now the people who follow a boat-race shout 'Stroke,' the name of the first rower, but mean at the same time, though they do not say so, 'Strike out.' All this, however, forms the prelude to language The only. Real language begins, as Aristotle Categories. knew perfectly well, with the sentence, with predication or κατηγορία. The word κατηγορία, and the different forms of it, the famous Categories, have been exposed to many misunderstandings, but their true meaning is neither more nor less than what its name implies, namely predication. This is the sense in which Aristotle first used the word, and it is the sense in which for the present I mean. to use it. Aristotle speaks generally of ten categories (Cat. iv. 1), namely: (1) Ovria, Substantia, Substantive, e. g. horse. (2) Пorov, Quantum, Adjective, quantitative, e. g. two cubits long. (3) Hotóv, Quale, Adjective, qualitative, e. g. white. (4) Пpós T, Ad aliquid, Adjective, relative, e. g. double. (5) Пoù, Ubi, Adverb, local, e. g. in the market. (6) Пoré, Quando, Adverb, temporal, e. g. yesterday. (7) Keiola, Situm esse, Verb, intransitive, e. g. to stand. (8) "Exew, (se) Habere, Verb, intransitive, e. g. to be thus or thus. (9) Пoeiv, Agere, Verb, active transit., e. g. to cut. (10) Пáoɣew, Pati, Verb, passive, e. g. to be cut. Aristotle evidently asked himself, What do we predicate when we form an enunciation? and he naturally took his answer from the Greek language, such as it was spoken in his days. But it is a mistake to imagine that he borrowed the categories from Greek grammars. Grammars and grammatical science hardly existed in his time, certainly not as an independent branch of knowledge. On the contrary, when grammar became separated from logic, grammarians borrowed Aristotle's logical terms, and used them for their own purposes. It is right, therefore, to say that Aristotle borrowed his categories from the Greek language, it is wrong to say that he borrowed them from Greek grammar. After this, everything will be easy and intelligible. In grammar the categories came to be used as the names of what we now call the ten parts of speech, and in that form the framework which had been borrowed from language was handed back, as it were, to the students of language. At a later time, when philosophers looked for the highest genera of things, these categories proved again extremely useful, because it was found that the most general praedicamenta corresponded, as was natural, to the highest genera that could be predicated. Aristotle himself takes the categories as σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, but also as γένη τοῦ ὄντος οι τῶν ὄντων. Lastly, when the question was asked how we came to predicate at all, these categories, though slightly modified by successive philosophers, came in again. as the fundamental concepts of the mind, the Stammbegriffe des Verstandes, the nature of which, whether as the result of repeated experience and generalisation, or as the antecedent sine quâ non of all experience, still continues to be one of the most important subjects of philosophical controversy. Almost every philosopher has amused himself in pointing out flaws or redundancies in Aristotle's table of categories, yet that table is a very wonderful achievement, if only rightly interpreted. Aristotle, speaking and thinking the Greek language, asked himself under how many different heads the words which he himself used in predication could be classified, or how many kinds of predication were to be found in that language which represented to him. all languages, namely Greek. As every sentence consisted of a subject and a predicate, all words might be divided into those which expressed substances, and those which expressed attributes. The first category was therefore that of substance, the predication of ovcía, which gives us Tà ovra, things. We must remember that we do not predicate rò ov, that which is, but that we predicate ovcía, substance, and thus create Tò öv. This is a distinction that has often been overlooked. First Category, The first category is fundamental and stands by itself. All other categories predicate attributes or accidents, and they always presuppose Substance. the first category of ouría, because attributes can be predicated only after the category of ovia has been applied to something which may become the subject of further predication. Grammatically this distinction often seems to vanish, because adjectives may almost always, without any change of form, be used as substantives, and substantives as adjectives. We may use adjectives as substantives, as when we say Sapientes dicunt, Sages say; but here homines, men, is under stood. We may use substantives as predicates, as when we say Bucephalus is a horse,' but in that case horse does not predicate substance, ovcía, but quality, oor. It is, in fact, an adjective in disguise. It means that Bucephalus has all the attributes of a horse, or belongs to the class of things signified by the name of horse. Equus is used instead of equinus. But when I say hic equus est albus, equus, horse, could not be replaced by equinus. Equus here predicates ovcía, substance, it refers to an ov, a thing; it is a true substantive, the name of something substantial. Categories ii-iv. While then the first category predicates ovoía or substance of something which thus becomes an ov, a thing, all the other categories are meant to predicate something of the ov. If we say that the horse is six feet high,' or better, if we say, 'the horses are five in number,' we predicate a Torov, or quantum. If we say the horse is strong, we predicate a Totóv or quale. If we say the horse is stronger than the mule, we predicate a Tρós T, an ad aliquid, a relation. These three categories which differ essentially from the first, in so far as they predicate something of something, while the first category names something of which attributes can be predicated, differ but slightly among themselves. The quantum differs from the quale, because it simply counts, while the quale defines or qualifies, and the ad aliquid may be explained as qualifying with reference to something else, not only when we actually use a comparative, but also when we speak, for instance, of the master, i.e. of a servant, or of a servant, i. e. of a master. Time. The next two categories refer to space and time. Categories They have been called adverbial, but it of Space and would be equally correct to describe them as declensional, for they are generally conveyed by the cases of nouns, excepting the nominative and vocative, both of which have really no right to be called cases or Twσes in the philosophical meaning of that word1. The verbal The last four categories are realised in the verb. If we take the ninth category first, we Categories. see that it is expressed by active transitive verbs, such as 'I dig the ground,' 'I cut the wood.' The tenth is the passive, and of course, intransitive verb, I am struck,' I am loved.' The seventh category is active, but intransitive, such as 'I move,' 'I walk,' 'I shake,' I fear,' I stand,' where the action remains in the agent, without necessarily going out towards something else, that is, where the verb is intransitive. The most difficult category of all is the eighth. It likewise comprises intransitive verbs, but verbs which express, not an act, but a passive status or habitus, what Aristotle expresses by ἔχειν or ἕξις, as in kaks exeu, Old Germ. ubil haban, and illustrates by ὑποδέδεται and ὥπλισται, i. e. he is shod, 'he is armed.' . Other interpreters, however, take exe not in the sense of se habere (sich verhalten), but of habere, though they do not explain how Aristotle could have illustrated that category by modédεтαι 1 If Sanskrit grammarians exclude not only nominative and vocative, but the genitive also from the name Kâraka, this is because they think of it chiefly as predicative or as yevкý. |