There confine Him perpetually, to one mode of operation. are, indeed, strong reasons why the laws of nature should be uniform in their ordinary operation; but there may also exist strong reasons for an occasional deviation from the common course: and the same wisdom which dictated the establishment of such regular laws, may also dictate, that, for the accomplishment of special objects of importance, it may be highly proper to deviate from them. And as it relates to this point, it matters not whether we adopt the theory, that the operation of the laws of nature is the agency of God himself, according to rules which he has established, or maintain, that in the formation of the universe, he communicated certain powers and active properties to inanimate nature; for as, in the first case, it is evident, that God who is infinitely free and sovereign, can, at pleasure, change his own operation; so, in the other, it is equally obvious, that he who communicated certain powers to matter, is able, according to his will, to control and suspend the operation of these second causes. The conclusion is, therefore, most manifest, that there is nothing absurd or impossible in the idea of a deviation from the sequence of causes, as they ordinarily take place in the regular course of the laws of nature. Whether, in fact, there are any such events, is a matter not to be determined by any reasoning on general principles, but in the manner in which we come to the knowledge of all facts, by experience, observation, and testimony. And all we have aimed at in the preceding remarks, is to show, that there exists no such presumption against facts of this particular kind, as would render it unreasonable to credit them, provided they are accompanied by such evidence as satisfies the mind of an impartial inquirer. The question which we now have to discuss is precisely the same as that treated by Mr. Hume, in his celebrated Essay on Miracles. The author, whose work we are considering, attempts to reduce us precisely to the same dilemma, as did Mr. Hume his readers, by a complete equipoise of evidence. The case is thus stated: A fact is supposed to be attested by such a force of testimony, that there is nothing wanting to render it. satisfactory; the witnesses are intelligent; of known integrity; would suffer injury by a false statement; are sufficiently numerous; and are harmonious and consistent in the testimony which they deliver. Such testimony, it is acknowledged, if it stood alone, would be competent to command our unwavering assent: but a counteraction may arise from the nature of the facts attested: they may imply that the same causes do not always produce the same effects; but this would be to contradict a plain axiom of common sense, confirmed by universal experience. Here, then, we have complete evidence on both sides of a proposition; and of course we can believe in neither. The rational mind, in such circumstances, can neither believe nor disbelieve; it must remain neutral. But our ingenious author, after bringing us to this apparent equipoise of evidence, by which all assent is rendered impossible, affords us some relief, by discovering that the evidence from testimony never can be as convincing as that which we have for the uniformity of causation. "The causes of testimony," he observes, or in other words, those considerations which operate on the mind of the witnesses, cannot be always ascertained; and as we are uncertain as to the causes in operation, we cannot be certain of the effects; we cannot be sure that the circumstances of the witnesses are such as have before given rise to true testimony, and consequently we cannot be sure, that the testimony is true." According to this view, we can be absolutely certain of nothing, the knowledge of which is obtained by testimony: but every man's experience will contradict this statement; for who needs to be informed, that there are thousands of facts, known no otherwise than by testimony, of the certainty of which we have no more doubt than of our own existence. Supposing then the fact which is contrary to the uniformity of causation, to be attended with testimony of this kind, the equipoise must exist. But there is one consideration which seems equally to have escaped the notice of Mr. Hume and this Essayist. It is, that the same contrariety of evidence, and consequent equipoise, destroying all assent, must take place between the evidence of our senses and the uniformity of causation; for there is no reason why this equipoise, and mutual destruction of conflicting evidence, should exist in relation to testimony alone: the very same thing must necessarily occur, if a fact be observed by our senses, which is contrary to the established course of nature. Thus, if we should see with our own eyes a cubic inch of ice placed in a temperature of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and should distinctly observe, that it remained unmelted at the expiration of an hour, we could not believe the fact; for although nothing can be more certain to us than what we see; yet as this fact implies, that the same causes do not always produce the same effects; and as this is a self-evident truth, the mind, between these conflicting and equally balanced evidences, must remain in a state of perfect neutrality; neither believing nor disbelieving the fact. And this effect must take place, however frequently we might witness the fact, or whatever number of persons should concur with us, as to the nature of the fact observed. For however certain we might be, that we saw the ice unmelted, yet no certainty from the evidence of sense can be greater than that which we have that the same causes will always produce the same effects. Thus would these philosophers, by their abstract and metaphysical reasonings, persuade us to disbelieve even the evidence of our own senses. It is true, as was observed, that neither this writer nor Mr. Hume has pushed the argument to this consequence, nor do they seem to have been aware of it; but we think it must be evident to every impartial mind, that the difficulty which they have so forcibly and confidently presented, is as applicable to the evidence of the senses, as to that of testimony. But whether, if we should witness a fact in direct contrariety to the known and established laws of nature, we should hesitate to believe it, is a thing not to be determined by abstract reasoning on general principles; every man is capable of deciding it for himself. Indeed, the effect which any kind of evidence will have on