Leninists. However, their relations with the orthodox Communists have not always been the smoothest.

The Jacobin leftists include the following: the Movimiento de Ízquierda Revolucionaria and the group which broke away from the Unión Republicana Democrática in Venezuela; the MIR and the Social Progressive Party of Peru; one wing of the Chilean Socialist Party; various Colombian groups, including the Movimiento Gaitanista and various other small factions; one wing of the Uruguayan Socialist Party; the most extreme wing of the Argentine Socialist Party, as well as a number of semi-Trotskyite groups there, and some elements which broke away from ex-President Frondizi's Radical Intransigent Party; a small breakaway group from the Liberación Nacional Party of Costa Rica; the Movimiento Popular Dominicano of the Dominican Republic. This list is not exhaustive, but is indicative of the variety of the groups on the Jacobin left.

The reactions of the orthodox Communists and the Jacobin leftists toward the Sino-Soviet split have been different. The Jacobin left has naturally tended to side with the Chinese. The first reaction of the leadership of the Communist parties was to support the Russians. However, to a greater or lesser degree, both Communists and Jacobin leftists have been split by the Sino-Soviet problem.

The sympathy of the Jacobin leftists for the Chinese arises from several factors. First of all, the leadership and membership of these groups tends to be very young. Hence, they have the rashness of youth, and the willingness to undertake venturesome and irresponsible activities which is often characteristic of youth, the kind of activities which the Chinese tend to encourage. Second, they have no traditional ties to the Soviet Union, and siding with its opponents represents no betrayal of their past. Third, being small groups with no past history of consequence, and no present influence among the masses of the people, the Jacobin leftists are willing to engage in the kind of guerrilla activities and urban terrorism which the Chinese advocate.

In contrast to the Jacobin leftists, the Communist leaders tend originally to side with the Soviet Union. The leadership of these parties tends to be middle aged or older, making them not the kind of people who will take to the hills with enthusiasm. Furthermore, virtually all of the middle-ranking and higher level Communist Party leaders have been trained in the Soviet Union. Particularly the top-ranking ones have looked at the U.S.S.R. throughout their adult lives as the epitome of the kind of society they are trying to establish in their own countries. Finally, the Communist parties have something to lose by launching guerrilla activities and urban terror compaigns. They remain legal in several of the countries, in some have representation in legislative bodies, have more or less influnece in the national labor movements, in a number of cases have sizable amounts of property which could be confiscated. In some countries, too, Communist leaders of working class origin look disparagingly on the young man of upper- and middle-class background who lead the Jacobin left and regard the Jacobins' advocacy of guerrilla activities as dilettantism. Thus in most countries of Latin America, the Communist Party leaders have thrown their support behind the more cautious kind of policy advocated for Latin America by the Russians.

Nonetheless, this comparatively moderate position of the Communist leadership has been challenged within the party ranks. Younger

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elements, particularly among the students, have been much influenced by the Chinese approach and by China's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In part, this is a conflict of generations such as occurs in almost any party. In part, too, it reflects the fact that the young people have not had the training their elders received in Russia, and in contrast in many cases have received training in Cuba.

As a result of these factors, there have been splits in the Communist parties of several countries, and are indications of future divisions in several others. Probably all of the parties will undergo a schism of greater or less importance sooner or later.

The first open split along Sino-Soviet lines took place in Brazil in 1961. A group of leaders, headed by Mauricio Grebols, João Amazones and Pedro Pomer broke away to form a separate party. It took the name Partido Communisto da Brasil, whereas the party they abandoned assumed the name Partido Comuniste Brasileiro. The Prestes party remained the majority group, and worked closely with the regime of President João Goulart.

There is no doubt that the overthrow of Goulart represented a severe defeat for the pro-Soviet Communists, who had followed the policy of trying to infiltrate the Goulart regime rather than to resort to guer rilla warfare. There are indications that a further split in the Prestes party took place as a result of the overthrow of the regime of Goulart fast year. The Rio newspaper "O Jornal" reported on October 20, 1964, that Luiz Carlos Prestes had been removed as secretary general of his party by pro-Chinese elements within his own central committee. Subsequently, I have heard rumors for which I have no confirmation that the ousting of Prestes has brought a complete schism in the party.

The second split in a Communist Party of Latin America took place in Ecuador. Here, the circumstances were rather peculiar. Before the military coup d'etat of a couple years ago, there had appeared a pro-Chinese group challenging the leadership of the pro-Soviet elements controlling the party. The pro-Chinese proclaimed that there would soon be a military coup against the regime of President Carlos Arosemans, who enjoyed Communist support. The party leaders rejected this thesis. As a result, when the coup actually came, the proChinese elements were already in hiding, whereas the pro-Soviet leaders of the party were not, and were rounded up by the new military regime.

