant contends that the exception was not taken by the United States according to law and the rules and practice of the circuit court, and that it cannot therefore be regarded as a part of the record of the proceedings in that court, nor considered here in revising its judgment. A brief extract from the exceptions, together with the note attached to it by the judge, will show how this question arises. After setting forth the bond and the testimony of several witnesses, examined on the part of the defendant, the exception proceeds in the following words: "The defendant then offered to read in evidence the [253] *depositions above referred to, when the plaintiff's counsel objected to the reading of the depositions of McDowell, W. H. Roberts, and George G. Lyon, as they were severally offered, which objection the court overruled. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the evidence of D. C. Anderson, who was examined as a witness by defendant, whose evidence went to show that Smith, one of the obligors to the bond, was poor and in straitened circumstances, which objection was overruled. This, together with the depositions above referred to, was all the evidence offered by defendant, and the same having been submitted to the jury, and argued by counsel, the court, at the request of the defendant's attorneys, charged the jury, 'that if the jury believe, from the evidence, that at the time Breitling's name was signed to the bond, it was understood and The United States v. Breitling. intended that other persons were to sign it as obligors, and he was to have notice that they did so, and who they were, and then, if satisfied, was to acknowledge the bond in the presence of witnesses, who were to attest it, and if this was not done, and the bond was not afterwards ratified by him, the jury ought to find for the defendant;' to which charge the plaintiff's counsel excepted. "And the judge therefore signs and seals their bill of exceptions, this 15th day of May, 1856, a day after the adjournment of the JOHN GAYLE. [SEAL.]" court. Explanations attached to the Bill of Exceptions. "During the term of the court, the attorney for the United States presented a bill of exceptions. The bill was presented on Saturday before the court adjourned, which was on Wednesday. On Monday morning, the bill was handed to the United States attorney, with the request that he submit it to the opposing counsel. On the third day after this, the minutes were signed, and the court adjourned. "I heard nothing further from the bill till the 9th or 10th May, when it was presented by the plaintiff's attorney again, with the written objections of the attorneys of the defendant, that it should be signed after the adjournment. The clerk will subjoin this explanation to the bill of exceptions. JOHN GAYLE." "Filed 15th May, 1856.” The objection stated in the note is founded upon a rule of the circuit court, which in general terms adopts the practice of the State courts; and the practice of the State courts, in relation to exceptions, is regulated by a law of the State, which * provides that no bill of exceptions can be signed after [* 254] the adjournment of the court during which the exception is taken, unless by consent of counsel in writing, when it may be signed within ten days thereafter, except in such cases as is otherwise provided. But the answer to this objection is, that the statute of Alabama, and the regulation it prescribes to the courts of the State, can have no influence on the practice of a court of the United States, unless adopted by a rule of the court. And it is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. The attention of this court has, upon several occasions, been called to this subject, and the rule established by its decisions will be found to be this: the exception must show that it was taken and reserved by the party at the trial, but it may be drawn out in form Vol. ii-25 The United States v. Breitling. and sealed by the judge afterwards. This point was directly decided in the case of Phelps v. Mayor, 15 How. 260; and again, in Turner v. Yates, 16 How. 28. And the time within which it may be drawn out and presented to the court, must depend on its rules and practice, and on its own judicial discretion. In the case before us, the judge who tried the case has deemed it his duty to seal and certify the exception to this court; and under the circumstances stated in the exception and the note, we think he was right in doing so, and that this exception is legally before this court as a part of the record of the proceedings of the court below. In proceeding to examine the points raised upon it and argued in this court, it is not necessary to state at large the testimony given by the witnesses for the defendant, nor the grounds upon which the United States objects to the admissibility of the evidence; for it does not appear that the plaintiff excepted to any one of the decisions of the court overruling his objections. The exception states that he made the objections which have been argued here, and that the court overruled them. But the fact that he made the point at the trial, and the court decided it against him, is not sufficient to bring the question before this court. He must show that he excepted to the opinion. And as there is no evidence that he did so while the jury were at the bar, the objections to the testimony of the witnesses are not before us. It is otherwise, however, in relation to the charge of the court to the jury. This, it appears, was excepted to, and consequently is regularly and legally before this court, and we think the judge erred in giving it. It is clearly error in a court to charge a jury upon a [* 255] supposed * or conjectural state of facts, of which no evidence has been offered. The instruction presupposes that there is some evidence before the jury which they may think sufficient to establish the facts hypothetically assumed in the opinion of the court; and if there is no evidence which they have a right to consider, then the charge does not aid them in coming to correct conclusions, but its tendency is to embarrass and mislead them. It may induce them to indulge in conjectures, instead of weighing the testimony. In the case before us, we do not see any evidence in the record which tends, in the least degree, to prove any one of the facts hypothetically assumed in the opinion. If such testimony was given, it certainly does not appear in the transcript. And upon this ground, without examining further into the opinion of the court below, the judgment must be reversed. 2 Hemmenway v. Fisher. THE SHIP INDEPENDENCE. AUGUSTUS HEMMENWAY v. WILLIAM B. FISHER. INTEREST ON AFFIRMANCE OF DECREE IN ADMIRALTY. i. Interest on judgments at law and decrees in chancery is allowed by the rule of this court, on affirmance of the judgment or decree below, after the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the court was held. 2. But interest on decrees in admiralty so affirmed is matter of special allowance or refusal, and requires an order of this court; therefore, where a decree is affirmed by reason of an equal division of the court, no interest can be allowed. This case was argued at the last term, and the decree of the court below affirmed by an equal division of the court. The mandate made no provision for interest in the judgment below. Mr. Bartlett now moved for a judgment for such interest. Mr. Gillett and Mr. Dehon, contra. * Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the [* 258] court. This case was decided at the last term. It was an appeal from the decree of the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, sitas a court of admiralty. The decree was affirmed here by an equal division of the justices of this court; and the decree of affirmance was entered by the clerk for the sum awarded by the circuit court and costs, and did not give interest on the amount decreed by the court below. The mandate was issued according to the decree; but it was not filed or proceeded on by the appellee, because he supposed that, under the eighteenth rule of this court, he was entitled to interest upon the amount recovered in the circuit court, from the date of the decree, and that its omission was a clerical error. And he has now moved the court, to correct it by amending the decree and mandate. If an error has been committed by the clerk, it is, without doubt, in the power of the court to correct it at the present term. But the judgment is correctly entered, and the mandate conforms to it. And the mistake on the part of the appellee has arisen from supposing the eighteenth rule to be still in force, and to be applicable to cases in admiralty. But it never applied to admiralty cases. It will be observed by reference to the seventeenth rule, to which the eighteenth refers, that these rules are in express terms confined |