the mind can only be known by experience; and on this ground we may assert, that what a man plainly and repeatedly sees he will believe. If any plain, sensible man should see ice remain unmelted at 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, he would not need to refer to the uniformity of causation, or any other abstract. principle, before he gave his assent. He would, indeed, esteem it an extraordinary phenomenon, for which he could not account; and he might at first be ready to suppose that there was something deceptious in the appearance; but if, after repeated and thorough examinations, he should find that it was a reality; and, especially, if he found that the same impression was made on a multitude of other persons, he could not do otherwise than believe the fact to be, as it appeared to his senses. And such an observer would experience no difficulty in giving his assent, from any equipoise of conflicting evidence, which might be supposed to exist. Indeed, if such a fact were witnessed by a dozen intelligent men, not one of them would conclude that there was an infringement of the uniformity of causation; or that the same effects did not always follow the same causes; but the supposition of every one of them VOL. IV. No. III.—3 G would be, that there was an extraordinary cause in operation, to which the observed effect must be ascribed. No one would be so foolish as to suppose, that if heat operated according to the laws which usually regulate it, and no other cause was concerned in the effect, that ice would remain unmelted for an hour, in such a temperature. In all cases where an effect different from the ordinary one in the same circumstances takes place, we are instinctively led to the supposition of the operation of an extraordinary cause, although we may be entirely ignorant of its nature. But when a real deviation from the laws of nature is observed, the rational conclusion is, that the power of God must have been interposed; since none has power to control or suspend the laws of nature but he that established them: and such an event is properly called a miracle. Now, although it requires strong evidence to satisfy an impartial mind of the existence of a miracle, the difficulty of believing in such a fact, does not in the least depend upon the principle assumed by the Essayist; namely, that such an event implies a violation of the uniformity of causation: for as has been shown, that idea never enters the mind of any one. The difficulty in believing in a miracle is owing to the presumption, arising from common experience, that the laws of nature will remain the same; and from the circumstance that we may never before have witnessed an event of this kind. But the thought that the thing is impossible to divine power, would never be likely to enter into any unsophisticated mind; and nothing would be requisite to produce the fullest conviction of its truth, but the opportunity of observing it in circumstances favourable to a distinct view of the fact. And when the miracle is attended by such evidence as commands assent, such as that of our own senses, no difficulty of crediting the fact would ever be experienced, on account of the uniformity of causation, or on any other account whatever. If the preceding observations are correct, as it relates to facts which fall under the observation of the senses, the same conclusions will be true in regard to facts made known to us by testimony, of the strongest kind. It is true, this writer seems to maintain, that there is always some uncertainty in the information derived from this source. "The causes of testimony," says he, "or those considerations which operate on the minds of the witnesses, cannot always be ascertained; and as we are uncertain as to the causes in operation, we cannot be certain of the effects; we cannot be sure that the circumstances of the witnesses are such as have given rise to true testimony, and, consequently, we cannot be sure that the testimony is true." According to this doctrine, testimony can in no case whatever lay a rational foundation for unhesitating assent to any fact. However numerous, and however respectable the witnesses, and whatever may be their circumstances, "we cannot be sure that the testimony is true. But is this statement correct? Is it not in direct repugnance to the experience and conviction of every man? How do most of us know, that there is in the world such a country as France, or Great Britian? Is it not by testimony? And can we not be certain respecting this, and a thousand other matters, which we know only by the information of others? Does any intelligent man doubt any more whether there lately existed in Europe such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte, or such a man as the Duke of Wellington? The truth is, that every man is conscious of believing thousands of facts on the testimony of others with fully as much certainty as he does the things which pass before his eyes; and it would be in vain to tell men that they might be deceived in any case where their knowledge depended on testimony, "because we cannot be sure that the testimony is true;" we might as well attempt to persuade them that they did not perceive the light which was shining around them, or even that they did not exist. This being a subject on which every man's own convictions are sufficient, no argument is needed. The case is as plain as it can be. Admitting, then that testimony may be such as to remove all doubt or uncertainty, as much as the evidence of the senses or of consciousness, the question is, supposing testimony of this kind to exist in support of a fact which implies a deviation from the regular operation of the laws of nature, Can we on the ground of such testimony credit the miracle? When the question is thus stated, the doctrine of this philosopher is, in conformity with his prototype, Mr. Hume, that there can arise no rational belief; for, however strong the testimony may be, it cannot be stronger than the intuitive certainty, that the same causes must be followed by the same effects. Our belief in testimony itself, he informs us, is founded on the same principle; for the reason why we believe that witnesses, in certain circumstances, will speak the truth, is, because we have always observed, that when thus situated, they do speak the truth. Now, the fallacy of this statement has already been shown: a principle is assumed which is altogether incorrect; or, rather, a true principle is applied to a case to which it does not belong. It is true, that |