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of hostility to the United States, and not from any action upon the part of our men.
Second. That the authorities of Valparaiso failed in their duty in not giving police protection to the attacked men, which offense was aggravated by the fact that some of the police of the city, as well as some Chilean sailors and soldiers, joined in the attack.
The Chilean Government entered a general denial of hostile intent against the United States, and quoted the following from a dispatch from our Secretary of State in connection with riots against Italian subjects within our territory. The dispatch was to the Marquis Imperiali, under date of May 21, 1891, and the words quoted were as follows: “There is no government, however civilized it may be, however great may be the vigilance displayed by its police, however severe its criminal code may be, and however speedy and inflexible may be its administration of justice, that can guarantee its own citizens against violence growing out of individual malice or a sudden popular tumult."
With regard to such cases in general Vattel also says that: “ It would be unjust to impute to the nation all the faults of its citizens. In general, it cannot be said that one has received an injury from a nation because some of its members have injured him."
The vital question of international law involved in the “Baltimore” case was, however, whether the Chilean Government took proper or sufficient measures to prevent the attack and to bring the offenders to punishment. This was a question of fact which our government had to decide for itself according to all the evidence in its possession, and it decided that the Government of Chile had not done all that it should have done to prevent the attack and to punish the offenders.**
34 Moore's Digest, p. 854, etc. 35 Snow's Int. Law. ed. by Stockton, p. 54.
With respect to the second class of states, that is weak states with unstable governments, it at times occurs that citizens abroad must be protected at once, not by diplomatic representation; there is no time for that, but by the employment of naval force.
Under these circumstances whenever civil disturbances occur, it is usual for naval powers to send a naval force to the place of the troubles or threatened commotion for the purpose of affording protection or asylum to the citizens that may be there domiciled. In those cases the regulations of the Navy already quoted must be followed so far as they can apply. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof, after due consultation with the diplomatic or consular officer upon
At times the mere appearance of a naval force, accompanied by a firm attitude on the part of the officer in command, will prevent the resort to active measures. A display of force is sometimes ordered by Congress or by the President of the United States.
It happens at times that the commanding officer of a naval force is required by circumstances or request to protect the citizens of other countries than his own. Instances of this kind have occurred of late years, for example, in the protection afforded by British men-of-war in Alaska at the time of a threatened Indian uprising, and by our own vessels on the Isthmus of Panama and at Bluefields in Nicaragua.
As to the third class of governments, such as are ordinarily classed as semi-civilized or barbarous, intervention by force in behalf of citizens domiciled or sojourning there is a more common matter. In these countries the employment of naval forces is the principal means of such protection, added thereto at times by the landing of military detachments.
TREATIES.—AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
MEASURES SHORT OF WAR.
Treaties. By the regulations of the Navy of the United States a senior naval officer when abroad is directed to guard against any actual or threatened violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights to the injury of the United States or its citizens on the part of foreign authorities. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force rests solely upon the commanding officer thereof. It is hence desirable that when on a foreign station the commanding officers, and those likely to be in command, should make themselves familiar with the treaties with the countries within the limits of their station.
Treaties are not international law, but as contracts between nations, treaties are subject to a certain extent to the rules of international law. A treaty which is in any of its parts a direct violation of a well-known fundamental rule of international law is not binding upon the parties concerned or third parties. A treaty, for example, which establishes jurisdiction over the high seas, or militates against the equality of sovereign states, would be void and of no effect. Treaties do not make international law, but they do show tendencies which may eventually become accepted rules. When changes become well established it is not necessary to have treaty conditions upon the point.
Treaties, as distinguished from conventions, protocols and declarations, are of primary importance, stipulating, as they generally do concerning political or large commercial sub
jects. Conventions generally concern specific matters of minor importance. Protocol, a word generally used to describe the daily minutes of a conference, is sometimes used as the name of a brief agreement or convention of binding force. Declaration is used often as an enunciation of a general doctrine or principles which shall be binding upon the assenting parties, like the Declaration of Paris, and of London.
The right to make treaties is included in the fundamental rights of a sovereign state. It can be exercised also in a partsovereign state, like Egypt, to the extent permitted by the
The treaty-making power of a state is in the hands of its ruler, subject to more or less restriction, as the constitution of the state provides. With us, for example, the President can only conclude treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. To make a treaty financially effective the House of Representatives is also called upon to act.
As commander-in-chief the President can, acting alone, in the exercise of his military powers, conclude armistices and arrange conventions with an enemy. So also can the commander-in-chief of an army or of a naval force. These latter are, however, subject to review by the President, and, as in the case of General Sherman in North Carolina during the Civil War, subject to disapproval and disavowal.
The Constitution of the United States provides that all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any state of the Union to the contrary notwithstanding
A treaty is not binding, of course, until it is duly ratified by the proper authorities of each state. Unless otherwise provided the treaty, however, goes into effect from the date of its signature.
The question of the interpretation of treaties is one that has given rise to many disputes in our country, as well as in others of greater age. Sentences, phrases and words have become the object of much wrangling. T. J. Lawrence says upon this subject that “we can hardly venture to go beyond the statements that ordinary words must be taken in an ordinary sense, and technical words in a technical sense, and that doubtful sentences and expressions should be interpreted by the context so as to make the treaty homogeneous and not self-contradictory. But when states get into controversy about the interpretation of a treaty they often make a new agreement, clearing up the disputed points in the way that seems most convenient at the time, which is not always the way pointed out by the strict rules of interpretation.” 1
In regard to the order of the execution of a treaty, it is generally considered that the special provisions take precedence over the general provisions, and other things being equal, that the more important matters take precedence over the less important.
When two treaties made between the same states at different times conflict, the later treaty governs, it being made or is supposed to be made in substitution for the former treaty.
When two treaties conflict which have been made with different states at different dates, the earlier treaty governs, it being unfair to violate an engagement made with one party by a later agreement made with another party without the consent of the first. (Russia and Treaty of San Stefano, 1878, vs. Treaty of Paris, 1856.)
Perpetual treaties.—The question of continuous obligations of treaties, especially of treaties of long or perpetual duration, has been one extensively discussed by publicists and statesmen. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty made between the
* Lawrence's Principles of Int. Law, p. 287, 3d edn.