was issued, and in whose name it was located, it inured to the benefit of the grantee
in the deed made by him. Ib.
7. This is also true on the principle that where a grantor sets forth that he is seized
of a particular estate which he purports to convey, he and all claiming in privity
with him are estopped to deny that he was so seized at the time he made the con-
veyance. Ib.
1. It is the settled doctrine of this court that, where a person obtains a patent for lands
by fraudulent imposition on the officers of the land department, equity will give relief
to the party legally entitled to receive the patent. Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 328;
Bernard v. Ashley, 18 How. 44; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72.
Garland v.
Wynn, 20 H. 6......243.
2. The boundaries and quantity of land granted by a patent must be ascertained by
descriptive language in the patent. Gazzam v. Phillips, 20 H. 372..... 475.
3. An equity of the grantee to recover more or different land, cannot control the lan-
guage of the patent in an action at law. The case of Brown v. Clements, 3 How.
650; 15 Curtis, 580, overruled. Ib.
4. The fact that a grant was made to Robert Harper, on a location and survey, made
in the name of James Nickols, does not affect the validity of the patent. Brown v.
Huger, 21 H. 305......797.
5. In ascertaining the boundary lines of a patent or grant, where natural objects are
given which conflict with the courses and distances given, the uniform rule is that
the former must prevail. Ib.
6. Where a river or rivers is given as one of the boundaries, the grant extends to the
river and follows its course.
LAND TITLES, GENERALLY, 6, 7.
1. Under the acts of congress concerning pre-emption of 1830, (4 Statutes, 420,) as
amended January, 1832, (4 Statutes, 496,) and revived June, 1834, (4 Statutes, 676,) a
pre-emptor could assign his certificate of pre-emption and location after entry at the
land office. Marks v. Dickson et al., 20 H. 501......541.
2. Assignments of floats made before such entry were void; but a power to assign,
though made before the location, would support an assignment under it made after
location.
3. By the act of congress of February 24, 1829, concerning the town of Galena, those
claiming as pre-emptors or settlers gained no vested right until they proved their
claim and paid the purchase money. Morehouse v. Phelps, 21 H. 294... .794.
4 Under the act of 1836, which appointed commissioners to take proof of claims, where
patents issued to the legal representatives of a claimant, these were the parties who
presented the claim, procured the certificate of the commissioners, paid the purchase
money, and received the patent. Ib.
5. It did not inure to the benefit of a party who had purchased of the settler many
years before. but took no interest in the matter, and asserted no claim until after the
patent had issued. Ib.
6. The case differed in this respect from confirmations of Spanish grants, because, in
those cases, vested private rights were recognized by congress, while here the United
States, being absolute owner, disposed of the title as congress should direct. Ib.
The authority to select and lay off the school lands, under the act of congress of
March, 18, 1818, was in the secretary of the treasury, and not in the register of the
land office. Dickins v. Mahana, 21 II. 276......783.
1. A law of the State which gave a right of action on a debt so barred; after the State
came into the Union, accompanied by statute of limitation requiring the suit to be
brought within four months, is valid as to the limitation, though the plaintiff lived
too far to have availed himself of the right to sue. Bacon v. Howard, 20 H. 22......
2. The bar of adverse possession must be actual, continued, and adverse; and possession
by a third party does not aid defendant, unless he connects himself with it. Dos-
well v.
De La Lanza, 20 H. 29......251.
3. A plea of two years' limitation is not good where the contract may not be barred
under three years, unless it sets out such a contract (namely, parol) as will be barred
by two years. Lyon v. Bertram, 20 H. 149 .....327.
STATUTES OF STATES, 3; ATTACHMENT, 1-2; TEXAS LAND TITLES, 7.
1. It is a necessary incident to all conquests by military power that it should be per-
mitted to organize a local government for the conquered territory. Leitensdorfer v.
Webb, 20 H. 176......342.
2. This includes the power to establish temporary courts for the administration of
justice. Ib.
