of a limited risk today will only produce a much greater danger tomorrow. This certainly is a requirement of first priority in our relations with Communist China-and will continue to be so for many years to come.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA

For some years the debate has raged on United States policies toward Communist China. Unfortunately, too often this debate has been accompanied by more heat than light. The discussion generally has centered on two basic issues: (1) United States diplomatic recognition of Red China, and (2) the admittance of Communist China into the United Nations.

Some have charged the United States with "isolating" Red China by refusing to establish diplomatic relations with its Communist government. It seems to us that, if Communist China is isolated, it is less because it lacks United States recognition than because its own leaders have sought to build a wall between China and the free world. There is no evidence at present that Peiping is interested in widening its contacts with the United States or that it would accept an exchange of ambassadors with Washington. Therefore, recognition would solve no current problems while almost certainly creating new

ones.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

This subcommittee heard witnesses on both sides of the issue of a United Nations seat for Communist China. The question of Communist China's representation in the United Nations and on the Security Council is part of a large problem, requiring a U.N. Charter revision. But it well may be that the argument on this point is moot since there is little to indicate that Communist China would accept a seat in the U.N. on anything but her own terms. Those terms are not likely to be acceptable even to nations which have sponsored Red China's admission to U.N. membership in the past. Those

terms are:

First, the United Nations resolution of 1950 condemning Chinese Communist and North Korean aggression must be rescinded;

Second, there must be a new U.N. resolution condemning the United States for "aggression" in Korea;

Third, the U.N. must be thoroughly reorganized along line satisfactory to the Red Chinese;

Fourth, the Republic of China and other "imperialist puppets" must be expelled; and

Fifth, Formosa must be "restored" to the control of the mainland regime.

It is apparent from these conditions that Communist China is more interested in belittling and destroying the effectiveness of the United Nations than in belonging to that organization.

U.S. TRADE AND EXCHANGES WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

For those who believe that opening trade with the mainland of China would produce political and commercial benefits for the United States, the experience of Great Britain and France provides a sobering

lesson. Although both maintain diplomatic relations with Peiping, neither of them has found its trade with Communist China particularly advantageous. Red China, on the other hand, benefits a good deal from economic relations with non-Communist nations. Dr. Alexander Eckstein pointed out that foreign trade was a significant factor in helping Communist China get through the critical period following the failure of the "great leap forward." He also estimated that such trade may have been responsible for as much as one-half of China's economic growth during the past decade.

In the future, benefits accruing to Communist China from external trade can be expected to play an important role in the economic development of the mainland-while, conversely, the Western countries will probably derive only marginal economic gains from such exchanges.

Nevertheless, the establishment of economic contacts, even on a very limited and carefully controlled scale, can in time produce desired political objectives by opening the mainland of China to Western influences. Such an eventuality should not be rejected out of hand.

Last year, in our report on the Sino-Soviet conflict, the subcommittee recommended that the United States consider the initiation of limited but direct contact with Red China through cultural exchange activities with emphasis on scholars and journalists. In the ensuing period, the State Department expressed its willingness to allow Chinese Communist journalists to come to the United States. Further, in his appearance before the subcommittee, Secretary of State Rusk said that the United States is now prepared to permit American universities to invite Chinese Communist scientists to visit their campuses.

The Chinese Communists have rebuffed the United States on both initiatives, denouncing them as imperialist tricks. By extending its hand to China in these ways, however, the United States has demonstrated once again that it is not we who have isolated Communist China, but Red China who chooses to isolate itself. As a next step the State Department might continue efforts to expand bilateral contacts such as certain cultural exchanges between the United States and Communist China. The continued refusal by China to participate would not hurt us; it would merely emphasize the xenophobic nature of the Mao regime.

CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions can we draw before finalizing this review of some 580 pages of testimony taken by our subcommittee on U.S. policy toward Asia?

First, it behooves us to acknowledge the fact that Communist China is steadily advancing to the rank of a great world power. As such, she is bound to exert considerable influence on the course of events in Asia-and, in time, on the entire structure of peace and order in the | world.

Second, the Communist regime on the mainland of China appears to be firmly entrenched. In a relatively brief period of less than two decades, that regime has managed to consolidate its control over a nation of some 700 million people-a feat which finds no parallel in more than a century of China's recent, troubled history. The solidarity of the Communist regime, the intimate relationships which exist between the party and the governmental bureaucracy, the centralized control of the countryside achieved through the instrument of some 70,000 communes, and the allegiance of the armed forces—all of those elements, added to the Chinese nation's tolerance of authoritarianism, contribute to the stability of the Communist rule on the Chinese mainland.

