which were definitely fixed by his instructions. On the rejection by the Mexican Government of the terms first offered, Trist was peremptorily recalled and the Mexican Government formally notified of the termination of his authority. In defiance of his recall, and with full knowledge on the part of the Mexican Government that he was without authority, a treaty was negotiated and signed. As, however, it conformed to his original instructions, it was accepted by the President and ratified by the Senate.

The work is written in a most attractive style and illustrated with ample maps and plans. The present difficulties in Mexico are incomprehensible without a knowledge of the course of her history during the first half of the nineteenth century as related in this book. While the present situation presents a more serious problem than any which has previously occurred, the reader of these volumes will, in many places, find reminders that many of the difficulties of the present day find a striking parallel in the earlier history of the country.

GEORGE A. KING.

Il Canale di Panama. By Enrico Catellani. Roma: Tipografia dell 'Unione Editrice, 1913. pp. 114, map.

In this pamphlet of 114 pages Professor Catellani has reprinted from the Rivista Coloniale his study of the international problems arising out of the approaching completion of the Panama Canal and the legislation on the subject adopted by the United States.

The limits of the article permit only of the most summary sketch of the history of the project, but the relevant facts are clearly enough and quite dispassionately stated, and noticeably without importing controversial matter or displaying any tendency either to undue criticism or enthusiasm.

The interest of the author in fact relates to the neutralization or semineutralization of the Canal, and to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as it bears upon the two subjects of fortification and of the exemption of coastwise shipping from tolls.

As a matter of fact, he would doubtless deny that the term neutralization is properly to be applied to the status of the Panama Canal at all: its exemption from warlike uses depends entirely on the clause of the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, modelled on, though not precisely following, the similar clauses of the convention. relating to the Suez Canal. As between the two parties to the treaty

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there is a mutual obligation; as towards other nations interested there is a mere promise without consideration, practically ineffectual because these nations are not themselves in any way bound to respect the neutrality: and the sole guarantee for the continuance of the status is in fact the armed power of the United States.

Neutralization, properly speaking, is necessarily an effect not merely of joint but of general action, and a guarantee resting merely on the power of a single nation is evidently imperfect. The analogy to the status of the Canal is in fact to be found not at Suez, but much more nearly in the Kiel Canal.

If it furnished a complete analogy the matter would be simple enough, and as a matter of fact since the acquisition of the Canal Zone a strong tendency has existed in the United States to regard it primarily as a domestic enterprise on native territory.

Against this is the existence of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, entered into when the territory in question did not yet belong in any sense to the United States, and creating very definite obligations towards Great Britain.

The question of the construction of the treaty first presented itself in connection with the proposal to fortify. The British Government did not think proper to make any protest on the subject, and the unofficial protest whether in the United States or abroad was not weighty enough to secure serious attention. Professor Catellani does not conceal his own view that the fortification was inconsistent with the intent of the treaty, and a quite unwarranted extension of the clause providing for the policing of the Canal.

The author's analysis of the motives influencing the conduct of the United States in reference to the Canal in its later development indicates three main factors,-political interests, economic interests, and a contemplated creation of a new system of international law embodying the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine but widely extended to cover all interstate relations on the American Continent. The idea of fortification is in fact represented as a development not so much of the duty assumed by treaty of policing the Canal, as of the voluntarily assumed duty of policing the sister states of the continent.

Political reasons would therefore appear to have governed the decision and attitude of the United States in the matter of fortification: economic reasons have been controlling in the question of tolls. The statesman and the politician regarded the matter as it affected the military and

strategic position of the country; the man of business considered it largely as a possible means of regenerating the lost shipping interests. And politician and business man were inclined to make common cause in the name of patriotism.

These tendencies, of course, finally crystalized in the Panama Canal Act of 1912 exempting coastwise shipping from tolls, and what is perhaps even more alarming to foreign interests, intimating by its terms. the reservation of the right by future regulations to favor further the shipping of the United States.

All the European nations possessing any considerable shipping trade are interested in this aspect of the matter, but Britain alone, of course, has any locus standi under the treaty of 1901. It is suggested, however, that the other nations interested possess a ground of protest in the repeated intimation of the United States to the effect that no rival enterprise under the auspices of any European nation would be permitted. The suggestion would hardly seem to possess much practical importance whether juridically sound or not. The Monroe Doctrine in all its various developments and extensions is, like "an official utterance," unanswerable.