3. The powers of these courts do not necessarily terminate with the cessation of hostil-
ities, if the conquering power retains the sovereignty of the conquered territory. Ib.
4. Suits pending in such courts may, on the organization of civil government, be trans-
ferred by statute to the new courts so organized. Ib.
1. The surrender of collateral security and an extension of time on an existing indebt-
edness is a good consideration for the delivery of new collaterals not overdue. Good-
man v. Simonds, 20 H. 343......458.
2. If a party, intending to accommodate another, signs his name to a blank paper, he
authorizes the other to fill up the blank, and is bound by his act in so doing. Ib.
3. A party who acquires such paper for value, in the usual course of business, is not
affected by any equities between the original parties, if taken before its maturity, and
without knowledge of these equities. Ib.
4. It is no defense to a suit by the holder that he might, with reasonable diligence or
care, have ascertained that there was a just defense to the paper, as between the orig-
inal parties, nor that there were circumstances to put him on the inquiry. Ib.
5. Hence a bill of exchange payable twelve months after date, being protested for non-
acceptance, parol proof cannot be admitted to show that there was an agreement that
it should not be presented for acceptance until after a certain other draft was pro-
vided for. Brown v. Wiley, 20 H. 442......518.
6. When an endorser of negotiable paper, before its maturity, promises the holder to
pay it, he is liable without demand and notice at maturity. Sigerson v. Mathews, 20
H. 496......538.
7. So a promise to pay, made after maturity, with the knowledge that payment had
not been demanded of the principal when the paper came due, is a valid promise. Ib.
EVIDENCE, 5; AGENCY, 1, 2.
1. Where a surety in an official bond has paid, under judgments rendered on it, the
amount of the penalty, he is responsible for no more. Leggett v. Humphreys, 21 H.
66... 674.
2. Where, pending an appeal from a judgment in his favor on such bond in one court,
he is sued in another court, and compelled to pay the full penalty of the bond, this
payment is a good defense to the first action, where the judgment is reversed and
sent back for a new trial. Ib.
3. If he has used due diligence to avail himself by plea of this defense, and failed, he
can come into equity for relief, and the judgment will be enjoined. Ib.
4. The fact that the principal in the bond had placed in his hands means sufficient to
indemnify him for the payment so made, does not interfere with his right to equitable
relief under the circumstances.
1. In chancery the rule is to allow plaintiffs the profits received from the unlawful use
of the invention, and not such as might have been made with reasonable diligence.
Dean v. Mason, 20 H. 198......357.
2. The court, by an equal division, affirms the decree of the court below sustaining
Foote's patent.
Silsby v. Foote, 20 H. 378......480.
3. A majority of the court reverses that decree, so far as it allows interest on the profits
decreed to plaintiff below. Ib.
4. Also reverses the decree in his favor for costs, because he did not seasonably enter a
disclaimer for that which was not new in his claim. Ib.
5. If the invention claimed be itself a mere improvement on a known machine, by a
mere change of the form or combination of parts, a person is not an infringer who
has also improved the original machine by a different form or combination perform-
ing the same functions. McCormick v. Talcott, 20 H. 402......492.
6. Manny's arrangement for dividing the grain to be cut from that to be left standing,
is not an infringement of McCormick's device for the same purpose. Ib.
7. Manny's arrangement for supporting his reel is not an infringement of McCormick's.
Nor does his arrangement, combination, and location of driver's seat infringe Mc-
Cormick's.
JURISDICTION SUPREME COURT, 1, 2, 3; EQUITY, PRACTICE, 6; EVIDENCE, 12; JURISDIC-
TION OF CIRCUIT COURT, 3, 4.
PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURT.
1. The statute of the State requiring suits to be brought in the names of the real parties
in interest is complied with when all the parties are joined as plaintiffs, though the
specific interest of each is not set out in the petition or declaration. Lyon v. Ber-
tram, 20 H. 149......327.
