share in giving rise to that almost puerile dislike of what is permanent, and that frantic fondness for up-rooting, overhauling, and down-pulling, which, deny it as they may, makes the mass of German writers legitimate objects of a little friendly ridicule with foreigners of sense. When weary, however, of this artificial chaos, we need only cross the Rhine to be at the antipodes. In France all is stereotyped, religion, politics, and dress excepted. Especially is this the case with writers of the old régime. While the German seems to adopt the principle that nothing must remain which can be changed, Frenchmen of this class seem to act upon the rule, that nothing must be changed which can remain.

Of this characteristic difference, which is not meant to be applied with rigour, we are constantly reminded in pursuing our comparison between the two editions of the work before us. The frame-work of the Grammar stands unaltered. The terminology has undergone no change, except by the addition of technical terms from the native grammars. The work, considered as a whole, is what it was, upon its first appearance. Indeed, some closeness of inspection is required to discern the slighter touches which do really distinguish it. Here and there a word is either added or omitted, a collocation is rendered more euphonic, two paragraphs are blended into one, or the reverse. In German phrase, it is an überarbeitung, not an umarbeitung. A very few parts seem to be re-written, those, for instance, on the conjugations and tenses of the verbs, and, in a less degree, those on the prepositions and the syntax of the pronouns. The matter absolutely new, with one exception which we shall recur to, consists of sentences and parts of sentences, with here and there a paragraph entire, scattered throughout both volumes.

Next to the quantity of matter added, we are struck with the character of the additions. Here again we are reminded of the Germans by the contrast. The same new facts which De Sacy simply adds to his previous details, as so many details in one long catalogue, a German, moderately national and lively, would have made the basis of a span-new theory, conflicting with, and possibly demolishing, the one that figured in the first edition. We do not say that either course is, in its essence, wrong. In essence, both are right. But in degree, both verge upon extremes. While we smile at the nimble self-complacency, with which two facts are sometimes wrought into a theory, with a train of exceptions and anom

alies behind it, like the tail of a bird of paradise, we must admit, that a mere detail of crude particulars, with no attempt to classify them, if not quite so ludicrous, is equally pernicious. The latter description is, however, very far from being applicable to De Sacy's work. He is not, indeed, a philosophical grammarian, in the modern sense.

He meddles very little with the rationale of the changes he describes, and still less with that sort of etymology, so highly prized in Germany, which, not contented with mere root-digging, descends into the bowels of the earth, and professes to rake up the primordial elements of speech, the very roots of roots. The cool assurance, with which some recent quacks in this department describe explicitly the stages of the process which elaborated language, ought to shame some of their betters who set them the example. This, if any thing, must make Gesenius sick of his absurd attempts to designate the age of every book and every sentence in the Hebrew Scriptures, by professional inspection, and to decide without appeal what is "spät," "aramäisch," "makkabäisch," or "unächt," in the oracles of God. In this sort of philosophy, De Sacy seems to have made no proficiency. His speculative powers appear to have been spent upon the nomenclature of his system. Under some strange misconception, he has taken endless pains to make the technicalities of this extensive work conformable, in all points, to a system of logic published by himself, and entitled Principles of General Grammar. This, we think, is more useless in itself than the German subtilties. The philosophy of things is something above the philosophy of names. This elaborate and novel terminology we regard as the greatest blemish of the Grammaire Arabe. Evil has arisen, we admit, from the transfer of the technics of Greek and Latin Grammar to the eastern languages, but even they are better than this substitute, or rather this appendage, for De Sacy employs both. The terms of Latin etymology and syntax, though in a great degree inapplicable, we must still prefer to the learned Baron's "complémens logiques," "rapports d'annexion," "propositions volitives," and "propositions qui font fonction de terms circonstantiels d'état."* This terminology, such as it is, comprises, we believe, all that the courtesy of criticism enables us to designate philosophy in this important work. The principle on which it is con

* See the Title of Ch. 29. t. 2, p. 383, 2 edit.

structed, is that of stating the phenomena of the language, under proper heads, with such explanations as are necessary to render them intelligible. In this way the book was origi nally written. In this way the additions have been made at present. They are mere specifications furnished by the author's reading, with scarcely an attempt to incorporate them with the previous matter, any further than by juxtaposition. This plan, whatever be its intrinsic merits, is carried out with faithfulness and skill. And after all that petty theorists may say, it is vastly easier to blow up a bubble from the soap and water of a little quack philosophy, than to exhibit a compli cated mass of facts, in methodical detail, so as to be intelligible. This our author has accomplished. We can recollect no work of similar extent, in which the same plan has been followed up with such perspicuous accuracy. The compara tive merits of the plan itself may well be questioned, and it must be owned, that there is a pervading tendency to push the leading principle too far, so far as almost to confirm Professor Lee's assertion, that "the Grammaire Arabe presents scarcely any thing more than an elaborate collection of examples, arranged under particular heads."