As against Great Britain at any rate, this position taken in the Act of 1912 is pronounced flatly to be indefensible.

British diplomacy is rather tartly criticised for the "debilitation" which it seems to suffer in crossing the Atlantic, for its successive concessions in the matter of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the amendment of the first draft of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and finally its slowness and moderation in the matter of the tolls.

The attitude of the author in regard to the final disposition of the question is in fact somewhat pessimistic. The main hope of a favorable result he seems to see in the essential interest of the United States, which will sooner or later become evident, to secure an effective joint guarantee of the neutrality of the Canal, a condition which he thinks in a time of more serious or mature consideration "the United States will recognize as indispensable for the security of the Canal and not a matter of indifference for the security of their own commerce and vested interests."

The article was of course written before recent developments in the matter, which give promise of sober second thought leading to a radical modification of the position adopted. And generally it may be said that from the tone of his anticipations he does not altogether appreciate that

the sentiments which lead to what he denominates the "maternal patience" of Britain in diplomatic negotiations with the United States find a certain answer in public feeling and opinion, which are likely in the long run to impose a corresponding check on too radical or uncompromising action even though favored by powerful interests and convictions: and also assuming that the argument as to the meaning of the treaty solemnly entered into is as clear and conclusive as he claims, it was bound in time to penetrate and mould public opinion in the nation, which is necessarily guided to a large extent by national self-interest, but is not by any means insensitive to national honor.

JAMES BARCLAY.

Deutsche Prisengerichtsbarkeit. Dr. jur. Heinrich Pohl. Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr. 1911. pp. 231.

Das internationale Prisenrecht. Dr. jur. Otto Hirschmann. München
and Berlin: J. Schweitzer. 1912. pp. 158.

These two books consider the recent attempts to make prize law truly international law.

The work of Dr. Pohl is a work on prize jurisdiction particularly as relates to German law and practice. The fundamental conceptions of prize jurisdiction are discussed and the changes consequent upon the abolition of privateering are shown to be in the direction of respect for law. In 1907, out of various propositions came at length the plan for the international prize court.

The German laws and regulations of 1884 and 1889 had brought the practice in regard to prize into fairly definite form. These were, however, national laws and while the prize courts might in theory administer international law, they must in fact in many respects give careful heed to national laws.

The idea of making the prize court international is not new in Germany. The ideas of Frederick the Great show the reasonableness of an international prize court. Other German writers and publicists developed the idea during the eighteenth century. The proposition of Hübner advocating the placing of neutrals upon the court which is to decide cases where the neutral national's property is concerned is particularly explained. The influence of writers of the eighteenth century shows a tendency toward a court that should be international in its attitude.

Gessner's plan is discussed as one of the most completely developed

of the ideas of "internationalizing" of the prize court in the nineteenth century. The position of other writers is briefly set forth.

The well known German-English-American coöperation for the prize court convention at the Second Hague Conference, together with the general course of discussion, is related, and the general effect of the proposed convention is explained. The difficulties of deciding what principles the court should follow in cases of conflict of laws and precedents and other difficulties which the court would face are not overlooked. Some of these are in part solved by the Declaration of London. The judicial character of the prize court, if established, must be recog'nized. The advantages of such a court seem too great to permit of long delay in the realization of the hopes of the early German writers.

The book contains in appendices the German and English propositions which were brought before the Second Hague Conference and the convention which was finally drafted, but remains unratified. There is also a good index.

The work of Dr. Hirschmann, Das internationale Prisenrecht, views the subject of prize law in a broad manner. He emphasizes the distinction between the capture of enemy property at sea and the capture of neutral property at sea. The course of discussion upon the exemption from capture of private property at sea in time of war is presented at length. This is familiar to American readers from the work of the American delegations at the First and at the Second Hague Conferences. The American position on this question, the British proposition in regard to the abolition of contraband, and the effects of these upon the ideas of blockade are shown.

The definition of many ideas by the Declaration of London of 1909 and the significance of these definitions is discussed in a clear fashion. The tendency to guard the rights of neutrals more carefully and to put the burden of war upon the belligerents is everywhere evident.

The development of prize law seems to show a growing recognition that property even in time of war should not be taken without due process of law.

A closing chapter presents the relation of the recent propositions in regard to capture on the sea to political questions. The controversy that has been waged in England over the Prize Court Convention and the Declaration of London, described in considerable detail, proves that there are many difficulties besides those of a legal nature which must be met.