2. Under the fifteenth section of the act of 1789, a notice to a party to produce books
does not incur the judgment of nonsuit, unless a motion is made and an order of the
court on that motion, for their production, which is disobeyed. It is not error, there-
fore, to refuse to order a nonsuit where no such motion has been made, though notice
to produce has been given. Thompson v. Selden, 20 H. 194 .....356.
3. This court has repeatedly held that, where an exception has been taken at the trial
to a ruling of the court, it may be reduced to writing and signed by the judge after-
wards, and, indeed, after the term. United States v. Breitling, 20 H. 252 ..... 383.
4. Where the circuit court has, by rule, adopted the State practice, which forbids the
signing of the bill of exceptions after the term, the court may suspend its own rule in
this, as in other cases, in aid of justice. Ib.
5. The judge of a district court interested in a cause pending before him may, not-
withstanding such interest, make a valid order for its removal to a circuit court.
Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 H. 264......392.
6. In an action of trespass for taking goods, all the
the goods, or the action cannot be maintained.
520.
plaintiffs must have an interest in
Warner v. Norton, 20 H. 448......
7. A general demurrer to a petition under the Iowa code is rightfully overruled when
there is a good cause of action set forth in it.
560.
McFaul v. Ramsey, 20 H. 523............
8. The action of the circuit court, in vacating a judgment, and refusing to order an
execution on it, held to be correct, under the special circumstances of this case, on a
motion for a mandamus to compel the circuit court to execute the judgment. Er
parte Ransom v. The City of New York, 20 H. 581......615.
PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25; EQUITY, PRACTICE, 1;
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT, FINAL JUDGMENT, 1; JURISDICTION CIRCUIT
COURT, 1, 2; EVIDENCE, 9, 10, 11, 12.
PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT.
1. A refusal to grant a new trial in the court below is not ground of error in this court.
Doswell v. De La Lanza, 20 H. 29..... 256.
2. Alleged error in charging defendant with rents and profits cannot be considered
here, because there was no exception in the court below to the master's report on
that subject. Hudgins v. Kemp, 20 H. 45......264.
3. Unless exceptions be taken in the court below to the master's report as to rents and
profits, the matter is not open to review in this court on appeal. Ib.
4. This court does not review the action of the inferior courts in granting or refusing
a continuance. Thompson v. Selden, 20 H. 194......356.
5. The appearance of a defendant in error in this court cures any defect in the citation
or its service. Chaffee v. Hayward, 29 H. 208.............362.
6. Where a case is submitted to the court, waiving a jury, a finding of facts filed
after the judgment, but stated to be as of the date of the trial, will be presumed to
have been filed by consent. McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 H. 221.. ...371.
7. As the bill of exceptions purports to give all the evidence offered by defendant, a
charge of the court based upon hypothetical statements not found in the evidence is
erroneous, and the judgment must be reversed. United States v. Breitling, 20 H.
252......383.
8. A plea that the title to the land which is the subject of the suit was vested in plain-
tiff by collusion, to enable him to sue in a federal court, is a plea in abatement.
Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 H. 264......392.
9. The refusal of the court below to allow such a plea to be filed after pleas to the
merits being a matter of judicial discretion, cannot be re-examined on writ of error. Ib.
10. Where there is no ground of error in the pleadings of the case or the record, prop-
erly speaking, there must be either a bill of exception, special verdict, or agreed
statement of facts, or there is nothing of which error can be predicated. Suydam v.
Williamson, 20 H. 427......506.
11. A special verdict, if sufficient, finds the facts; and if the judgment on those facts is
not such as the law requires, the appellate court can reverse it. So of a statement
of facts agreed to by the parties, signed by them, and made part of the record. Ib.
12. The bill of exceptions makes a part of the record every ruling of the court in the
progress of the trial to which the losing party excepts. Ib.
13. But a statement of facts in the form of a report of all the evidence, signed by the
judge, and called the case, is neither a bill of exceptions nor an agreed statement of
facts, and is no part of the record in the case. Ib.