This quotation tempts us to incur the guilt of a digression, by adverting to the article from which it is extracted. As a curious specimen of literary controversy, as well as on account of the author's reputation, and the importance of the subject, it deserves attention. The Baron de Sacy, it appears, inserted in the Journal des Savans, some three years since, an extensive notice of Lee's Hebrew Grammar, published two years earlier. This notice we have never read, but we gather from Professor Lee's reply, that De Sacy, as might have been anticipated, undertook to controvert the leading principles maintained by his contemporary. A reply to this review, by Lee himself, appeared in the last two numbers of the London Classical Journal. The first thing in it that attracts attention, is the total want of ceremony, not to say of courtesy, with which the writer speaks of his opponent. To one who recollects the standing of the parties in the public eye, the following expressions must, to say the least, seem strange.

"As to the term recommended by M. de Sacy, I cannot help considering it a perfect absurdity." Classical Journal, Vol. 40, p. 2.

"In this, M. de Sacy is mistaken. It is probable, indeed, that he has not read my Grammar throughout." p. 3.

"I hope M. de Sacy has not been willing to pass over certain particulars, and then to report them as wanting." p. 4. "I cannot help treating his objection, therefore, in this place, as quite beneath himself, and perfectly childish." p. 7. "The truth appears to be, that M. de Sacy has no adequate notion whatever of the real force of these forms." p. 9.

"Can any thing short of perverseness, or a determination never to depart from the paths of custom and of ignorance(!) induce a writer to close his eyes, &c." p. 10.

"It would be a work of supererogation to exemplify a thing of which every tyro in Hebrew is well acquainted, but, I doubt, whether any sort of proof would suffice to convince my learned reviewer." p. 13.

"M. de Sacy must necessarily be right, and because he believes he is so." p. 308.

"When the philosophy of language shall be substituted, as I trust it will, for the philosophy of technicalities, it will, perhaps, be found, that half a dozen rules will really comprehend more of the Arabic and Hebrew language, than all the ponderous volumes with which the world has been pestered by such philosophers as the Baron de Sacy." p. 310.

"Had M. de Sacy stumbled on this, his Grammar would, perhaps, have been shorter by a few pages, and its rules intelligible." p. 311.

"Fortunately, however, for poor Mr. Ewald and myself, literature and science have no Pope." p. 312.

"The truth is, that no such rule any where exists; it is the mere figment of M. de Sacy; and it has been framed for this particular occasion." p. 323.

"Why does our savant object? I suppose, because he is determined to do so, and for no other reason." p. 325.

Here, then, we have a trifling technicality, implicating one of the greatest savans of Europe in a ridiculous mistake." p. 326.

In these quotations, which are mere selections from a number that we marked upon perusal, there are two things which we think must offend every reader of taste. The one is the tone of contempt adopted towards the learned Baron. However great the acknowledged merits of Professor Lee may be, and however just his criticisms in the present case, we are sure, that public sentiment will never sympathize with this apparent scorn of his illustrious contemporary. Another, and,

perhaps, still more offensive circumstance, is the vindictive style in which he justifies himself, by accusing his opponent; defending his own Hebrew Grammar by assailing the Grammaire Arabe. No doubt, there was occasion to call into question some of De Sacy's views of Arabic grammar, and, no doubt, as to many of the controverted points, the two tongues may be looked upon, and spoken of, as one. But what we allude to is something very different from mere objection to De Sacy's theories. A particular criticism offered by De Sacy, is sometimes met by a sweeping condemnation of his own work, or a sneer at some specific flaw in it, entirely unconnected with his own remark on Lee. This adds an air of personality to the pervading coarseness of the articles, which we are grieved to see sanctioned by authority so high. It ought, however, to be recollected, that we write with no further knowledge of De Sacy's own critique, than the reply affords, and cannot therefore undertake to say, that no provocation was there given, which would palliate or justify this mode of refutation. If we may form a judgment from the Baron's other writings, and the way in which he notices a criticism on his Grammar by Professor Lee, in a note to the last edition, we should rather expect a punctilious adherence to old fashioned courtesy, than outrages upon it.

*

The

We are so far from making these remarks upon the style of the reply, because we think De Sacy altogether in the right, that on almost every point of Hebrew Grammar called in question, we think him very clearly in the wrong. specimen here given makes us not a little sceptical about his merits as a Hebrew scholar. We had, indeed, before seen reason to believe, that the absorption of his faculties and feelings in one favourite study, had prevented any very close attention, during many years at least, to the details of other languages. At all events, the criticism quoted from the Journal des Savans, evince no accurate experimental knowledge of the Hebrew text. The reference to arbitrary technical definitions as fixed principles, and the adoption of the opinion so common among sciolists, that Hebrew is a chaos

* Vol. II p. 483.

+ There is one expression in the work before us which must make a Grecian smile. After speaking of the "antithetic future," a term introduced by Erpenius, and of the sense which he attached to it, the author adds; "en effet le mot avriseos, qui est grec," &c. This "qui est grec," strictly implies no more than a doubt of the reader's erudition.