The next passage, which we had designed to give, can only be made tolerably intelligible, by a brief notice of some things previously asserted, in relation to the fundamental constituents of human reason. We give the author's own words, at least, those employed to express the result of an extended train of reasoning:

"Reason, however it may develope itself, to whatever it may be applied, can conceive nothing, except by means of two ideas, which always preside over its exercises, viz. the idea of unity and multiplicity, of the finite and infinite, of existence and its manifestation, of substance and phenomenon, of the absolute cause and second cause, of the absolute and relative, of the necessary and contingent, of boundless and finite space, of eternity and time, &c. When we rank together the first terms of these propositions a profound analysis identifies them; the same is true in relation to all the second terms, so that from all these propositions compared and combined, there results a single proposition, a single formula, which is the formula of thought itself, and which may be expressed according to the case, by the one and the multiple, time and eternity, finite and infinite space, &c. Finally, the two terms of this so comprehensive formula, do not constitute merely a dualism, in which the first term is upon one side, and the second upon the other, without any other relation, except to be perceived at the same time by reason; they have another essential relation, unity, existence, substance, immensity, eternity, &c. the first term of the formula is cause, absolute cause necessarily developing itself in the second term, viz. multiplicity, the finite, phenomenon, the relative, &c. The result of all this, is, that the two terms and their relation of generation, which derives the second from the first, are the three integral elements of human reason."

We now give a passage that may have to some of our readers the appearance of novelty, if not of truth; a bold attempt to subject infinite depth to the easy measurement of the very finite line employed by human thought:

"There are in human reason two elements and their relation; three elements, then-three ideas. These three ideas are by no means the arbitrary product of human reason; so far from that, in their triplicity and their unity, they consti

tute the very foundation of this reason; they appear there to govern it, as reason itself appears in man to govern him. What is true of reason humanly considered, is true of reason considered in itself; that which constitutes the foundation of our reason is the foundation of the eternal reason, viz. a triplicity which resolves itself in unity, and a unity that developes itself in triplicity. The unity of this triplicity is alone real; at the same time, this unity would entirely perish if confined to any one of the three elements which are necessary to its existence; they all have, therefore, the same logical value, and constitute an indecomposable unity. What is this unity? The divine intelligence itself. There, gen

tlemen, even to that height, upon the wings of ideas, to speak with Plato, our intelligence soars; there, see the thrice holy God, whom the human race recognises and adores, and at whose name the author of the system of the world,* at eighty years of age, always bowed with uncovered head.

"Gentlemen, we are far above the world, far above humanity, above human reason. For us, nature and humanity are no more, we are only in the world of ideas. Can we now

hope, since it is no longer a question concerning either nature or humanity, that the preceding theory will not be regarded as Pantheism? Pantheism is, at present, the bugbear of feeble minds; we shall see, on some other occasion, to what it comes. In the meantime, I hope I shall not be accused of confounding with the world, that eternal intelligence, which, prior to the world, prior to humanity, existed in the triplicity that is inherent in its nature. But, if at this height, philosophy escapes the charge of Pantheism, she will hardly avoid an accusation of a directly opposite kind, and which she willingly accepts, that of wishing to penetrate the profundity of the divine essence, incomprehensible as it is thought to be. We are told it must be regarded as incomprehensible. There are men, reasonable beings, whose business it is to understand, who believe in the existence of God, who, nevertheless, are unwilling to believe, except under this express reserve, that this existence be regarded as incomprehensible. But what do they intend by this? That this existence is absolutely incomprehensible? But that which is absolutely incomprehensible can have no relation with our understandings, cannot be admitted by them. A God who is absolutely in

La Place. Trans.

comprehensible by us, is a God who, for us, does not exist. In truth, what could a God be for us, who had not thought fit to give his lowly creature sufficient intelligence to reach himself, to comprehend and exercise faith in him. What is it to believe? It is to understand, at least, in some measure. Faith, whatever may be its form, vulgar or sublime, faith can be nothing but the consent of reason to that which reason comprehends as true. Such is the foundation of all faith. Take away the possibility of knowledge, and there remains. nothing to believe, the very root of faith is taken away. It is said that if God is not entirely incomprehensible, he is so, in part, at least. Be it so; but let the measure be determined, and I will maintain that this measure of the comprehensibility of God is precisely the measure of human faith. God is so little incomprehensible, that that which constitutes his nature is, precisely, ideas, ideas whose very essence it is to be intelligible. It has been much debated whether ideas represent or not, whether they are conformed or not, to their objects. In truth, the question is not whether ideas represent, for ideas are above all things; the true, philosophical question is, rather, if things represent, for ideas are not the reflection of things; things are the reflection of ideas. God, the substance of ideas, is essentially intelligent and essentially intelligible. I will go farther, and to this reproach of pusillanimous mysticism, will reply from the very height of Christian orthodoxy. Do you know, gentlemen, what the theory is that I have now exhibited? Nothing but the foundation of Christianity itself. The God of Christianity is three and one at the same time, so that any accusations against the doctrine which I teach, strike at the root of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The dogma of the Trinity is the revelation of the divine essence made clear in all its profundity, brought entirely under the cognizance of human thought. It does not appear that Christianity believes the divine essence inaccessible, since it teaches this doctrine to the most humble mind, making it one of the first truths inculcated. But, cry they, do you forget, this truth is a mystery? No, I do not, but do not you forget, this mystery is a truth."

