portunity, and thereafter jurisdiction was refused in cases considered original,1 or the proceeding was regarded as ancillary and cognizance was taken of the entire controversy.

When the question was directly presented to the Supreme Court, it met the issue fairly and frankly. Certain property had been seized under process of attachment issuing in an action at law pending in the United States Circuit Court. The property was taken from the possession of the marshal by the sheriff of the county, acting under process issuing from the State Court. The party at whose instance the property was seized by the sheriff considered himself remediless in the Federal Court, in that the requisite diversity of citizenship was lacking between himself and the adverse claimant. The case proceeded in the State Court, where it was insisted that the Federal Court was without jurisdiction, that its process was illegal and void, and that the State Court alone was competent to afford adequate redress.

Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Nelson declared that it belonged exclusively to the Federal Courts to determine the question of their own jurisdiction and the validity of their process; and that it need scarcely be remarked that no government could maintain the administration and execution of its laws if the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals was subject to the determination of another. The right of the Federal Court to decide every question arising in a cause over which it had first acquired original jurisdiction was fully maintained; and it was in express terms declared that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and thereby prevent injustice or an inequitable advantage under mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but is ancillary merely, "and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties, "2

Referring to the earlier expression of the court that its power was limited to a case between the original parties to the action at Freeman. Howe, 24 How. 450; 16 L. Ed. 749.

2 Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 81; 20 L. Ed. 763.

law, it was said that such a declaration was probably not intended, "as any party may file the bill whose interests are affected by the suit at law." It has sometimes been said or inttmated that this statement on the part of the court was obiter dictum, and not to be treated as the law of the case; but the Supreme Court, on great consideration, has finally declared that it was in point of fact a substantial part of the argument in support of the judgment, and the court felt bound to confirm it in substance as logically necessary.1

The reason underlying the decision is so convincing, and the acceptance of the doctrine so necessary to an orderly administration as between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that the doc trine has found practically universal acceptance.

That property seized under the process of one court cannot be reached by the process of another court of merely concurrent jurisdiction, and that the court first acquiring jurisdiction acquires the right to decide every question arising in the cause, were doctrines which were adopted from the English courts of chancery. The novel questions involved concerned the jurisdiction of the court relative to that of the State Court. It is perfectly plain that no court could preserve its dignity and maintain its authority if its process was subject to review by coordinate courts of another sovereignty; and a strong assertion of the right of the Federal Court to regulate and control its own process, judgments, orders and decrees, without regard to the citizenship of the parties, followed as logically necessary in order that the parties might not be left remediless or be subjected to the abuse of process.

This case and those which followed and applied the principle, defined the general sphere within which the ancillary power of the court would be indulged. While it was clear that all persons claiming an interest in property in the possession of the court, or in the benefits of an estate which was being administered in chancery, might intervene for the purpose of asserting such in1Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; 28 L. Ed. 145.

terest or receiving such benefit, it remained to be decided whether the court could, by compulsory process, bring in third parties who are entire strangers to the original litigation in order to enforce liabilities which it is claimed they owe to the estate. Neither had it been adjudicated whether the court would take cognizance of an ancillary proceeding against strangers to the litigation where the amount claimed was less than that necessary to confer original jurisdiction. These two important questions came before the court in the same case.

The receiver of an insolvent land company instituted one suit in the Federal Court of his appointment against a great number of persons who were claimed to be indebted to the corporation for lands purchased under separate and distinct contracts.

The indebtedness claimed against many of the parties was less than the requisite jurisdictional amount. The Supreme Court held that any suit, by or against the Receiver, in the course of the winding up of the affairs of an insolvent corporation, whether for the collection of its assets or for the defense of it property rights, must be regarded as ancillary to the main suit and as cognizable in the Circuit Court, regardless either of the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. Theright of the Receiver to bring in these third parties was sus tained; but the court expressly refused to decide whether all could be made parties defendant to one suit, as had been done by the Receiver.1

This decision proceeded upon the proposition that when a court exercising jurisdiction in equity appoints a Receiver for all the property of the corporation, the court assumes the administration of the estate; the possession of the Receiver is the possession of the court, and the court itself holds and administers the estate, through the Receiver as its officer, for those whom the court shall ultimately adjudge to be entitled to it.2

The Receiver takes title by operation of law and as an instru

1 White . Ewing, 159 U. S. 36; 40 L. Ed. 67; Lanning v. Osborne, 69 Fed. 657; Peck r. Elliott, 79 Fed. 10; Miles r. New South B. & L. Ass'n, 95 Fed. 921.

