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the want of original righteousness and tendency to evil-and others not; but with an uniformity almost unparalleled in theological language and opinion, has the idea of innate corruption been represented as the essential constituent idea of original sin. The very distinction between original, and actual sin, so

. common, shows that the former expression is intended to convey the idea of something which is regarded as sin, which is not an act or voluntary exercise. The obvious sense, therefore, of Mr. Rand's assertion, is correct.

The reviewer's answer is a little remarkable. He tells us there are various senses in which the phrase "original sin” has been used in orthodox confessions and standard writings, in some one of which senses Mr. Finney may, and doubtless does, hold to "original sin.” p. 13. He then undertakes to enumerate eight different senses, mainly by representing as distinct, different modes of stating the same idea. 1. The first sin of the first man. 2. The first sin of the first man and woman. (Is it not clear the reviewer was anxious to swell his list?). 3. Natural or inherent corruption. 4. Want of original righteousness and inclination to evil. (Identical with the preceding.) 5. Imputation of Adam's sin, and the innate sinful depravity of the heart. 6. Something not described, but distinct from natural corruption, and that came to us by the fall of Adam. (This specification is founded on the answer given in the Form of examination before the communion in the Kirk of Scotland, 1591-to the question, "What things come to us by that fall? Ans. Original sin, and natural corruption. Where it is plain that by original sin is meant, the guilt of Adam's first sin.) 7. The guilt of Adam's first sin, the defect of original righteousness, and concupiscence. 8. The universal sinfulness of Adam's posterity as connected with his first sin by divine constitution.—Dr. Hopkins.

No one, we presume, could imagine that Mr. Rand intended to charge Mr. Finney with denying the fact that Adam sinned, when he said he denied the doctrine of original sin. The first and second, therefore, of the foregoing specification might safely have been omitted. As to all the others, excepting the last, they amount to the simple statement of President Edwards, that the phrase is commonly used to indicate either the guilt of Adam's first sin, or inherent corruption, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, but most frequently both conjoined. The cases in which original sin is said to include both the want of original righteousness and

corruption of nature, are, as we before remarked, but examples of greater precision in the description of the thing intended, and not statements of an opinion diverse from that expressed by the single phrase, innate depravity. The absence of light is darkness, the absence of heat is cold, the absence of order is confusion, and so the absence of original righteousness is depravity, and this is all that President Edwards intended to express in the passage quoted by the reviewer, in which he says, there is no necessity, in order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, to suppose any evil quality infused, but that the absence of positive good qualities is abundantly sufficient. The reviewer, we presume, knows very well that this is the common view adopted by those who hold the doctrine of physical depravity, as it is styled by the New Divinity. He knew that, according to their views, it is just as supposable that man might be created with an “instinctive" disposition to love God, as with the disposition to love himself, love society, his children, or any thing else; that Adam was actually thus created, that this disposition was not constitutional in the sense in which the instinct of self-love is constitutional, but supernatural, resulting from his being in communion with the Spirit of God; that the human soul, instinct with the dispositions of self-love, natural appetite, &c., and destitute of any disposition to take delight in God or holiness, is not in its normal state, but in a state of moral degradation and ruin; that they believe there is a great difference between the state of the soul when it comes into existence, since the fall, and the state of Adam's soul; between the soul of an ordinary man and the state of the soul of the blessed Jesus ; that this difference is prior to all choice or agency, and not dependent upon them, and it is a moral difference, Adam being in a holy state, instinct with holy dispositions, and men being in a state of moral corruption, at the moment of their coming into existence. He doubtless knew also, as his own enumeration shows, that the phrase, original sin, has been, with great unanimity, employed to designate this state of the soul prior to moral action, and that the fact that all men actually sin, and that their sinfulness is somehow connected with the sin of Adam, is not the fact which the term has been employed (to any extent) to express; that on the contrary the one fact (the universally sinful conduct of men,) has been the standing argument to prove the other fact, viz: innate inherent depravity; and he should, therefore, have seen that it is preposterous to assert, that the fact of all men actually sinning, and that this is somehow connected with Adam's sin, is the fact expressed by the term original sin. If this be so, then all Pelagians, and all Socinians, and all opposers of the doctrine of original sin, still hold it. For they all believe that men universally sin, and that this is somehow, (by example, &c,) connected with Adam's sin. The reviewer's saying "that men sin, and only sin until renewed by the Holy Ghost," although it may make a difference as to the extent of the wickedness of men, makes none in the world as to the doctrine of original sin. This doctrine, as it has been held by ninety-hundredths of the Christian church, he rejects just as much as the Pelagians do.* We presume this will be called an ad invidiam argument. It little concerns us, what it is called, if it is but just and proper in itself

