standpoint of international law, theoretically produces the same result in all cases, regardless of who may be the ceding, or the acquiring power. The practical results, however, may differ in a large degree. The effect of the transfer of Porto Rico from Spain to the United States will probably be very different from what the effect would have been if the United States, as the result of the Spanish war had been obliged to cede Long Island, for instance, to Spain. As soon as territory is transferred from one power to another the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the former ceases, and that of the latter attaches; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said in the Florida case already referred to, the inhabitants are subject to such conditions as the new master may mon carrier from responsibility for negligence of his servants, the courts of the United States are not bound by decisions of the courts of the State in which the contract is made. The general maritime law is in force in this country so far only as it has been adopted by the laws or usages thereof. "The law of Great Britain since the Declaration of Independence is a foreign law, of which a court of the United States cannot take notice, unless it is pleaded and proved. "The law of the place where a contract is made governs its nature, obligation and interpretation, unless it appears that the parties when entering into the contract, intended to be bound by the law of some other country. "A contract of affreightment, made in an American port by an American shipper with an English steamship company doing business there, for the shipment of goods there and their carriage to and delivery in England, where the freight is payable in English currency, is an American contract, and gov erned by American law, so far as regards the effect of a stipulation exempting the company from responsibility for the negligence of its servants in the course of the voyage." Some of the other cases in which the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been based upon the Law of Nations as the principles thereof have been determined by that court are: Rose vs. Himeley, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1808, 4 Cranch, 241, MARSHALL, Ch. J. The Nereide, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1815, 9 Cranch, 388, MARSHALL, Ch. J. The Pizarro, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1817, 2 Wheaton, 227, STORY, J. The Santissima Trinidad, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1822, 7 Wheaton, 283, STORY, J. The Antelope, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1825, 10 Wheaton, 66, MARSHALL, Ch. J. Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1812, 7 Cranch, 116, MARSHALL, Ch. J. And see also the cases involving rights of Indians and construction of treaties with Indians cited under § 417, notes, pp. 223 et seq., post. impose.1 The sovereignty and jurisdiction of the acquiring power is necessarily exclusive and the "new master" in imposing the conditions cannot be controlled by the former sovereign, except so far as stipulations have been made in the treaty of cession itself. Even as to these there is doubt whether they are binding upon the courts in protecting inhabitants of the ceded territory if the legislature of the acquiring territory does not carry them out. As a proposition of international law the persons residing, or owning property, in territory ceded by one power to another are not entitled to indemnity from the ceding power. International law does not allow change of sovereignty to affect private titles and property, and local laws and customs remain unchanged until modified by the new sovereign.3 If the inhabitant, or owner of property, considers the former sovereign preferable to the new, he can so far as he is personally affected remove to other territory of the ceding power, and thus retain his original citizenship. As to his property he can take his personalty with him; if his realty is affected in value by the change of sovereignty there is no legal remedy, as the transfer or relinquishment of sovereignty over territory is a political act of the sovereign and there is no forum in which the citizen or owner of property can maintain an action. The ceding government might indemnify owners of property in territory ceded, or over which sovereignty is relinquished, but it would be a purely voluntary act and the indemnity would have to be fixed either by the legislative power, or by such tribunal as the legislative power clothed with special jurisdiction in regard thereto.5 § 400. 1 Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1828, 1 Peters, 511, MARSHALL, Ch. J. 2 See § 395c, pp. 175, et seq., ante. * See § 395a, p p. 160, et seq., ante. * Treaties of cession have generally contained provisions as to the retention by inhabitants of ceded territory of their citizenship under the former sovereignty even though still residing in the ceded territory, on complying with certain prescribed formalities. This was the case in the recent cessions by Spain to the United States. See Treaty of 1898 in full in INSULAR CASES APPENDIX at end of Volume I. 5 The United States indemnified the owners of property in what was known as the "disputed territory" when it relinquished sover The United States has always taken the position that as to the treatment of, and rights accorded to, the inhabitants of territory ceded to it, the United States must be sole judge and is entirely free from any interference by the former sovereign. When, therefore, the United States has ceded, or relinquished sovereignty over, territory its jurisdiction has forthwith ceased and that of the new sovereign has attached; thus the inhabitants of the territory ceded are relegated to the courts of the new sovereign for protection of their rights, and those courts are bound in the same manner by their local laws and customs as the courts of the United States are bound by the laws and customs of this country. If territory is ceded by one power to another by a treaty containing stipulations as to the treatment of the inhabitants, and the acquiring power disregards or violates such stipulations, it might be proper for the ceding power to intervene on behalf of the inhabitants suffering by reason of such violations, but that would be a high political act and would have to be asserted through the