2 Porter . Sabin, 149 U. S. 473; 27 L. Ed. 815.

ment of the court which appoints him; and if he appears as a party to the suit, it is only because he represents the court in its inherent power to wind up the estate of an insolvent corporation over which it has, by original bill, obtained jurisdiction.

I have thus briefly outlined the nature and extent of the ancillary jurisdiction exercised by Federal Courts of Equity. Many cases might be referred to as showing the application of the principles involved, some of which will be found cited in the footnotes for the benefit of those who care to make a more particular investigation.1

There is a well-defined distinction between the ancillary and the auxiliary jurisdiction of courts of equity, though the difference seems frequently to have been disregarded. That which is ancillary implies that it is subordinate and dependent, while that which is auxiliary refers to the extending of aid which is entirely

1 Cross-bill growing out of subject of original suit is regarded as ancillary. Milwaukee R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 750, 18 L. Ed. 861; Averett . Independent School District, 102 Fed. 529; Brooks v. Laurent, 98 Fed. 647; First National Bank v. Salem Company, 31 Fed. 583; Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 806; Jesup v. Ill. R. Co, 43 Fed. 496.

Assignee of plaintiff may file supplemental bill to quiet title as ancillary to original pleading. Glover v. Shepperd, 21 Fed. 484.

Third party may intervene without regard to citizenship. Lamb v. Ewing, 54 Fed. 273; Park v. New York R. Co., 70 Fed. 643; Conwell v. Valley Canal Co., 4 Biss. 200.

Substituted plaintiff may file original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill. Ross v. Ft. Wayne, 63 Fed. 471.

Bill to foreclose upon property in the hands of Receiver is ancillary. Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 279.

Where suit is pending for appointment of Receiver, court has jurisdiction of bill filed by lien claimants, whose right to foreclose in the State Court will be defeated when the Federal Court takes possession. Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed. 762.

As to service of process in ancillary proceedings, see Gregory v. Pike, 79 Fed. 521; Smith v. Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 143, 29 L. Ed. 357; Abraham v. North German Fire Insurance Co., 37 Fed. 732.

A court entertaining ancillary bill may protect its exclusive jurisdiction by injunction without offending section 720 of the Revised Statutes. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 43 L. Ed. 399; Oliver v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 105 Fed. 272.

Bill attacking assignment for creditors in aid of an attachment at law is ancillary. Dewey v. West Fairmont Co., 123 U. S. 333, 31 L. Ed. 181. Bill of plaintiff's assignee to compel conveyance ordered under original proceedings is ancillary. Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 413, 37 L. Ed. 1126.

Bill for reformation of insurance policy upon which suit is pending at law is ancillary. Rosenbaum v. Council Bluff Insurance Co., 37 Fed.

independent in its nature. When reference is had to the subject of a suit, the jurisdiction of equity is either original or ancillary; with relation to other courts, the jurisdiction is either exclusive, concurrent or auxiliary. An ancillary proceeding grows out of and is always dependent upon some original proceeding in the same court. When the aid of a court is sought in order to carry out the purposes contemplated in an original bill pending in another court, the secondary jurisdiction so exercised is not dependent or ancillary, but is independent and auxiliary. It has been denied that one Circuit Court of the United States would exercise jurisdiction as purely ancillary to that of another Circuit Court. A bill invoking the aid of a court other than that in which the original proceeding is pending, must have all of the averments and prayers necessary in an original bill and must be addressed to the auxiliary jurisdiction of the court. While the bill in such case may be in some sense ancillary, the jurisdiction exercised is independent. An ancillary bill is applicable only to a proceeding growing out of original proceedings in the same court, upon which it depends, and is instituted for the purpose of rendering complete justice as between all the parties in interest in that cause.

A bill filed to assist another circuit court in the administration and distribution of assets is really addressed to the independent power of the court and is auxiliary. A receivership in one court, however, may be said to be ancillary to that in another court. This auxiliary jurisdiction is freely exercised by the courts of the United States because of the comity existing between them.

The close political and commercial relations of the people in the various States have brought about business conditions requir ing frequent invocation of the auxiliary jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. When an insolvent corporation is engaged in business and has assets situated in other States, it becomes of the

1 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kanawha & O. R. Co., 39 Fed. 337.

2 New York &c. R. Co. v. New York &c. R. Co., 58 Fed. 268.

3 Coltrane . Templeton, 106 Fed. 370.

Platt v. Philadelphia R. Co., 54 Fed. 569.