Third, judging from those dominant national characteristics which continue to find expression in the attitudes and in the policies of the Mao Tse-tung regime, Communist China is not interested at present in attaining peaceful accommodation with the outside world except on its own terms. Since those terms clash with some of the basic principles developed within the Western World-such as respect for the dignity of the individual, for his and his nation's right to freedom and self-determination, as well as with the national and security interests of the non-Communist countries-continuing friction between Communist China and the outside world is to be expected, and larger conflicts cannot be ruled out.

Fourth, in spite of the enduring quality of the Sino-Soviet split. and of the fact that the Chinese nation has not lived down its hereditary aversion to foreigners-including the Russians we cannot ignore the fact that the two colossi confronting the Western World are bound by ties of common ideology and devotion to the cause of Communist world revolution. In the years to come, these ties may be stretched to the breaking point by the conflicting national interests of those two powers. Also, the ideological impetus, and revolutionary zeal, tend to dissipate over a period of time. Nevertheless, it would be foolish, and extremely risky, for the West to stake its security on the fragile premise that problems in their bilateral relations, and eventual "domestication" of communism, are going to do away with the threat posed by Communist China's, and the Soviet Union's, aggressive designs on the outside world.

Fifth, while we acknowledge the superiority of our vast nuclear military power, and of our highly developed industrial establishment, it seems to us that our country's ability to influence the course of events on the Asia mainland is essentially limited, and will probably tend to decline in the years to come as Communist China acquires more of the attributes of a first-class power. Internally, China offers virtually none of the opportunities which are present, for example, in Eastern Europe, to encourage evolution in the direction of liberalization. Also, on the economic plane, our policy of denying the Chinese the essentials of industrial advancement, while undoubtedly retarding that country's progress toward the goal of industrialization, will not stop it entirely. And, finally, the geographical location of Communist China, her growing power and stature, and her historical position on the continent of Asia, provide her with an in-built advantage over any distant, non-Asian country.

If the above assumptions are valid-and we believe that the weight of the testimony presented to our subcommittee points to that conclusion-how should the United States conduct itself with respect to Communist China?

In attempting to answer that question, we will address ourselves first to the security implications of our policy toward Asia.

In the short run, Communist China's expansionist policies pose a dual threat: on the one hand, to our own military security arrangements in the western Pacific and in the Far East; and on the other hand, to the continuing economic and political development, within the framework of national independence and peaceful cooperation, of the countries on the periphery of the mainland. At present, our military security arrangements in that part of the world not only safeguard our own national interests but also play a vital role in blunting Communist aggression-thus maintaining some semblance of stability in that entire area. However, we seriously question the wisdom and, ultimately, the capacity of the United States continuing, for the next decade or more, to discharge these heavy responsibilities with only marginal assistance and cooperation from our allies in Europe. We believe that the vital interests of the entire Western community of nations are involved here and that there is an urgent need to achieve a greater degree of harmony in our respective approaches to Red China, as well as a more equitable distribution of the burdens of peacekeeping. We therefore urge that the highest priority be accorded to the task of developing effective antidotes to the trend toward separatism which is beginning to characterize the Western industrial countries' relations with, and policies toward, Communist China. The time-tested adage, "United we stand; divided we fall," certainly applies to this situation. And it seems to us that the members of NATO, whose future security and welfare may well depend on developments outside of their region, ought to explore every possibility of approaching the problems of Asia with greater unity than has been in evidence thus far.

In the long run, it appears to us that the achievement of peace and stability in Asia will depend in large measure on the success of our efforts both to discourage Communist aggression and to give the independent countries of that continent-from India and Pakistan on the west, to Japan and Korea on the east-the help and the opportunity

to develop economically, to mature politically and, in time, to esta’ lish viable relations with the mainland of China. It would be shor sighted indeed, unrealistic-not to envision, and hope for, the d velopment of such relations between countries occupying the san continent. It would be equally unrealistic to expect that these goa can be attained unless Communist China is made to realize that aggre sion-through subversion and exported "wars of liberation," or in th form of open conquest-will not go unchallenged.

We come, last, to the present and the immediate future of our rel tions with Asia. Here, once again, we wish to reiterate our belief the our country, while adhering to the commitments outlined above, ough to continue in its endeavors to enlarge our limited peaceful contact with the mainland of China. Thus far, our initiatives in this fiel have met with rebuffs. This should not discourage us. Instea conscious of the terrible price that war has already exacted in our ag we ought to apply our best energies to the search for new approache new peaceful solutions to international tensions and conflicts. Unle we persevere in our determination to do this, the heritage which w will pass on to our children will be sorry indeed.