political side of the Government and the right to so intervene could not be judicially determined in the courts of either country. Cessions of territory have been made by the United States on a few occasions, but always as the result of boundary settlements, and as such have been more in the nature of relinquishment of sovereignty over, than actual cession of, the territory, although words of cession have been used. Whether the United States has the power to cede terri eignty over certain territory, which had been considered as parts of Maine and other boundary states, by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, settling the Northeastern boundary. See § 474, pp. 387, et seq., post, and notes thereunder for details in regard to this settlement and indemnity. The indemnity that was paid was the result of congressional appropriation and not judicial determination. In the analytical indices of the various treaty volumes already re ferred to (U. S. Tr. and Con. 1889, and U. S. Treaties in Force, 1899) full lists of all treaties containing stipulations as to boundaries between the United States and Nations owning adjoining territory will be found. Consult also INDEX to this book and the TREATIES APPENDIX at end of this volume, in which all treaties made by United States are arranged alphabetically according to the names of the foreign countries. tory, either belonging to the United States or to one of the States, is largely an academic question. At present there does not seem to be any prospect of its becoming a practical It has been discussed by many writers and reference is made to their views in a subsequent chapter.? one. It is apparent that courts of the United States would have no jurisdiction over questions which might arise from the cession of territory by the United States to other powers or which relate to the effect of the transfer on the inhabitants of the ceded territory so far as the rights of persons and property within the ceded territory are concerned; and therefore the subject is not within the scope of this book. The foregoing is simply the converse of the proposition that at the present time courts in Spain which formerly had Jurisdiction over Porto Rico and the Philippines cannot now enforce their decrees in those Islands, and that a decision by such courts on questions arising since April 11, 1899, affecting the rights of property and persons within such territory would be a mere nullity. If the United States should ever be obliged to cede any of Art. III of the Adams-de Onis treaty of 1819 with Spain (U. S. Tr. and Con. 1889, p. 1016) after describing the then boundary line west of the Sabine river to the Pacific Ocean concludes as follows (p. 1017): "The two high contracting parties agree to cede and renounce all their rights, claims and pretensions, to the territories described by the said line, that is to say: The United States hereby cede to His Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all their rights, claims, and pretensions, to the territories lying west and south of the abovedescribed line; and, in like manner, His Catholic Majesty cedes to the said United States all his rights, claims, and pretensions to any territories east and north of the said line, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, renounces all claim to the said territories forever." By this treaty the United States renounced, or ceded, a large tract which included the whole of Texas, as well as a great deal of the Mexican territory which was ceded to the United States by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 after the Mexican War. The Northeastern boundary was settled by the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842. The Northwestern boundary was settled by the Buchanan-Pakenham treaty of 1846. See TREATIES APPENDIX at end of this volume under Great Britain. The controversy between the United States and Great Britain over the Northeastern boundary is discussed at length in §§ 474 et seq., pp. 387, et seq., of chapter XVI, post See special provisions, however, its territory, or that of any of the States, the burning question will not be the legal power to make the cession, but the lack of physical power to retain the territory. Fortunately it will not be necessary for us to cross that river until we reach it. in Article XII of the Treaty of 1898 | case arose." The Treaty of 1898 is with Spain, as to the judicial de- printed in full in the INSULAR crees in pending cases and for their CASES APPENDIX at end of volexecution by the "competent auume I. thority of the place in which the ADDITIONAL CASES ON CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Other cases involving the effect | Sup. Ct. 1899, 175 U. S. 509, Mcof change of sovereignty are: Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. vs. Lowe, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1885, 114 U. S. 525, FIELD, J. Effect of cession from State to United States, and extent of sovereignty transferred. Langdeau vs. Hanes, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1874, 21 Wallace, 521, FIELD, J. Effect of cession on private rights. United States vs. Percheman, followed. Kelly vs. Harrison, N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1800, 2 Johns. Cas. 29, KENT, J. Effect of change of sovereignty on title to real estate. Marsh vs. Arizona, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1896, 164 U. S. 599, BREWER, J. Effect of cession and taxation. Peabody vs. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1900, 175 U. S. 546, PECKHAM, J. Appeal from Court of Private Land Claims. See § 396, p. 181, ante. United States vs. Chavez, U. S. 194 KENNA, J. Appeal from Court of United States vs. Moore, U. S. United States vs. Morant, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1887, 123 U. S. 335, BRADLEY, J. Florida land grant adjudicated. United States vs. Morris, U. S. Cir. Ct. Dist. Col. 1895, 23 Wash. Law Rep. 745, HAGNer, J. United States vs. Pena, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1899; 175 U. S. 500, BREWER, J. United States vs. Pillerin, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1851, 13 Howard, 9, TANEY, Ch. J. United States vs. Sibbald, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1836, 10 Peters, 313, BALDWIN, J. West vs. Cochran, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1854, 17 Howard, 403, CATRON, J. |