The Peruvian Communists have also been split. In January 1954 a pro-Chinese group seized by force the headquarters of the Communist Party and proclaimed that the leaders of the party were expelled. They then established their own authorities for the party. The proSoviet elements fought back, and reorganized their own forces. They continued to control that segment of the labor movement which was under Communist influence. However, the pro-Chinese element is very strong among the country's students, and in a recent congress of the Peruvian Students Federation, a coalition of supporters of President Belcúnde, the Aprista Party and the pro-Soviet Communists was necessary to defeat the candidates of the pro-Chinese group. There have been minuscule splits in the Chilean and Mexican Communist Parties. However, there are indications that the Chilean party is now going through a profound crisis as a result of the defeat of its nominee for the President in last September's election. The Chilean party has been one of the most outspokenly pro-Soviet parties in Latin

America, and has roundly denounced meddling both by the Chinese Communists and Fidel Castro in the internal affairs of the Chilean party. They have strongly supported the idea that it is possible for a pro-Communist regime to come to power through constitutional processes, and have regarded any suggestion to launch guerrilla war in Chile as quixotic.

The September election, which put Christian Democratic nominee Eduardo Frei in the Presidency, represented a major defeat for this position. There is, therefore, a good deal of discontent in the rank and file of the Communist Party, and several of the important regional groups of the party have been taken over by pro-Chinese elements opposed to the present leadership of the party. The further defeat of the Communists in the recent congressional elections will undoubtedly intensify the pressure on the pro-Soviet leadership of the Chilean Communist Party.

The Venezuelan Communist Party presents a special case. It is the one Communist group in Latin America which has put into practice the kind of program for seizure of power which the Chinese advocate. Yet they have managed to keep the support not only of the Chinese party but that of the Soviet Union as well. Nevertheless, there is considerable indication that the Venezuelan party is torn by internal conflict.

Since early 1962 the Communist Party of Veneuzela and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionarie have supported campaigns of guerrilla war in the countryside and terrorism in the cities. At its April 1964 central committee meeting, the Communist Party resolved to continue the guerrilla war, in spite of the fact that violence had not prevented the people from voting in the December 1963 poll. However, there has been a serious controversy within the party since at least early 1963 concerning this problem. Attempts by some of the older leaders of the party to get a national conference to call off the violence campaign was thwarted by younger elements. Since the 1963 election there have been leaders of both the PCV and the MIR who have been urging a return to constitutional activities.

The situation of Castro is of particular significance in Latin America, insofar as the Sino-Soviet split is concerned. Other things being equal, Fidel Castro is the logical leader of the pro-Chinese Communists in the hemisphere. He, after all, has successfully carried out the kind of revolution which the Chinese advocate. Furthermore, the Cuban leaders seem to be convinced that their own regime will not be safe until there is a similar revolution somewhere on the Latin American continent.

However, unfortunately for Castro, other things are not equal. Castro cannot afford to be abandoned by the Russians. They are contributing perhaps $1 million a day to the Cuban economy. Therefore Castro has tended to be equivocal on the Sino-Soviet split. He has tried to maintain his friendship with both sides.

The Cuban United Party of the Socialist Revolution, formed by a merger of Castro's followers, and the old-line Communist Party, was one of the 19 Communist parties-together with the Argentine and Brazilian parties-called together by the CPSU in Moscow at the beginning of March. But Castro has at the same time kept his lines of communication with the Chinese open. He has not participated in any propaganda campaign against either the Chinese or Soviet parties. His party's magazine Cuba Socialisto carefully runs articles from both sides.

The alliance of Castro followers and old-line Communists in the PURSC has not been entirely smooth. Recently, Castro has been purging top-rank Communists from key posts in the administrationthe victims including Carlos Rafael Rodriguez removed from presidency of the Agrarian Reform Institute, and Juan Marinello, removed from presidency of the University of Havana. Whether this signals anything to come on the international plane remains to be seen.

There is little doubt that Castro is caught in a bind in this dispute. He has frequently issued pleas for peace between the two sides, something which he undoubtedly devoutly desires. However, within Latin America, there is little doubt that Častro aspires to be the leader of the Latin American Communist revolution. He has been giving various kinds of support to Chinese-type movements against Latin American regimes. Castro and his associates have also been critical of these Communist elements who have been more prone to follow a peaceful road to power. Maj. Ernesto Guevara has been particularly outspoken in such criticism.

Yet, there has not been any open break between the Cuban leadership and the more pro-Soviet Communist Parties in Latin America. In December 1964 there was held, in Havana, a meeting of representatives of all of the official Communist parties of Latin America, which came out in strong support of the Cuban revolution.