14. There being no error apparent in the record, nor shown in any other manner which
we can notice, the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed. Ib.
15. On a second writ of error in this court, none of the questions decided in the first are
open to review. The second writ only brings up for revision proceedings subsequent
to the mandate. Roberts v. Cooper, 20 H. 467......529.
16. The only bills of exception taken relate to the refusal of the court to grant a con-
tinuance and to change the venue. These are not grounds on which error can be
assigned. Mc Faul v. Ramsey, 20 H. 523......560.
17. No ruling of the court, as to instructions given or refused by the court on the trial,
can be reversed in this court, unless the record shows that exception to it was taken
or reserved at the time. Barton v. Forsyth, 20 H. 532......569.
18. Hence a bill of exceptions taken on motion, after verdict, to substitute a new plaintiff,
cannot bring before the court the rulings on the trial not excepted to at the time. Ib.
19. A writ of error having been dismissed at last term, the cause cannot be reinstated
on the docket at this term, because the writ, having expired by the termination of
that term, is functus officio. Rice v. Minnesota and N. W. R. R. Co., 21 H. 82......
685.
20. The fact that the case was dismissed for want of a final judgment in the court, as
shown by the record below, and that it is now shown that there was such a judg-
ment, does not enable the court, at another term, and after the writ has expired, to
reinstate the case. A new writ must issue if the case is to be brought here again. Ib.
21. The case of the Falmyra, 12 Wheaton, 1, considered, and the difference between
appeal in admiralty and writ of error at common law stated. Ib.
22. When a case at common law is submitted, by agreement of parties, to the court,
without a jury, to decide the law and the facts, the court sits rather as arbitrator
than as judge, and no writ of error can bring his decision before us for review.
Campbell v. Boyreau, 21 H. 223......757.
23. Nor can exceptions to any ruling on the evidence or other question of the trial be
validly taken or reversed. Ib.
24. In such case, as the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties, its judgment must be presumed to be right, and therefore affirmed. Ib.
25. In the circuit court of Louisiana it is otherwise, because, the common law not pre-
vailing there, congress, by the act of 1824, adopted the State practice, by which the
court can, by consent, find the law and the facts. Ib.
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT, PLEA IN ABATEMENT, 1, 2; Writ of Error, 1, 2,
5,6; CALIFORNIA LAND GRANTS, 4; APPEALS AND APPEAL BONDS, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9.
Where a party voluntarily intervenes in a suit between other parties, and has his claim
of rights in the matter decided against him, he cannot afterwards sustain a suit
against those parties, or either of them, founded on the same matters decided in the
first suit. That judgment cannot be treated as a mere dismissal of his intervention,
unless expressly stated to be without prejudice to these rights. If there were errors in
the first judgment, the remedy was by appeal. Ingraham v. Dawson, 20 H. 486......
536.
1. The construction given by the State courts to the statutes of their own States con-
cerning title to land, being a rule of property, must be followed by the circuit courts
of the United States sitting in the same Stato. Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 H. 1......239.
2. Though the State courts may change their views of the statute pending a writ of
error from the circuit court to this court, such a change cannot make that erroneous
here which was rightly decided in the circuit court, whatever effect it may have on
other cases in the circuit courts. Ib.
3. Where the laws of the republic of Texas had barred a debt on a judgment while it
was an independent State, the debt was not revived on her coming into the federal
Union. Bacon v. Howard, 20 H. 22......251.
4. On the subjects of titles to real estate, the federal courts are governed by the de-
cisions of the State courts. Fisher v. Haldeman, 20 H. 186. ....352.
EQUITY, PRACTICE, 4; JURISDICTION CIRCUIT COURT, 1; PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURT, 7;
INSURANCE, 1, 2.
1. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, which prefers some creditors, and which
directs that the dividend of all other creditors who refuse to accept the dividend as
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