Hill . Smith. These facts, with others, were proper to be submitted to the jury, from which they might have presumed that the lots had been duly selected. In the language of the supreme court of Ohio, in the case of Coombs and Ewing v. Lane-"Facts presumed are as effectually established as facts proved, where no presumption is allowed.” That was a suit for the possession of this same land, and involved the same evidence this case does, and presented the same questions of law. But there, the cause was submitted to the circuit court on the law and the facts, without the intervention of a jury; and the supreme court was appealed to in order to reverse the opinion of the lower court, on a motion for a new trial. The State courts dealt with both facts and law; whereas, here, the jury must deal with the facts and presumptions, under the instructions of the court, as respects the law. We order the judgment of the circuit court to be reversed, and remand the cause for another trial. HENRY HILL, Plaintiff in Error, v. CALEB B. SMITH and others. 21 H. 283. An agreement by which defendants guarantied to plaintiff that the stock of a railroad company which he was about to take in payment for land should be worth par in three years is a valid contract, and a demurrer to an action on it should have been overruled. WRIT of error to the circuit court for the district of Indiana. The case is fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Oliver H. Smith, for plaintiff in error. No counsel for defendants. [* 285] * Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff's demand is founded on the following contract, dated August 17th, 1853, signed by defendants, and set forth at length in the declaration: [* 286 ] *Whereas Henry Hill, of Delaware county, has proposed to convey to the Cincinnati, Newcastle, and Michigan Railroad Company a certain tract of land in Delaware county, containing three hundred and nine acres, for the consideration of six thousand one hundred dollars, to be paid in the capital stock Hill v. Smith. of said company, at par, on the condition that Caleb Smith and other responsible persons will guaranty that the said stock shall be worth par in three years from the present date, and in default thereof, that the company shall make it up to par; and whereas the said Cincinnati, Newcastle, and Michigan Railroad Company have agreed by a resolution of their board of directors to accept said proposition: Now, we, the undersigned, in consideration of the premises, hereby guaranty to the said Henry Hill, that the said stock shall be worth par in three years from the date of this instrument; and if at the expiration of that date said stock shall not be worth par, we guaranty the said Henry Hill that the said Cincinnati, Newcastle, and Michigan Railroad Company shall make up to him or pay him whatever sum the said stock shall be worth less than par, so as to make the said stock worth par to said Henry Hill at that date." The declaration is in proper form, and contains all the averments necessary to show a breach of this contract, and the consequent liability of defendants. There was a general demurrer to the declaration and judgment for the defendants. As we have not been furnished with an argument on behalf of defendants, we are at a loss to discover on what grounds it is supposed that this judgment can be supported. As the contract is in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, it cannot be affected by the statute of frauds; and, although the term "guaranty" is usually applied to a collateral undertaking to pay the debt of another, yet when taken in connection with the other terms of the instrument, this is clearly an original, independent contract. If it had been under seal, the term "covenant” would have been the technical synonym for the word "guaranty' as here used. It states that the defendant would not agree to sell his land *in exchange for stock, except on condition that de- [* 287] fendants should guaranty that the stock in three years would be worth par, or should be made so by the corporation. For this consideration, defendants agree to make it so, or, in other words, to pay the difference between the cash value of the stock on that day and its nominal value. On this condition and for this consideration, the plaintiff agreed to convey his land to the railroad company; and, on the faith of defendants' undertaking, he has conveyed it, and accepted, not money, but certain stock, which defendants have agreed to make equal to money by a certain day. The declaration avers, that at Ford v. Williams. the time specified the stock was wholly worthless, and of no value, and the railroad company utterly insolvent, and unable to pay the difference; and that defendants, having full notice of these facts, refuse to comply with their contract. There is no reason why this contract should be treated as void because of an illegal or immoral consideration. Its conditions require no previous suit to be instituted against any one as principal debtor. The declaration contains every necessary averment; a valid contract, a large consideration paid, and a breach of the contract by defendants; all set forth in proper and technical language. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment on the demurrer, unless the court below, in their discretion, shall permit the defendants, on payment of costs, to withdraw their demurrer, and plead some good defense in bar. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and record remitted for further proceedings. BENJAMIN FORD, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOHN S. WILLIAMS and HERMAN WILLIAMS. 21 H. 287. AGENCY-PAROL EVIDENCE IN WRITTEN CONTRACTS. Where an agent, in making a contract for us principal, takes the written obligation of the other party to himself, the principal can maintain a suit upon it in his own name, and can prove by parol testimony that it was made for his benefit by his agent, though this was not disclosed. THIS is a writ of error to the circuit court for the district of Maryland. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. Mr. Brown, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Nelson, for defendant. [* 289] *Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The single question presented for our decision in this case is, whether the principal can maintain an action on a written contract made by his agent in his own name, without disclosing the name of the principal. It is not necessary to the validity of a contract, under the statute of frauds, that the writing disclose the principal. In the brief memoranda of these contracts usually made by brokers and factors, it is seldom done. If a party is informed that the person with Lownsdale v. Parrish. whom he is dealing is merely the agent for another, and prefers to deal with the agent personally on his own credit, he will not be allowed afterwards to charge the principal; but when he deals with the agent, without any disclosure of the fact of his agency, he may elect to treat the after-discovered principal as the person with whom he contracted. The contract of the agent is the contract of the principal, and he may sue or be sued thereon, though not named therein; and notwithstanding the rule of law that an agreement reduced to writing may not be contradicted or varied by parol, it is well settled that the principal may show that the agent who made the contract in his own name was acting for him. This proof does not contradict the writing; it only explains the transaction. But the agent, who binds himself, will not be allowed to contradict the writing by proving that he was contracting only as agent, while the same evidence will be admitted to charge the principal. "Such evidence (says Baron Parke) does not deny that the contract binds those whom on its face it purports to bind; but shows that it also binds another, by reason that the act of the agent is the act of the principal." (See Higgins v. Senior, 9 Meeson and Wilsby, 843.) The array of cases and treatises cited by the plaintiff's counsel shows conclusively that this question is settled, not only by the courts of England and many of the States, but by this * court (See New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Mer- [* 290] chants' Bank, 6 How. 381, et cas, ib. cit.) The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and a venire de novo awarded, DANIEL H. LOWNSDALE and others, Appellants, v. JOSIAH L. PARRISH. 21 II. 290. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT. In a suit to prevent an obstruction of a street in Portland, Oregon, commenced before any title could have been acquired to lands under acts of congress, this court can have no jurisdiction, because the title to all the land being in the United States, the matter in dispute cannot be of the value of $2,000. THIS is an appeal from the supreme court of the territory of Oregon. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. Mr. Gillet and Mr. Johnson, for appellants. Mr. Baxter, for appellees. [* 291 ] Lownsdale v. Parrish. *Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court. Parrish filed his bill in equity against Lownsdale and others in a district court of Oregon territory, praying for an injunc tion to restrain the defendants from obstructing a narrow [* 292] * piece of land, claimed as Water street, lying in front of the complainant's storehouse, and a square of ground claimed as his, two hundred feet on each side, laid off into eight lots, as city property, within the city of Portland, and on one of which the storehouse stands. The strip of land lying in front of these lots extends to the Wallamette river; at that point, the land is several hundred feet wide. The complainant alleges that it was dedicated to the public as a street, to the use of the proprietors of the town, for the purposes of commerce; the river there being within the flow of tide, navigable for ships, and requiring a wide front space to accommodate loading and discharge of cargoes. The district court found that Water street, in the city of Portland, was bounded by the river, opposite the lots of the complainant; and that the defendants at the commencement of the suit were about to obstruct the same, to the special injury of the plaintiff, as stated in the bill; and thereupon an injunction was granted, as prayed for. This decree was affirmed in the supreme court of Oregon, where the respondents carried the cause by appeal, and from that decree they have appealed to this court, and we are called on to revise the proceedings below. The first question presented is, whether this court has jurisdiction and power to re-examine the controversy. By the act of congress organizing the inhabitants of Oregon territory into a government, it is provided (sec. 9) that writs of error and appeals from final decisions of the supreme court of Oregon shall be allowed to the supreme court of the United States, where the value of the property, or the amount in controversy, shall exceed two thousand dollars, to be ascertained by the oath of either party, or by a competent witness; and also in cases "where the constitution of the United States, or an act of congress, or a treaty of the United States, is brought in question.' The complainant assumes that he would sustain special damage. by the obstruction of the space between his property and the river, but how much damage does not appear from the allegations [293] in the bill, or otherwise; and it is difficult for us to * see how either party to the suit could sustain damage to his rights of property, as the town was laid off in 1845, on property of the United States, whilst our inhabitants who had emigrated there, and those of Great Britain, held joint possession of the country in |