If our readers are not already fatigued with abstractions, we now present a passage, where the Gordian in the question of creation is fairly cut through, if not really unravelled. The author's conclusion is all that we can insert:

sess.

"To create, is a thing easily conceived, for we constantly do it ourselves. We create every time we do a free act. I will, I make a resolution, I make another, then another, I modify, suspend, or pursue it. But what do I do? I produce an effect, which I refer to no one of you, but to myself as cause, the only cause, so that, in relation to the existence of this effect, I seek nothing above or beyond myself. See, then, what it is to create. We create a free act; we create it, I say, for we refer it to no principle (cause) superior to ourselves, we impute it to ourselves exclusively. It was not, it began to exist in virtue of the principle of proper causality which we posSo, to cause is to create. But with (from) what? with nothing? No; but, on the contrary, with the foundation of our existence, with all our creative force, with all our liberty, our free activity, and our personality. Man does not bring from nothing the action that he had not performed till he attempted to perform it, he drew it from his power to perform it, from himself. Here is the type of a creation. The divine creation is of the same nature. God, if he is a cause, can create; if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe, he does not bring it from nothing, he derives it from himself, from that power of causation, of creation, in which we feeble men have a share; all the difference between our creation and that of God, is the general difference between God and man, the difference between the absolute and the relative cause.

"God creates then, he creates in virtue of his own creative energy; he draws the world, not from the nothing, which is not, but from himself, the absolute existence. This eminent characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into act, it follows, not simply, that creation is possible, but that it is necessary; it follows that God creates incessantly, infinitely; creation is inexhaustible and constantly maintained. More than this; God creates from himself. God is in the universe as the cause is in the effect, as we ourelves, feeble and limited causes, are, so far as we are causes, (en tant que causes) in the limited and feeble effects that we produce."

In a subsequent lecture the author speaks thus:

"In human reason we have found three ideas, which it does not constitute, but which govern it in all its applications.

The passage from these ideas to God was not difficult, for these ideas are God himself."

Thus reasons a philosopher who claims to be Christian, who ascribes the whole progress of the human mind, of civilization since the middle ages, to the Christian religion. Here are his own words: "Christianity is the foundation of modern civilization, they have the same destiny, they share the same fortunes," &c. Cousin often asserts the same thing in the most unequivocal terms, a proof that his penetration is not always blinded by philosophical theories.

The extracts which we have given are principally from the fifth lecture of the Introduction to the History of Philosophy. Another sentiment found in this volume deserves notice. It is substantially this: the virtues of a victorious hero are nearly in proportion to his success; the victorious nation in war is always in the right; the vanquished deserved to be trodden under foot. All this follows from the principle, that every great change in human affairs is a step gained in the progress of humanity. Whatever power is overcome must be one that had done its work, and then only stood in the way of something better. On these principles Buonaparte was a saint, with but an occasional blemish, till the battle of Waterloo, where he became a most guilty man, abundantly deserving banishment from the world.

The following sentiment is found at the commencement of the fourth lecture:

"A grand thought, a divine thought is also in the physical world, but it is there without knowing itself; it is only after crossing the different kingdoms of nature, and by a progressive labour, that it arrives at self-consciousness in man; there it knows itself very imperfectly at first, by degrees it comes not only to self-consciousness, but to the full knowledge of itself."

The sentiment of Cousin in regard to revelation may be gathered from the sixth lecture of this volume.

"Inspiration, in all languages, is distinct from reflection; it is the perception (l'aperception) of truth, I understand it of essential, fundamental truths, without the intervention of will or personality. Inspiration does not belong to us. There we are simply spectators; we are not agents, at least our action consists only in the consciousness of what is done: there VOL. IV. No. III.—3 A