The full impact of the Sino-Soviet split is not likely to be felt in Latin America until either the Chinese or Soviet Party forces the issue to the point at which each national Communist Party has to take a stand. This will force those parties, such as the Cuban one, which have tried to avoid taking a stand, to line up either with the Russian or the Chinese side. At that point that the Chinese will try to bring together those elements within the old-line Communists which support them and the Jacobin leftists to form single disciplined parties which can be part of the worldwide Communist movement led by the Chinese Party. At the same time, the Russians will undoubtedly try to consolidate their hold over these groups which remain loyal to them. Equivocation on this issue will then become a luxury which none of the Latin American Parties can any longer afford.

ADDITIONAL DATA ON EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET SPLIT ON LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

The data on the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on the Latin American Communist Parties is scattered. However, the following information, arranged by country, gives some indication of the nature of this impact. The material is gathered largely from Communist sources and personal correspondence with well-informed Latin Americans.

Latin America

An informal countdown of the Communist Parties of Latin America took place at the East German Party Congress in January 1963. Orlando Millas, of the Chilean Politburo, spoke for those Latin American Parties which sided with the Soviets against "the provocations of the Albanian leaders." He spoke not only for his party, but for those of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica. Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru. Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay. The Venezuelans did not sign this.

Argentina

The Argentina Communist Party is almost completely pro-Soviet. On July 25, 1964, it expressed its solidarity with Moscow, in connection with the calling of the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, in the following terms:

"The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, who pose as the only defenders of the colonial and dependent countries, propose to exclude from the preparatory

organization commission of an international Communist conference, the Communist Parties of Brazil and Argentina, which took an active part in the preparations for the conference of 1960. They are trying in this way to leave Latin America without any representation in this commission."

Bolivia

The Bolivian party's position has been in support of the Soviet party, although the PCB has had to expel a number of leaders who were pro-Chinese in their orientation. The Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario is reported as being more pro-Chinese than the Partido Comunista de Bolivia.

Brazil

There are two Communist Parties in Brazil, at least. The split took place in 1961. Ex-Communist Writer Osvaldo Peralva describes the split in the following terms:

"The Amazonas-Grabois-Pomar group, after dominating important fractions of the party in Rio Grande do Sul, the State of Rio and São Paulo, broke with the party dominated by Prestes (which had decided to call itself Partido Comunista Brasileiro, instead of Partido Comunista do Brazil) and declared itself heir of the latter; that is, of the Partido Comunista do Brasil, and adopted that name. It established its own leadership apart, founded a publishing house 'Edicoes Futuro Ltda,' which brought out the book of Che' Guevera, 'Guerrilla War,' and announced other books, written by Amazonas, Pomar, Grabois, Kalil Chede, Lincoln Oest, and other elements expelled from the party of Prestes, according to announcements in 'Novos Rumos.' The most significant fact is that among the volumes announced was one with the title 'Living Marxism Through Its Masters,' a collection of works of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung. The defiance was clear: Stalin and Mao Tse-tung among the masters of Marxism."

The reaction of the two parties to the overthrow of Goulart was different. The Prestes party called for the Communists to put themselves "in the advance guard of the workers in strikes, in the advance guard of the peasants in the struggle for agrarian reform, and in the advance guard of the Brazilian people which is engaged in resistance."

In contrast, the pro-Chinese party insisted that the fall of Goulart had demonstrated that the pacific road to revolution had failed, and that cooperation with the national bourgeoise around Goulart had been unsuccessful and the only thing that remained was violent revolution.

However, it was also reported that some from the pro-Soviet party had gone over to the idea of violent upheaval and some militants of the party had gone to Cuba for training. One of these was a leader, Luiz Barreira Araujo. At the same time, Lionel Brizola had accepted with open arms the Prestes party as collaborators. (Brizola is a brother-in-law of ex-President Joao Goulart, and former Governor of Rio Grande do Sul.)

The pro-Russian party may have undergone a further split after the fall of Goulart. An article in "O Jornal" of Rio de Janeiro on October 20, 1964, read as follows:

"Sr. Luiz Carlos Prestes was deposed 15 days ago from his post of secretary general of the Communist Party, after a meeting of the central committee of the party, his deposition being interpreted by sources allied with communism ‘as a consequence of discord between the policy of Red China and the line dictated by the Russian C.P.'

"Today comes the news that the substitute for Prestes will be Mario Alves, although he is in jail and doesn't appear in the report of the junta established to run the organization, and the definitive choice of someone to succeed Prestes must be made soon."

Several correspondents in Brazil from whom I have heard in recent months have not been able to confirm this rumor concerning the Prestes party. Chile

The Chilean Communist Party has been strongly on the side of the Russians. It has had public polemics with the Chinese Communist Party. Characteristic of these polemics was the following statement by Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the party, in June 1963:

"If the Communist Party of China considers our position to be erroneous, it could address itself to the central committee of our party, officially presenting to us its point of view or inviting us to a bilateral conversation. This would be the proper procedure. But what has happened is that, disregarding all the norms fixed for interparty relations, it has devoted itself, as has been said, to propagating its erroneous concepts in the ranks of our party, to attempting to influence our