. What is the state of the case. Here are a set of men, who hold certain opinions, which they assiduously and ably advocate. Not content with allowing them to stand on their own merits, they seek to cover them with the robes of authority, asserting that this, and that, and almost every man distinguished for piety and talents, has held or does hold them. When currency and favour are thus sought to be obtained for these opinions, by claiming in their behalf the authority of venerable names, is it not a duty to say and to show that this claim is unfounded, if such be really the case? What means this arraying against Mr. Rand, the authority of Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, Bellamy, Dwight, &c. &c.?' What is the object of this array, if it is not to crush him, and sustain Mr. Finney? And yet we presume, there is no fact in the history of theological opinions more notorious, than that, as to the points in debate, they agree with Mr. Rand, and differ from Mr. Finney. The earliest advocate of some of the leading doctrines of the New Divinity, the author of Views in Theology, instead of pursuing this objectionable and unworthy course, came out with a distinct avowal of dissent from the generally received doctrines on these subjects. The same honourable course was taken by Dr. Cox; by the late Mr. Christmas, in

The appeal which the reviewer makes to writings of the disciples of Dr. Emmons, is, as he must know, entirely unsatisfactory. Though as to the verbal statement, that sin consists in voluntary acts, there is an agreement, the whole view and relations of the doctrine as held by him and them are different, and some of the most zealous opponents of the New Divinity, are these very Emmonites, to whom he is constantly appealing for protection.

his sermon on Ability; by Mr. Duffield, in his recent work on Regeneration, and we venture to commend it to the reviewer as the right course, and, if such a consideration need be suggested, as the most politic. We have little doubt some of the advocates of the New Divinity have suffered more in public confidence from taking the opposite course, than from their opinions themselves. And we suspect the reviewer's pamphlet, will be another mill-stone around their neck.

Another inference from the leading idea of this new system is, that regeneration is man's own act, consisting in the choice of God as the portion of the soul, or in a change in the governing purpose of the life. Mr. Finney's account of its nature is as follows: “I will show," says he, “what is intended in the command in the text (to make a new heart.) It is that a man should change the governing purpose of his life

. A man resolves to be a lawyer; then he directs all his plans and efforts to that object, and that, for the time is his governing purpose. Afterwards, he may alter his determination, and resolve to be a merchant. Now he directs all his efforts to that object, and so has changed his heart, or governing purpose.” Again, “It is apparent that the change now described, effected by the simple volition of the sinners mind through the influence of motives, is a sufficient change, all that the Bible requires. It is all that is necessary to make a sinner a christian.

This account of making a new heart, the reviewer undertakes to persuade the public is the orthodox doctrine of regeneration and conversion. This he attempts by plunging at once into the depths of metaphysics, and bringing out of these plain sentences, a meaning as remote from their apparent sense, as ever Cabbalist extracted from Hebrew letters. He begins by exhibiting the various senses in which the words, will

, heart, purpose, volition, &c. are used. We question the accuracy of his statements with regard to the first of these terms. He is right enough in distinguishing between the restricted and extended meaning of the word, that is, between the will considered as the power of the mind to determine on its own actions, and as the power to choose or preser. But when he infers from this latter definition, that not only the natural appetites, as hunger and thirst, but also the social affections, as love of parents, and children, &c., are excluded, by Edwards and others who adopt it, from the will, we demur. Edwards says, that “all liking and disliking, inclining or being averse to, being pleased, or displeased with," are to be referred to the will, and consequently includes these affections. However, it is not to our purpose to pursue this subject. The reviewer claims, as usual, to agree with Edwards, and excludes all such affections as love of parents, love of children, &c., from the will until they involve a preference or choice. As though every exercise of these affections did not in their own nature involve such a preference, as much as love, when directed to any object. He then makes the will and heart synonymous, (thus excluding love of children, &c. from the heart) and proceeds to enumerate the various classification of volitions into principal, ultimative, subordinate, imma. nent, and imperative, and winds up his elucidation and defence of Mr. Finney's statement, by making his “governing purpose," to be equivalent with an “immanent volition," or the controlling habitual preference of the soul.” We cannot understand by what rule of interpretation this sense can be got out of the preacher's expressions in their connexion in the sermon. Certain it is, the common usage of language would never lead any reader to imagine that, in a plain popular discourse, not in a metaphysical essay from an avowed advocate of the exercise scheme, the phrase a “governing purpose,” meant an immanent volition; or “to alter a determination,” meant, to change the supreme controlling affection or choice of the soul. The reviewer himself betrays his conviction that this is not the proper acceptation of the terms. For he complains of Mr. Rand for making Mr. Finney's governing purpose mean no more than a mere determination of the mind; and yet the preacher substitutes one of these expressions for the other, as in his own view, synonymous. He tells us “a man alters his determination, and so has changed his heart or governing purpose.” But supposing we should admit that, taken by themselves, the words "governing purpose” might bear the sense the reviewer endeavours to place under them, how is this to be reconciled with the preacher's illustrations? “A man resolves to be a lawyer, then he directs all his plans and efforts to that object, and that for the time as his governing purpose; afterwards he may alter his determination, and resolve to be a merchant, now he directs all his efforts to that object; and so has changed his heart or governing purpose.” What is the nature of the change involved in the alteration of a man's purpose, with regard to his profession? Is it a radical change of the affections, or is

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